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ABSTRACT
• This thesis aims to dispel the prevalent Western notion of a
monolithic dissident movement within the Soviet Union. Doctrinal
dispute among individual dissenters reveals an entire philosophical
spectrum within the movement itself.
To prove that the dissident movement is variegated, we have
compared the political thought of three prominent Soviet dissenters—
Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Andrei Sakharov, and Andrei Amalrik. Writings
of each thinker have been examined to reveal a lively debate over
subjects such as the viability of socialism, the future of Russia, and
the wisdom of detente.
Solzhenitsyn emerges as a Christian ideologist in the 19th
century Russophile vein. Sakharov starts from a neo-Marxist perspec
tive in the late 1960's, only to discard the socialist label in 1975
in favor of liberalism and internationalism. Amalrik serves as a
prophet who foretells Russia's doom. He is less analytical, more
visceral In his dissent than Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. These men
sustain a political dialogue which engages other dissidents such as
Roy Medvedev and Vladmiir Bukovsky. Despite their differences,
however, the dissidents are united in their support of basic human
rights.
The thesis ends by suggesting that an emasculated political
movement is the price dissidents pay for fidelity to their ideals.
Espousing toleration and free discussion in the face of Party decree,
the dissidents practice these same qualities among themselves and
undermine their movement's unity. An emerging dissident movement may
hint at growing pluralism within Soviet society. Discord among dis
sidents reveals much pluralism within the movement itself, thus laying
to rest one Western misconception.

DISCORD AND UNITY:
SOVIET DISSIDENT THOUGHT

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Context and Relevance
Let ns start from the premise that no government ever commands
the unanimous support of its citizenry.

Dissent is ubiquitous, not in

the sense that some regimes govern entirely disloyal populations, but
rather in the sense that some opposition can be found within any
state.

1

One would not expect even the most dictatorial regime to be

free of disaffected elements, however miniscule or concealed.

Given

the soundness of this premise, the study of political dissent in the
Soviet Union is clearly justified.

This is not to say that if dissent

■was rare, then studying it in the Soviet Union would be an illegitimate
endeavor.

But if dissent was merely a sporadic phenomenon, the Soviet

Union would be the last place where we would expect to find it.
Since the short-lived, cultural thaw following Stalin's death
in 1953y the Soviet leadership has reacted to political dissent in an
indecisive manner.

Steering a course between Stalinist terror and

unrestrained liberalization has been the awkward task of the Georgian's
successors.

Even Nikita Khrushchev, who initially repudiated Stalin’s

harshness, retracted the policy of cultural toleration once he saw the
excesses committed in the name of the thaw.
opposition had been simple.

Stalin’s answer to

Few were in the voices that bullets,

2

3beatings3 and prisons could not silence.

Yet such policies* though

decisive in their time^ were rejected by Khrushchev in 1956.

When

Khrushchev later wished to rein in the forces he had unleashed* no
alternate course was readily available.

In the late 1950's and early

1960's ., Soviet intellectuals were in the uncomfortable position of not
knowing just how much they could complain without inviting reprisals.
Khrushchev’s heirs offered a partial answer in early 1966.

Two

writers, Andrei Sinyavsky and Yuli Daniel* were convicted of violating
2
Article 70 of the Soviet Constitution.
Specifically* Daniel and
Sinyavsky were accused of having pseudonymous ly written anti-Soviet
articles which later appeared in Western bourgeois publications.

For

this crime* the men were sentenced to labor camps for five to seven
3 •
years.
A few prominent intellectuals objected to the trials fearing
that it presaged a return to Stalinist intolerance.

Sympathetic

writers issued protest letters., formed defense committees3 and secretly
Ij.
circulated the trial’s transcript.
All of this may now seem mild* but
in Stalin’s time such insolence was suicidal.

Many observers now

believe the trial heralded the first steps of cultural de-Khrushchevization undertaken by the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership.

Above all* the

post-1966 era has witnessed the development in Russia of what may be
called a dissident movement.
For numerous reasons one may justifiably refer to a dissident
movement.

Ideologically * this ’’political counterculture” embraces'many

common causes.

Except for a few underground neo-Stalinist and fascist

groups* nearly all dissidents esteem spiritual and moral values3 oppose
injustice and conformity., and desire a larger measure of legality in

government action.

But this point should not be overdrawn* as it

often has been in the West* to say that there are no major differences
among dissidents's ideas.

Many prominent scientists* artists* and

writers are aware of the radical nature of their views.

Members of the

dissident community are attentive to each other's thoughts and are
7
accustomed to informally discussing taboo subjects.
If political
theory consists of reasoned discourse through time* then dissent
occupies its own niche within the study of political philosophy.
Unsanctioned political discourse has surfaced in the Soviet Union.

All

three thinkers analyzed herein— Alexander Solzhenitsyn* Andrei
Sakharov* and Andrei Amalrik— engage in political dialogue.

Even

before his exile* Solzhenitsyn maintained a lively correspondence with
Sakharov.

Sakharov has critiqued Solzhenitsyn's ideas* and the

novelist has responded in kind.

Sakharov has organized a Human Rights

Committee which has as its aim the protection of fellow dissidents.
Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov are co-editors of Kontinent * an emigre
journal of East-West relations.

Amalrik has protested at political

trials* and has appraised the views of other dissidents.

By means of

circulated letters* petitions* samizdat (secretly self-published
writings)* and informal contacts* the dissident movement has formed
and has maintained a remarkable degree of cohesion.

Still* one must

remember that such cohesion falls short of unanimity.
Increased publicity has thus produced In the 1970’s a
situation where the importance of the dissident movement transcends
the domestic realm.

The existence of a dissident current beneath the

ideological mainstream now has international political ramifications.

5.
Western nations have developed a keener interest in human rights in the
Soviet Union.

For example, the 19 7U Jackson Amendment to the Trade

Reform Act conditioned favorable trade terms on increased Soviet
toleration of emigration requests.

Adherence to the 1975 Helsinki

Agreement on European Security would presumably result in greater
Q

freedom of expression within the USSR.

Private groups such as Amnesty

International monitor the observance of basic human rights within the
Soviet Union.

Valentin Turchin, the director of Amnesty International's

Moscow chapter, believes that his findings help determine Western .
policies toward the Soviet Union.

9

Attempts to cow dissidents

jeopardize the entire detente relationship between the US and the USSR.
Recent diplomatic skirmishes over Soviet threats to Andrei Sakharov
dramatize the fact that toleration of dissent is now key to gauging
10

the status of East-West relations.

Additionally, much evidence shows that dissidents articulate
views held by many other people within Russia.

Though Khrushchev was a

patron of Solzhenitsyn until 19&2, it is doubtful that the
Brezhnev-Kosygin regime favors any innovative writer.

Nonconformists

seem to have only a marginal influence on the Kremlin's decision-making
process. Yet dissidents probably reflect the opinions of a larger
number of citizens, and these renegades may thus "represent and enhance
an important, but suppressed potential for political change."

11

For

instance, evidence indicates that most talented Soviet writers support
Solzhenitsyn's attacks on censorship.
applaud Sakharov's liberalism.

13

12

Many Soviet scientists secretly

British journalist Henry Fairlie notes

that Soviet dissidents are no longer ’’treated as individuals with a
personal case against their governments, but as representatives of a
wider caus e .”^ ■
Analyzing the political thought of modern Soviet dissidents
may thus complement innumerable studies of political elites. Tapping
this subterranean current of political thought may lend clues
concerning the direction of and prospects for change in the Soviet
Union.

Given the absence of opinion polls conducted among Soviet

citizens, studying dissident thought offers a way to gauge roughly the
content of political attitudes below the elite level.
Anyone interested in both Soviet studies and political theory
has usually concentrated on the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism.
Until 1960’s, this preoccupation was understandable since bold
dissidents were silenced before their pleas reached Western ears.
Interest in the official ideology siphoned off energy that might have
been directed toward dissident studies. With the emergence of an
opposition movement in the 1960’s, however, the conventional view of a
monolithic Soviet society became outdated.

Open dissent may portend

the emergence of pluralism within Soviet society.

No longer does all

political action and thought answer to the state’s beck and call.

Our

aim is to evidence these faint signs of pluralism and also to dispel
another conventional view of a monolithic dissident movement. To this
end, the thesis may offer insights to the emerging, but heretofore
relatively untouched, field of dissident studies•
Divisions between domestic and foreign affairs are increasingly
blurred in an age of economic interdependence and instantaneous

communication.

This development offers a wider audience to dissidents

and removes their cause from the sole realm of internal politics.
Few will deny that domestic opposition to the Soviet regime has
become more vocal, dissent more publicized, and toleration a more
important determinant of East-West relations.

But if a study of

political opposition is to be purposeful, one should analyze the
meaning of the term "dissident.”
Components of Dissidence
Like many other concepts, dissidence is a culturally-determined
phenomenon.

What constitutes a radical critique for one government or

society may be relatively mild for another.

When a state claims a

monopoly over all political thought, any criticism of the status quo by
the political "outs” constitutes dissent.
concept.

Dissent is not an indefinable

General criteria of dissidence are available and common themes

emerge from dissident writings.

Yet one must begin a study of political

dissent by acknowledging that there is no foolproof standard for
identifying such discourse.

Conclusions regarding the components of

dissidence are impressionistic.

Again, this is not to argue that terms

such as "dissent" and "dissidence" are devoid of meaning or are totally
relativistic. Classification admits a degree of subjectivity and room
for reasonable dispute.

To recognize dissidence, one must identify

certain norms established by a particular government.

Since in many

societies these standards are veiled and only implicit in government
policy, absolute precision in defining such norms is elusive.
When a government explicitly and continually endorses certain
values, however, phrases such as "political dissent" become less

slippery.

Identifying dissent is easier -when a government reiterates

the norms upon -which it is based and upon -which it professes to act.
This is the approach available to the student of Soviet political
dissent.

The Soviet regime claims to adhere to the thoughts and

writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

16

Soviet institutions and

policies are supposedly modeled on this ideology.

A few generalizations

regarding Soviet political dissent may now be hazarded.
First, one may say that, in the Soviet Union, dissent includes
a rejection of Marxism and Leninism.

The writings of these thinkers are

the purported basis of the Soviet state and constitute one standard by
which governmental policies are judged.

Acceptance, or at least the

toleration, of this ideology represents an obvious norm.

Criticism of

this ideological foundation is no trivial matter to the powers that be,
for it strikes at the heart of the regime's raison d' 'etre. This may
not hold for East Europe, where some communist states tolerate
"revisions" or reinterpretations of the Marxist creed.

But while a

revisionist tradition runs through the recent political history of East
Europe, the term "revisionist" remains a label of opprobrium in the
Soviet Union.

As such, divergence from this state-supported norm

constitutes political dissent.

All states assert a monopoly over

legitimate violence, but the Soviet leaders covet a monopoly over
acceptable social thought as well.

17

Ideological currents other than

Marxism-Leninism— religion, avant-garde art, local nationalism— -are
tolerated only insofar as they do not in the slightest way challenge
the regime's interpretation of the official creed.

No contending

thoughts are granted enough autonomy to question this ideology.

Persons

or groups seeking such a degree of independence are properly called
dissidents.

Any deviation from the Party line (presumably the

embodiment of Marxism-Leninism) is thought to be dangerous.

Trans

lated literally, the Russian word for "dissident" (inakomyslyashchie)
means "one who thinks differently," giving some indication of the
pressure for conformity.^
Secondly, those who openly object only to the regime's
policies, without attacking the theoretical underpinnings, may also
be called dissidents.

One cannot criticize particular governmental

actions without questioning the legitimacy of the entire regime.

In

communist thought, theory and practice are necessarily connected.
Poor theories must lead to incorrect actions.
placed on ideological purity.

Hence much emphasis is

Conversely, unsuccessful policies

presumably indicate incorrect ideas.

19

In the leadership's eyes, one

cannot protest the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, the jailing of
dissidents, or the feud with China without, by implication, ques
tioning the theoretical basis of the Soviet order.

Critics of

particular policies must be stifled before the focus of questioning
turns toward the state's legitimacy.

As Valentin Moroz, a Ukrainian

»

dissident e:xplains: "It is very important to silence the man who first
cries out, 'the King is naked,' before others pick up the cry."

20

Criticism of Stalinism might be an exception to this
principle, but even this has been checked as Khiushchev's successors
21
have subtly rehabilitated the old vozhd.
One may thus apply the term
"dissident" to anyone who criticizes specific Kremlin policies.
Though each successive ruling group has recently denounced its

10.
predecessor for betraying Marxism-Leninsm, this type of criticism
toward an existing regime is unthinkable.

Khrushchev's criticism cf

Stalin and Brezhnev's rebukes toward Khrushchev cannot therefore be
classified as dissent.

Whoever rules claims that his predecessor

misapplied Marxism, but he never admits the possibility that he him
self might repeat the mistake.

The illogic inherent in this reasoning

was one reason why many communist leaders thought Khrushchev's "secret
speech" to be a blunder.
Official statements of the regime offer a third way to decide
who is or is not a dissident.
to the student.

In this respect the Kremlin is helpful

Those who criticize either the regime's ideology or

policies are called traitors, reactionaries, hooligans, and a host of
other epithets.

Individuals attempting to weather criticism by not

recanting their views are vilified in Pravda and Izyestia, the
Party- and state-controlled newspapers. Both publications are
available to Westerners. Subversive persons are often sent to work
camps, deported, confined in psychiatric prisons, or are harassed.
Code words thus appear in the Soviet press and serve as signs to
identify dissents.
Fourth, admissions of those who dissent supplement official
pronouncements.

Not only does the Soviet press consider certain persons

to be dissidents, but these same people often acknowledge the radical
nature of their views.

That an individual considers himself a

dissident is of no small significance, given the high price of such
candor.

Dissenters need not remain in the Soviet Union in order to

retain their role.

Indeed, two of the dissidents analyzed herein are

11

.

now ^rnigr^s whose deportation signifies their troublesomeness to the
regime.

Exile merely renders the dissident less subject to reprisal.

The dialogue continues, albeit outside the Soviet Union.

Exiled Czech

dissident Ludek Pachman insists that banished intellectuals are not
powerless since "their weapon is truth."

22

The dissident is conscious of his status and of the role he
plays.

Russian dissidents, Solzhenitsyn notes, do not oppose power

with force, but rather combat injustice with reason.
places himself in the midst of the struggle.

23

Solzhenitsyn

Similarly, Sakharov

admits that his opinions are controversial but he accepts this as the
price of frank discussion.^

Historian Andrei Amalrik contests the

notion of gradual progress, debunking one of the regime's most
cherished myths.

2^

By the personal admission of each thinker, the

term "dissident" is applicable.

Though the bases for dissent

frequently differ, personal admissions offer a fourth criterion of
dissidence.
Insistence on ideological conformity is not limited to
politics.
true.

Gogol's lament that "everything is politics here" still holds

Certain literary norms, the violation of which indicates

dissidence, are espoused by the Soviet regime and enforced by its
literary vicars.
realism.

Writers must adhere to the canons of socialist

Developed by Maxim Gorky in the 1930's and codified by

Andrei Zhdanov in the 19U0's, socialist realism aims to describe the
"New Soviet Man" produced by the socialist order.

Avoiding "decadent"

Western themes, socialist realism aims to describe man not only as he is
now, "but also as he must be— and will be— tomorrow."

26

Literature is

12.
judged by a utilitarian, rather than aesthetic standard.

The notion of

"art for art’s sake" is rejected as a vestige of bourgeois mentality.
Accordingly, literary characters must express socialist values and,
for instance, extol production quotas.
Creative unions are charged -with the task of maintaining
literary conformity.

27

Renegade writers soon discover that their works

are either excluded from or criticized in Literaturnaya Gazeta, the
official organ of the Soviet Writers’s Union.

Another literary journal,

Novy Mir, while traditionally a bit more liberal, must also accept the
official norms.

Most important of all is the judgement of Glavlit, the

state’s censorship watchdog.

Writers quickly learn that certain

subjects are taboo: anything presenting Czarism or the West in a
favorable light; criticisms of the Party line or official versions of
28
history; and works on disgraced personalities.

Uoncompliance usually

results in expulsion from the Union of Soviet Writers.
becomes difficult and risky.
be classified as a dissident.

Publishing then

Anyone writing samizdat material may thus
29

The fact that each man discussed herein

has produced samizdat writings reinforces their dissident status.
The scientific realm is no different.

Independent scientists

who incur official ire invite various reprisals. Expulsion from the
USSR Academy of Sciences is a constant threat.

Dissident scientists

are denied access to classified information, prevented from attending
foreign scientific conferences, and are barred from travelling abroad
for any reason.

Publishing privileges are also revoked.

Public attitudes offer a sixth way to determine who is or is
not a dissident.

To most Westerners, the phrase "Soviet dissident"

13.

brings to mind the names of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov.

30

Undoubtedly,

the notoriety of these two men has been enhanced by Western press
coverage and by their reception of various Nobel Prizes. Sakharov has
long been known as nthe father of the Soviet H-bomb.M Amalrikfs exile
in 1976 received thorough press coverage in the West.
ception is certainly not a foolproof standard.

Public per

To the extent is

corroborates other indications of dissidence, however, public
perception is a useful measure.

There are now probably few, if any,

vocal dissidents who are unknown in the West.

Since the writers

discussed herein are considered by those both within and outside of the
Soviet Union to be nonconformists, one may call these men dissidents.
Each thinker to be considered meets all of the preceding six
criteria i Each man shares a questioning attitude toward Marxism-Lenin
ism.

Each man has criticized certain government policies, and each has

been accordingly vilified.

None of these men deny that they are dissi

dents and few observers would deny them this status.
Aims and Methods
This thesis’s purpose is to compare, contrast and critique the
political thought of three modern Soviet dissidents.

Essentially a

study in comparative political thought, this thesis will not try to
identify a representative dissenter, for no one case is typical.

Our

purpose is to distill from writings, speeches, and interviews various
political philosophies and to examine doctrinal differences among the
dissidents.

Analysis is limited to these three men since they are

prolific, articulate, and well-known.

These thinkers directly or

indirectly speak to each other by addressing common themes. More than

1U*
any other dissidents, these men engage in a genuine political dialogue.
Perhaps other dissidents could be examined in addition to or in place
of the ones studied herein.
arbitrariness.

Selection inevitably invites charges of

Reasonable choices must be made nevertheless, in the

interests of intelligibility and manageability.
The political writings of the relevant authors will serve as
the primary sources for this study.

Most of these works were orig

inally pieces of samizdat. Other volumes, such as Solzhenitsyn’s
Warning; to the West, encompass dissenting views which exile has not
silenced.

Most of the writings of Sakharov and Amalrik directly

address political themes.
Solzhenitsyn, of course, is a prolific novelist as well.
This presents no major problem since particular fictional works may
shed light on Solzhenitsyn's political thought.

This task is not

accomplished by matching a fictional character to an author’s
presumed sentiment.

Taken in their entirety, Solzhenitsyn's novels

and plays supplement the political themes offered in his more
polemical works.- Instead of trying to guess which character speaks
for the author, the serious student can find in Solzhenitsyn’s
fiction many themes relevant to political thought: the problem of
moral choice; the proper aims of government; and the role of ideology
and values, for example
Solzhenitsyn encourages attempts to seek political insights
in his literature.

In a 196? interview with the Czech correspondent

Pavel Licko, Solzhenitsyn stated that
. . . b y intuition and by his singular vision of

15.
the world, a writer, is able to discover far earlier
than other people aspects of social life and can
often see them from an -unexpected angle. . .
It is incumbent upon the writer to inform society
of all that he is able to perceive and especially
all that is unhealthy and cause for anxiety.31
Nearly a decade later, this view is unchanged.
To fight against untruth and falsehood, to
fight against an ideology which is hostile to man
kind, to fight for our memory of what things were
like— that is the task of the artist.3^
Harvard’s Adam Ulam argues that many of the ideas expressed in
Solzhenitsyn’s political tracts are developed thematically in the
dissident’s literature as well.
Most Westerners indiscriminantly lump all Soviet dissidents
together, ignoring important differences between them.3^

This con

ventional view is unrealistic, as this thesis will try to prove.

The

early 1970’s were unique for Soviet society as various dissidents began
to debate about their country’s future.

But Solzhenitsyn’s sudden

exile probably overshadowed the significance of this dialogue.

Herein

lies one cause of the popular misconception regarding a monolithic
dissident movement.

Uncovering (but not exaggerating) points of

dissonance within the dissident movement is this thesis’s aim.

Hypotheses and Categories
We may now consider some bases for comparison between
dissident political theories.
starting point.

Intellectual freedom is an obvious

Predictably, a dissident will desire an increased

amount of intellectual license and expression.
questioning the reasons underlying this view.

One is justified in
How do dissidents

analyze the tension between the one and the many in a political

16.
society?

Are dissidents willing to limit the claims of either?

assumptions undergird this desire for personal freedom?

'What

Can the present

role of the Coirmrunist Party be reconciled with more artistic autonomy?
What exactly is meant by the phrase, ”intellectual freedom”?

The

topic of personal .liberty must be discussed if the concept of dissidence •
has any meaning.
A related topic worthy of treatment is the legitimacy of the
Soviet regime.

As has been noted, opposition to the official ideology

is a key component of dissidence.

Presumably, each dissident harbors

views which vary from the Party line.
Soviet political system?
logical perspective?

Why do these men object to the

Does their criticism reveal its own ideo

Are objections rooted in particular policies or

do they extend to an abhorrence of the regime1s ideology?
men evolutionists, reformers, or revolutionaries?
political system desirable?

Are these

Is a multiparty

Do dissidents distinguish between Russian

and Soviet national attributes?

Answers to these questions will be

examined and critiqued.
In his essay on man in revolt, Albert Camus argued that
rebellion necessarily involves both negation and affirmation.
rebel says ”no” to the old order and ”yes” to a new vision.

35)

The^

Thus, if

one discovers dissension within Soviet society, one must also seek some
alternative to the past. Criticism of the Soviet regime is thus
inseparable from the issue of Russia’s future.

What would dissidents

put in the place of the present Soviet structure?
an alternate vision?

Do they even offer

Are such visions realistic or utopian?

models have any substantive faults of their own?

Do these

What might be some

17practical consequences of these schemes?

Does Russia bear a special

mission among the family of nations?
The Stalin era also deserves special attention.

"Stalinism11

refers to the brand of Soviet communism practiced during Stalin’s rule
from 1928 to 1953-

Features characterizing this rule include

agricultural collectivization, an emphasis on heavy industry, extensive
use of terror to achieve political ends, and authoritarian and
personalized rule.

All of the dissidents to be analyzed lived through

some part of the Stalin period.
nothing short of traumatic.

In many cases, the experience was

An indication of Stalinism’s importance

to dissidents is the amount of energy they devote to its discussion.
One may thus justifiably examine the dialogue surrounding Stalin.
Does Stalin merit the suffix "ism”.? Why do dissidents single out
Stalin’s rule for special criticism?

Is Stalinism a perversion of

humane Marxism or the predictable product of an intolerant and
hate-filled ideology?

Does Stalinism offer any legacy?

Does the end

of Stalinism portend any liberalization of domestic policies?
Equally pertinent is the role of the intelligentsia in the
Soviet Union.

Modern Russian history has produced a series of intel

lectuals possessing a special sense of noblesse oblige. Dating from
the abortive ’’back to the people’’ or Narodnik movement of the late 19th
century, the Russian intellectual has tried to represent the conscience
of the masses.

A deep sense of commitment to the common people has

characterized this class’s thinking.

The intelligentsia’s tradition

is thus closely linked to the theme of Russian populism.

37

Intel

lectuals have sensed for themselves a special mission of responsibility.

18.
l/\Jhile Lenin envisioned the Party as serving as the vanguard of the pro
letariat, the intelligentsia historically has seen itself as the
vanguard of all the common folk, not just the industrial workers.
Membership in the intelligentsia is largely a matter of self-identifiO
cation. The term usually includes scholars, artists, and students.
One may thus ask whether m o d e m dissidents, ostensible members of the
intelligentsia, envisage any special role for themselves in reforming
the status quo.
In turn, one may examine how these dissidents view the West.
Russian political thought has traditionally exhibited a love-hate
attitude toward the West.

Periodic swings between an admiration for

and an aversion toward the West reflect this almost schizophrenic
trait. 39

Some Russians have viewed the West as a progressive society,

the standard by which Russian endeavors are measured.

Other Russian

thinkers have equated the West with decadence and disorder.

In the

late 19th century, the tension between these perspectives polarized
the intelligentsia into factions representing Slavophilism and Western
ization.

The dissident’s views of the West are important, for they

sustain a prominent theme in Russian intellectual history.
dissidents view the West?
warning to Russia?

How do the

Is the West a model, a mirror-image, or a

Does the West play any role in dissident schemes for

Soviet liberalization?

Do the dissidents fall into the classic molds

of Slavophilism and Westernization?

Since two of the dissidents are now

emigres living in the West, the changes in their views regarding the
occidental world are also notable.
Additionally, the issue of East-West relations is important

since these relations have global, not merely regional repercussions.
Certain questions must be asked.

What do these dissidents see as the

optimal relationship between the Soviet Union and the Western world?
Do they suggest returning to a more confrontationist or Cold War
policy?

Do dissidents favor the policy of detente?

Do they support a

more comprehensive partnership, or entente, with the "West?

Is Russia’s

salvation to be found in introspection or in greater involvement with
the world community?

What bearing does the West’s future have on

Russian political development?

Do any historical or natural ties link

the Soviet Union and the United States?

How might the Sino-Soviet rift

affect Russia’s future?
Perhaps other categories will develop in the course of research.
Wo effort will be made to force a thinker into a pre-existing category
if such a classification is unwarranted.

Examples of political

opposition in the Soviet Union have been so rare that the modern
dissident dialogue bears Importance that transcends the contemporary.
The dialogue represents a reoccurring phenomenon in Russian intel
lectual history.

One may now question Dahl's classification of the

Soviet Union as a ’’pure hegemony”^
to a ’’subversive opposition.”^

and accept Barghoorn’s references

A political countertradition survives,

often at its own peril, within the Soviet Union.

The dissident move

ment is much more variegated than most Westerners care to admit.

United

by some common values, Soviet dissidents nevertheless exhibit some
doctrinal discord within their own ranks.

It is thus appropriate to

begin our study with" perhaps the most controversial and seminal
dissident— Alexander Isaevich Solzhenitsyn.
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CHAPTER II
SOLZHENITSIN: POLITICS OF
SUFFERING AND LIMITATION
Frequently praised, selectively read, Alexander Solzhenitsyn
remains an enigma to many Westerners. Self-styled conservatives hail
him as a symbol of freedom.

Fashionable liberals view him merely as an

anachronism or a primitive reactionary.

Without doubt, the West has

tended to suppress those political ideas of Solzhenitsyn deemed embarrassing to conventional thought.

1

Thus have his political views been

dismissed as the rantings of an unbalanced anti-communist or as the
nostrums of a gifted author but naive political analyst.
claims are as dangerous as they are false.

Yet these

Instead, our thesis is that

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as a Soviet dissident and Russian emigre, is a
profound political theorist.

Our aim is not to pigeonhole Solzhenitsyn

into some ideological niche, but to identify, 'discuss, and evaluate
the most prominent political themes in his writings.

No one chapter,

thesis, or book could exhaustively represent the breadth of his vision.
Nor does any definitive interpretation of his philosophy exist.

Serious

consideration of Solzhenitsyn the political thinker is long overdue and
is the task undertaken in the following pages.

In his writings,

Solzhenitsyn offers a political vision that is both timeless and timely.
Support for our view that Solzhenitsyn is a profound political
thinker in his own right lies in analyzing his speeches and writings.
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Let us begin, therefore, by discussing the subject that is
Solzhenitsyn1s interest, life and,, if you will, obsession.
Soviet Tyranny
Solzhenitsyn examines the Soviet political system at many levels,
starting with its theoretical basis.
Marxism
Though he was once a devout Marxist, Solzhenitsyn now has
nothing but contempt for this philosophy.
as a predictive tool, is useless.

He believes that Marxism,

Contrary to Marx's prophecies,

those nations that are most -underdeveloped are most susceptible to
upheaval.

Highly developed societies, presumably the most fertile

grounds for revolution, have been largely free of proletarian unrest.
Moreover, in those underdeveloped nations that have experienced
revolution, the crises have not been caused by worker grievances.

The

Russian Bolshevik coup was led, not by the alienated industrial
laborers, but by selected members of the intelligentsia and the
petit-bourgoisie.
peasant revolution.

Industrial workers played virtually no role in Mao's
Marx’s prediction has been stood on its head, has

failed the test of historical experience, yet the ideology still in
sists on somehow being "scientific.”
Aside from this, Solzhenitsyn sees Marxism as a reductionist
theory which purports to explain the complexity of human life using
2
the one factor of economics.

But not everything in life is deter

mined by material conditions or by the relationship between labor and
ownership.

Impulse, irrationality, ideals— these elements are as

27.
important as economic causes in shaping history.

Marxism claims to

offer the one and only definitive analysis of history.
punctures this pretension.

Solzhenitsyn

In Cancer Ward, Solzhenitsyn's alter ego,

Oleg Kostoglotov says that "nothing is decided once and for all, for
3
life ■would then cease."
This is a rebuff, not just to the pretensions
of the Russian Revolution, but to the "definitive" presumptions of
Marxist thought.^
Marx's analysis of society in terms of economic classes also
draws fire from Solzhenitsyn. Persons from certain backgrounds are
"objectively" bourgeois.
tality.

Corruption is a vestige of bourgeois men

Not only is this an absurd generalization, Solzhenitsyn

thinks, but it smacks of racism as well.

The dictatorship of the

proletariat must liquidate whole classes, even if they offer no
apparent threat, because they are "objectively" hostile.

Like the

Christian theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, Solzhenitsyn argues that evil
is not distributed along class lines. Again in Cancer Ward,
Kostoglotov tells a young communist that "there were greedy people
before the bourgeoisie and there'll be greedy people after the
bourgeoisie."
In the Marxist scheme, the capitalist worker is alienated and
exploited because he does not own the means of production.

Alienation

includes a feeling of purposelessness in work, an inability to see any
meaning in labor, the feeling of being a tiny cog in a vast machine.
But in his navels, Solzhenitsyn implies that worker alienation does not
result from a lack of ownership.

For instance, in One Day in the Life

Ivan Denisovich (hereafter referred to as One Day), Shukov and Kilgas
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take pride in and find meaning in their work.
one is a carpenter, the other a bricklayer.
or receives the fruits of his labor.

Both men are prisoners;
Neither one owns his tools

But together, these men give

their work much value and esteem skill in labor for its own sake.
Even when workers theoretically own the means of production, as they
are told in the Soviet Union, alienation abounds.

In his short story

For the G-ood of the Cause, Solzhenitsyn explains how builders con
structing a research institute could not care less about the quality
of their work.

Man must impart his own meaning to work, for such

meaning does not magically appear once the proletariat owns the means
of production.

Alienation, Solzhenitsyn implies, is less a function

of ownership than of self-esteem.
But Marxism's fundamental flaw, according to Solzhenitsyn, is
that it is anti-human.

Marxism is based on hate, hate for any class that

is "objectively" harmful.

Whole classes are forced to bear the guilt

of a few individuals. Thus does Solzhenitsyn disdain the word
"anti-communist," since to be against Marxism or communism (to him they
are synonymous) is to be for humanity.
be human.

To reject this creed- is only to

In Solzhenitsyn's view, Marxism approves of any act, as long

as it is "for the good of the cause."

Marx rejects capitalism, not

because it violates some transcendant value of justice or virtue, but
simply because the majority is the exploited and not the exploitative
class.

In its endorsement of majority tyranny, Marxism is a pernicious

dogma, Solzhenitsyn believes
Solzhenitsyn also thinks that Marxism is a closed system.
sees all, knows all, explains all.

Arguments

It

donot affect it since it
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has decided in advance that anyone rejecting the creed is a reactionary
and should therefore not be heard.

In prison trucks, Solzhenitsyn de

bated with some imprisoned but true-believing Marxists.

Each one, he

recalls, advanced the same argument in the same words at the very same
point.

Solzhenitsyn kept his sanity only by reminding himself that it

was just a game and that he stood no chance of changing the dogmat7
ists's minds.
As an ideology, Marxism is hermetically sealed against
all contending thought.

Marxist reasoning, Solzhenitsyn believes, is

impenetrable and the Marxist convert imperturable.
It is no coincidence to Solzhenitsyn that the world's largest
police state claims Marxism as its foundation.

Forget all the talk

about "Marxism with a human face," Solzhenitsyn'urges, for no such
thing exists. Did not Marx and Engels refer to the dictatorship of the
proletariat?' Under this new dictatorship (a dictatorship sanctified
since it is one of the majority over the minority), how could one
g
possibly dispense with an army, a secret police, or a prison system?
The roots of the Gulag are easily traced back to Marx, Solzhenitsyn
argues. For example, in his Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx
concludes that under the proletarian dictatorship (Marx's phrase),
prisoners should not be deprived "of their only means of improvement,
productive labor."

10

This same rationale was later used by Soviet

authorities to establish slave labor camps in Siberia snd the Arctic
Circle.

Even the classless society is evidently not without its co

ercive organs.
This may be a misreading of Marx on Solzhenitsyn's part, but
no interpreter of Marx holds a monopoly over truth.

Like the
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Scriptures, Marx can often be quoted against himself.

Too often the

debate surrounding Marx has pitted dogmatist against dogmatist— those
who see only humaneness in the man versus those who see In Marx only
the budding flowers of

evil.

Solzhenitsyn's interpretation of Marx may

be mistaken, but it is

not without some support.

Consider,for

instance, the view of R. N. Carew Hunt, one who is familiar with all of
Marx's works and who has no axe to grind.
The "one-party system," which is certainly alien to
Western democratic thought, follows [[from Marxism] as a
corollary. For Marxists argue that opposing political
parties derive from the conflict between different eco
nomic classes, and that once their cause is removed they
will cease to exist. It is no more necessary that there
should be two political parties than that a man should
have two heads.^
Certainly no writer can be held responsible for every crime
that his writings are posthumously used to justify.
case this has not been a sporadic occurrence.

But in Marx's

Beyond a certain point,

one must ask why Marxism is the frequent justification for so-called
"peoples democracies."

Is it really coincidental that leftist police

states clothe their actions in Marxist garb?

Why always Marxism?

Why

have most of the humane Marxist visions remained on paper only?
No, Solzhenitsyn prefers to judge Marxism on its practice, not
on its theory, on its track record, not on its more scholarly exegesis.
He has little patience with the scores of Marxian scholars who, like
ancient augurs divining Truth from bird entrails, claim to know the
real Marx.

Perhaps he is so embittered by the cruelty he has suffered

from his own countiy that he is blind to the real possibility of hu
mane socialism.

Ironically, while many Marxian scholars are sure that

humane socialism is quite possible despite its rarity in practice,
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'they refuse to consider the possibility of capitalism with a human
face.

Again, Solzhenitsyn may be mistaken in his view of Marxism, but

it will take more than a "Prague Spring" or the existence of a second
party in South Yemen to prove him wrong.
To Solzhenitsyn, Soviet tyranny is not a perverted interpre
tation of an essentially humane body of thought.

Rather, the Soviet

system is the predictable product of an intolerant, value-free, and
hate-filled ideology.
tyranny.

12

Marxist ideology is the "fetid root" of this

As Raymond Aron notes, Solzhenitsyn views Marxism as

"the root of all ill, the source of all falsehood, the principle of
evil.1,13
Lenin's Legacy
To those who remember Lenin's rule as being relatively benign,
Solzhenitsyn offers harsh words. For him, Lenin only produced an even
more intolerant and hateful interpretation of Marxism.

Neo-Leninists

who criticize Stalin's harshness thus defend an untenable argument.

In

his reconstruction of Lenin's emigre years, Solzhenitsyn explores other
sources of Soviet intolerance.

We learn from Lenin in Zurich that

"Vladimir Illych never forgave mistakes, never countenanced any oppo
sition, and always judged individuals as tools to further his own
cause.

1Jt|

Lenin was contemptuous of most people: "The majority is

always stupid, and we cannot wait for it."

1

Nor was Lenin's brand

of communism much more compassionate than his successor's.

Solzhe

nitsyn points to Lenin's 1908 tract, The Lessons of the Paris Commune.
Lenin believed that the abortive commune made two major errors: first,

32 it did not seize the hanks; and second, it was too lenient.

"Instead

of shooting the hostile classes wholesale, it spared their lives, imagi16
ning it could re-educate them."
If Stalin is the main evil in Cancer
Ward and The First Circle, Lenin is portrayed as the chief villian in
/

The Gulag Archipelago. If Stalin's atrocities dwarfed Lenin's, this
was only because Lenin died before he could consolidate the already
growing system of terror.
In passing, it should be noted that Solzhenitsyn's view of
Lenin and Stalin is a minority opinion, one which many scholars (along
with this writer) would dispute.

We will deal with Solzhenitsyn's

argument more thoroughly in the next chapter, when we compare his view
with Sakharov's.
The Stalinist Myth
There never was any such thing as Stalinism, Solzhenitsyn be
lieves.

Stalin was a faithful disciple of Lenin in all important

respects.

Stalin only implemented on a grand scale what Lenin intended

all along.

Leninism, Stalinism— to Solzhenitsyn there is no difference.

Stalin collectivized land and murdered peasants?
1922 Land Code, started this process.
and enslaved other peoples?

Lenin, by way of the

Stalin oppressed nationalities

Lenin used the Red Army to crush national

resistance in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, and the Baltic states.
Stalin instituted forced labor, the secret police, and religious
oppression?

Lenin started the first work camps5 created the Cheka (the

first secret police), and plundered the Church.
property?

Stalin seized private

Lenin did the same thing in Tambov and Siberia.

Stalin
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sacrificed everything to heavy industry?

It was Lenin

industrialization and who starved light industry.

who urged rapid-

17

As a distinctive style of rule, Stalinism never existed.
Solzhenitsyn thinks the myth of Stalinism is a ploy created by
Khrushchevites to legitimize their own rule and by pseudo-dissidents
(he places the historian Roy Medvedev in this group) to soothe their
own consciences.

18

Stalin.1s cruelty, which made Ivan the Terrible look

like a merry old soul, was Lenin's brainchild.

19

Stalin was no freak.

His crimes cannot be passed off as some "cult of the individual" or as
"violations of socialist legality."

Stalinism is a system which pre

ceded and survived the life of its namesake.

As we learn in One Day,

the slave camps were not isolated phenomena, but were microcosms of
Soviet society as a whole.

20

Hot surprisingly, those who now praise

Stalin (occasionally the Chinese, frequently the Albanians) are those
who felt his knout the least.

21

The Soviet System
It would be mistaken to see in Solzhenitsyn's works an
exaltation of Czarism.

22

the Soviet system abound.

Yet comparisons between the old order and
In comparing the two systems, Solzhenitsyn

believes that the new order finishes a poor second.
rule, Czarism was infinitely humane.

Compared to Soviet

The number of men in Czarist

prisons is dwarfed by the millions who languish in the Gulag.
prisons make the Czarist facilities look like resort areas.

Soviet
The

lowest serf in the Czarist hierarchy had much more freedom than the
modern Soviet citizen.

23

in many ways, Solzhenitsyn favorably com

pares the ancien regime to the new order.

3k.
Of course, in terms of material wealth, Solzhenitsyn recognizes
Soviet superiority.

But he is quick to ask: 11At what cost?”

The fact

is that material abundance is built on a foundation of exploitation.
Soviet society has paid for its affluence with unparalleled human
.
2h
suffering.

Ironically, the prisoners in One Day are busy con

structing a Socialist Community Development.
the complex to thwart escape.

Barbed wire rings

To build socialism, entire classes are

liquidated, not because they are in fact guilty of any crime, but
because they are "objective class enemies."

Ivan Denisovich is a

criminal because he escaped from the Germans during World War II.

25>

Tyurin, another prisoner, is punished for being the son of a kulak
(a prosperous peasant).

26

Others are imprisoned because they are

Christian (evidence of ideological subversion) or because they are
Estonian (evidence of bourgeois nationalism).

Citing the figures of

Ivan Kurganov, an emigre statistics expert, Solzhenitsyn claims that
from 1917 to 19^9, internal repression cost 66 million Soviet citizens
their lives.

27

The system's real crime, according to Solzhenitsyn, is that it
enslaves men’s minds.

Citizens grow so accustomed to conformity that

they lose their taste for freedom.
often better than life "outside."
are forbidden in "freedom."

28

In One Day, prison conditions are
In prison, one can say things that

The police state atmosphere transcends

the prison, engulfing all of society.

Ivan Denisovich had been in

prison for so long that "he didn’t know any longer himself whether he

29
wanted freedom or not." 7

Constant pressure for conformity thus

produces mass apathy, enslaving men’s energies and minds.

35.
Myth contrasts starkly -with reality.

Under the rule of the

proletariat, workers cannot protest low wages or squalid living
conditions.

30.
*

"While the interest of the collective is supposedly

predominant, self-interest remains the guiding force in the lives of
all.

Corruption and deceit make the system work.

Industrial

production soars, but production figures are p a d d e d . A u t o m a t i o n
progresses, but manual labor and inefficiency is common.
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Official

propaganda extols the People, but the system cannot stand real people.
-*-n Cancer Ward, Pavel Rusanov, a Party bureaucrat, loves people only in
the abstract.
The Rusanovs loved the People, their great People.
They served the People and were ready to give their
lives for the People. But as the years went by they
found themselves .less able to tolerate actual human
beings, those obstinate creatures who are always re
sistant, refusing to do what they are told . . . ^
Such a contrast between myth and reality gives rise to the Big
Lie.

The system requires active participation in the Big Lie.

If a

colleague is arrested, one must denounce him and renounce friendship.
If production quotas are to be met, output must be falsified.

To avoid

personal suspicion, one must become an informer. And if there is
)
nothing to report, one must invent charges.
The Big Lie becomes a
daily habit, for few can survive without it.

35

In Soviet society,

millions must be enslaved for the sake of freedom, privileges must be
established for the sake of equality, and lies must be told in order to
preserve truth.

Such is the essence of ideology, Solzhenitsyn argues.

Physical enslavement is one of the least onerous aspects of the system.
Participation in the Big Lie is mandatory.
tragedy.

Herein lies the modern

36.
Nor is any voluntary liberalization likely.

Securely

entrenched at all levels of society are "little Stalins "— petty bureau
crats -who love to play the role of the tyrant.

In the story, For the

Good of the Cause, Knorozov remains a proponent of the "strong-willed
school of leadership" long after Stalin's death.

That darling of

socialist realism., the New Soviet Man, cuts a pathetic figure.

As a

New Man, Rusanov in Cancer Ward trembles at the thought of facing old
political foes.

Without the state's backing, he is a coward.

37

Solzhe

nitsyn recalls that in the Gulag, imprisoned Party loyalists called
themselves revolutionaries, but were the first ones to submit to
authority.

As Thor stein Veblen satirized the 19th century leisure

class, supposedly the "fittest" of society, so does Solzhenitsyn ridi
cule the-myth of the New Soviet Man.
Instead of a New Man, all that is really produced is a new
class.

Where once the private capitalists exploited 'the masses, now

this is done by the state and Party.

In one case the exploitation is

unjustified, in the other it is exalted.

As Milovan Bjilas explained in

his book, The New Class, the toiling masses have merely traded in one
type of master for another.

State capitalism now exploits where

private capitalism once flourished.

A new and privileged class has

arisen and it is this class, not the worker, which controls the means
of production.

In Cancer Ward, Rusanov is emblematic of the new class,
oo
enjoying special housing and consumption privileges.
No one
remembers the egalitarian ideals which inspired the October Revolution
and which were expressed in Lenin's April Theses.
regime to the present, little has changed.

From the ancien

Before, exploitation was

37.
called exploitation.
masses.”

Now., it is called "the progressive will of the

Under capitalism, man exploits man.

it is the other way around.
capitalism.

Under Soviet socialism,

Granted, Marx too inveighed against state

But this disclaimer can hardly be reconciled with the

idea of a proletarian dictatorship, the transitional period of social
ism in which a strong state remains.
Solzhenitsyn holds out little hope for voluntary internal re
form.

The Soviet system is intolerant, closed to criticism, and

inflexible.

Mistakes are not admitted, and hence problems are veiled

but never solved.

As long as any disagreement is treated as ideologi

cal subversion, Solzhenitsyn maintains, the Soviet system will not
adapt to new problems and changing conditions. 39

To borrow a concept

from Marxist thought, the Soviet system will succumb to its own in
ternal contradictions.

Inflexibility is rooted in the official

ideology, itself a closed and intolerant creed.

Solzhenitsyn views the

Soviet system with a mixture of bitterness and pity.

He has no

illusions of easily changing the system, but he has not abandoned all
hope of reform.
If Vladimir Petrov was correct in 1962 in asserting that
”Solzhenitsyn remained a loyal and patriotic Soviet citizen,
verdict was clearly outdated by 1970.

this

Perhaps as Solzhenitsyn grew

increasingly pessimistic regarding the prospects for Soviet reform,
his literature became more daring.
this development.

But there is another way to view

Importantly, The Gulag Archipelago reflects not only

Solzhenitsyn’s present bitterness but conclusions that he reached al
most 30 years ago in prison.

Perhaps Solzhenitsyn was never really a

"loyal and patriotic Soviet citizen” but rather used each successive
literary work to test the water, to see how much he could get by with.
With each work, he perhaps felt less compelled to mask his true
beliefs.
cisms.

With One Day, he learns that he may express oblique criti
With Cancer Ward, he ventures some near-heresies.

The Gulag

Archipelago represents the final blasphemy which has been fermenting
for many years but which only now finds open expression.

Thus, while

Petrov may have been correct in 1962, insights offered by The Gulag
Archipelago undermine his view.

In any event, Solzhenitsyn does not

view the Soviet problem in historical isolation.

Rather, he sees the

Soviet tragedy as one manifestation of a larger and more pernicious
force which shapes our age.
Ideology
One might think that in a century that produced Dachau,
Auschwitz, and the Gulag, the following discussion would be superflu
ous.

Yet for Solzhenitsyn, the topic of ideology occupies a central

area of political thought.

Though Solzhenitsyn offers no specific

definition of ideology, it is clear what he has in mind.

To him, an

ideology is a set of beliefs that claims to explain reality and to pre
scribe a way to transform man and society toward some goal.
Solzhenitsyn claims to be skeptical of all ideologies, not just
}1
Marxism.
Our century has seen unparalleled suffering, he believes,
precisely because of ideology.

Ideological wars (he includes religious

crusades here) have consistently been the cruellest.
vestige of man's bestial origins.

Ideology is a

Primitive emotions such as envy,

greed, and hate now surface in the guise of the class, mass and race

39.
struggle.^-2 with i^3 grandiose vision of re-making man and society
for the sake of an indefinite but utopian future, ideology justifies
all injustice.

To Solzhenitsyn, ideology has consistently excused evil

and dehumanization.

Ideology is fancy rationalization.

It is a pro-

crustean bed, destroying all those who do not fit into its plans.
are readily sacrificed for the sake of lofty goals.

Men

Thus, ideology

must treat man as a n .instrument, not as an end in himself.

Ideology

detaches men from moral responsibility, giving the criminal a clear
conscience.

It is ideology which not only crushes man, but demands

that he embrace and praise his tormentors.
The nature of man is fortunately such that he must
seek a justification for his actions.
Macbeth's justifications were feeble and his con
science tormented him. Iago too was a mere lamb. The
imagination and resources of Shakespeare’s villians
did not carry them beyond the first dozen corpses. For
they lacked Ideology.
Ideology! This is what gives the evil deed its
sought-for justification and the villain the lasting
callousness he needs. This is the social theory which
helps him vindicate his deeds in his own eyes and those
of others, to hear not reproaches and curses, but
praise and honor. This did the inquisitors draw strength
from Christianity, the conquerers from the exaltation of
the motherland, the colonizers from civilization, the
Nazis from race, the Jacobins (both early and late) from
equality, fraternity and the happiness of future genera
tions .
Thanks to Ideology it was given to the twentieth » _
century to experience atrocity to the millionth power. ^
Ideology thus obscures the human costs of political action, asking men
to ignore all restraints for the sake of a hazy and future nirvana.
The growth of ideology reflects, in part, the growing politic
ization of life.

"When societal problems arise, men first look to

governments for solutions.
dency.

Solzhenitsyn inveighs against this ten

Though religion is on the defensive in a secular and cynical

ho.
age, ideology allows men to function with a religious intensity.

But

politics is not religion, Solzhenitsyn reminds us, and there is much
to life that politics alone cannot transform.

Ideology, Solzhenitsyn

argues, assumes an unrealistically high degree of human and societal
malleability.

This obsession with political solutions is, in the long

run, an unhealthy sign.

Ideology thus rests on an illusion, the illu

sion that man and society can be changed at a single stroke.
Ideology becomes most pernicious when it combines with absolute
power.

Then, oppression reaches its peak.

But for Solzhenitsyn,

authoritarianism per se is not reprehensible.

As long as the system

does not demand adherence to some ideology, Solzhenitsyn approves of
a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m A s long as there is some sense of limitation in
politics, tyranny is unlikely.

By renouncing limits, by applauding

any act that advances the cause, m o d e m ideology sweeps away those
restraints previously imposed by morals and laws.
Ends and means thus beecme inextricable.

Ideology tries to

separate them, arguing that future perfection (be it the Third Reich or
the classless society) sanctifies all means.

In rejecting ideology,

Solzhenitsyn is not saying that there is nothing more precious than life.
Rather, he believes that it is senseless to die for some indeterminate
future utopia which may never materialize.
ble.

Ends and means are insepara

In the First Circle, Sologdin engages Lev Rubin, an imprisoned

communist, in a philosophical debate.

Naturally, Rubin argues that the

progressive march of history justifies any action, that concepts such as
good and evil are thoroughly bourgeois.

Sologdin retorts that nthe

higher the ends, the higher must be the means! Dishonest means destroy

la
the ends themselves.11^

In other words* the means must ennoble the

ends. Unjust means tend to acquire a momentum of their own, becoming
entrenched and obscuring the original humane aims.

There is no reason

why ends and means should be judged by entirely different ethical
standards.

In judging political action* therefore* intentions are only

marginally relevant.

One must also consider the consequences of method.

Solzhenitsyn summarizes in the second volume of The Gulag Archipelago
the lesson prison taught him:
It is not the result that counts! It is not the
result— but the spirit! Not what— but how. Not what
has been attained— -but at what price .Uy
There are many worthwhile values* Solzhenitsyn implies* only one of
which is utopia.

To Solzhenitsyn* the ideologue is the monomaniac*

eager to trample on many other cherished values in his rush toward
future perfection.

This is not a call for conservatism* but rather

an ethical standard of political prudence.

Though Solzhenitsyn opposes

ideology* he certainly does not resist all change.
The Problem of Change
Revolution as Illusion
Solzhenitsyn is skeptical* not of all change* but of all
revolutions.

To him* revolutions seldom accomplish much good and nearly

always do much evil.
* injustice.
• . a..
bQ
ox

Revolutions destroy only the most obvious symptoms

Often* in passion and haste* revolutions destroy insti

tutions worth preserving.
limits.

Once violence is sanctioned* it knows few

Revolutions rarely improve societies.

In obliterating old

forms of injustice* revolutions often spawn their own unjust policies.

!±9

The Bolshevik Revolution is a prime example in Solzhenitsyn’s argument.
The subsequent variations are predictable: A disciplined group seizes
power in a bloody struggle; the People’s Republic is proclaimed; old
enemies are killed or Imprisoned* contending parties banned* land re
distributed* industries nationalized* and conformity enforced; everyone
settles in to await the withering away of the state* which somehow
never occurs.
By establishing a precedent of violence* revolutions usually
fulfil few of their aims and thereby give birth to insecure regimes.
Solzhenitsyn does not call for a revolution against Soviet tyranny.
embraces no ideology.
the growing list.

He

He does not want to add yet another ”ism” to

Within societies* however* the problem of change

must he handled at an individual level.

Each man must look withim him

self* establish his values* and resist dehumanization.

Introspec

tion* not revolution* is the sane course9 Solzhenitsyn believes. It
does not guarantee bliss* but the history of most revolutions is a
tale of shattered hopes.
underly change.

Some values* and not just any values* must

These values may be found* not through mobilizing the

masses* but through individual contemplation.
Suffering and Denial
Since few men undertake such contemplation voluntarily* some
external force usually prompts the process.

In Solzhenitsyn’s case*

this external force was arrest and imprisonment.

Suffering forces one

to re-examine one’s life and to recover a sense of ethical responsi
bility.

Only with the aid of ’’external violence” will man forgo his

1*3

*

egocentric habits.
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and instills values.

Suffering is a catharsis which purifies the soul
What slavery was to Cervantes and hard labor was

to Dostoevsky, the Gulag travail was to Solzhenitsyn.

In retrospect,

Solzhenitsyn believes that prison was a beneficial experience.
5l
now he can write, "Bless you, prison!”

Even

In his play Candle in the

Wind 3 Alex expresses the same sentiment after serving a nine-year term
in a fictitious Desert Caledonia.
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To Solzhenitsyn, for both indi

viduals and nations, there is an inverse relationship between affluence
and spiritual development. Alex, in the above-mentioned play, claims
that "suffering is a lever for the growth of the soul.

A contented

person always has an inpoverished soul."
Just as suffering is often beneficial for individuals, so are
defeats good for entire nations.
empires.

Successes cause nations to seek

Defeats force introspection and spiritual growth.

Russia's

victory over Napoleon, Solzhenitsyn argues, forestalled internal re
form for at least 25 years.

Defeats in the Crimean War, the Russo-

Japanese Whr and the First World War prompted Russian liberalization.
National complacency breeds moral nihilism and a preoccupation with
comfort over all else.
of human values.

Thus is material wealth purchased at the cost

Juxtaposed with affluence, Solzhenitsyn advocates

asceticism.
Own nothing! Possess nothing! Buddha and Christ
taught us this, and the Stoics and Cynics. Greedy
though we are, why can's we seem to grasp that simple
teaching? Can't we understand that with property we
destroy our soul?5£
Possessions only subject one to the state's leverage.
little is beyond the state's grasp.
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He who owns

Beneficial change will not

511.

result from some glorious revolution, but rather from a renunciation of
materialism in favor of spiritual improvement.
The Intelligentsia
In Solzhenitsyn1s political thought, the intelligentsia serves
as a vehicle for change. But he strives to clarify the term!s meaning.
In the Soviet Union, the word "intelligentsia” has become so debased as
to include any and all white collar workers— bureaucrats , bookkeepers
and clerks.

5>7 The term is now applied to so many people that it has

lost all meaning.

Posited against this usage, Solzhenitsyn offers a

different definition.

For him, an intellectual is not defined by class,

occupation, or family background.

Instead, an intellectual is one who

is preoccupied with the ethical and spiritual aspects of life.
Interestingly, Solzhenitsyn never mentions intelligence,

S8

ho matter how

brilliant or articulate, a person who eschews value judgments is not an
intellectual in Solzhenitsyn!s lexicon.

Moreover, the true intellectual

does not hesitate to flout convention for the sake of his values. The
intelligent, for Solzhenitsyn, is inner-directed and non-imitative in
thought.
At one time, Solzhenitsyn had high hopes for the intelligent
s i a ^ ability to reform society.

He is less sanguine now, believing

that there are certain things one must experience in order to learn.
But neither is Solzhenitsyn totally without hope.

He still views the

intelligentsia as the conscience (not so much the intellect) of
society.

In this respect he resembles the 19th century Russian intel

lectual.

Comparisons should not be overdrawn, however, since

us.
Solzhenitsyn criticizes this group for having an over-romanticized
view of the common people.

Though he is no elitist.

Solzhenitsyn

dismisses the unrealistic populism he detects in Gogol and Herzen.
Solzhenitsyn is nevertheless obsessed with a special sense of mission.
He is the collective memory of those who have suffered.

If only all

Soviet citizens could read his Gulag Archipelago, they would renounce
communism.
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His mission is to speak the truth, even if it is un

welcome, embarrassing, and unfashionable.

Solzhenitsyn occassionally

exhibits a classic liberal faith in the power of education (in this
case a moral education) to improve man and society.

Central to his

thought, therefore, is the idea that change and growth are not pri
marily political problems.
The Limits of Politics
The Transcendence of Politics
"When Solzhenitsyn thinks of politics, he thinks of political
parties.

Though he would not ban political parties, he does believe

they are very dispensable.

By their nature, parties place their own

interests above the common good.- In a competitive situation, a party
must rejoice in the ruling faction’s defeats and bemoan their successes,
even if these respective results frustrate or advance the common good.
For this reason Solzhenitsyn does not advocate a multiparty parlia
mentary system for Russia.

Rather, he seeks an ’’extraparty” or

"nonparty” system where a consensus regarding the common good tran
scends partisanship.^0

On this point he differs with Andrei Sakharov.

Neither is freedom mainly a political problem.

Men can be given

U6-.
all types of freedom; indeed, the Soviet Constitution grants nearly
every imaginable kind of freedom.

Xet as long as men grow submissive

and lose their zest for freedom, codifying rights will be all for naught.
Resistance to conformity is a matter of individual integrity, and no law
can impart this quality.

The obsession with political freedom— voting

rights, ability to form parties, freedom of expression— is harmful to
the extent to distracts men from the central task: committing oneself
against the Big lie, regardless of the consequences.
Similarly, equality is a moral, not political, problem.

Only

when men abandon materialism and the lust for comfort will true equality
be possible.
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Until that time, no matter how much income governments

try to redistribute, an elite stratum will remain.

In such a way does

Solzhenitsyn’s call for asceticism highlight his belief in the limi
tation of political solutions.

He recognizes that government is a

blunt instrument, but that most people still look toward government
action as a panacea.

The state’s structure-authoritarian or demo-

cratic— is of only secondary importance to Solzhenitsyn.
most is that a nation posses moral strength.

What matters

Solzhenitsyn thus stresses

the primacy of individual commitment over mass political action.
The Ethics of Accountability
Not everyone need endure prison in order to recover a sense of
values.

Each nation and each citizen bears same responsibility for the

injustice committed in their names.

No one is guiltless and moral

neutrality is a facade for collaboration.
Big Lie, each man is a potential tyrant.^

In a society dominated by the
The secret police informer

is no monster; he appears to be a normal human being.

Even Solzhe

nitsyn just barely avoided enlisting in the ranks of the secret police.

hi..
Solzhenitsyn echoes Hannah Arendt's views on f,the banality of evil.”
Each person who refuses to stand up to unjust authority contributes in
some small way to the web of repression.

Those who torture, slander,

and spy are not ghouls, but seemingly ordinary people who would rather
obey than think.

With accountability goes responsibility.

Aware of the

ubiquity of guilt, man in the oppressive state must avoid the roles of
victim and executioner.

But if one is forced to choose between the two,

Solzhenitsyn recommends the former role.

For him, life itself is not

the highest good and he is thus willing to die for certain principles.
We have often mentioned Solzhenitsyn’s moralism.

Perhaps it is now

appropriate to discuss this subject in detail.
The Return to Values
One of the political and social evils of our time, Solzhenitsyn
believes, is the notion of moral relativism.

Simply expressed, this is

the idea that there are no absolute standards of right and wrong and
that, given a suitable set of circumstances, any act may be justified.
Solzhenitsyn recognizes and bemoans the fact that modern man is embar
rassed to use terms such as right and wrong.

Merely endorsing certain

values invites charges of being presumptuous.

The word "moralistic”

now assumes a pejorative connotation.

In a pseudo-sophisiticated age,

good and evil fall sway to ”situational ethics.”
But Solzhenitsyn rejects this tendency, arguing that there are
some definite standards of good and evil.

For him, moral relativism is

a fancy way to describe an abdication of responsibility.

Dostoevsky

wrote that ”if there is no God, then nothing is forbidden.”

Similarly,

U8.
Solzhenitsyn claims that if all values are relative, then everything is
permitted.

In Candle in the Wind, Alex scorns

. . . that infernal pretext of the relativity of morality!
You can justify any villainy by the relativity of morality!
But raping a girl is always bad, in any society! Or beating
up a child! Or driving a mother out of her home! Or slander
ing others! Or breaking a promise! Or abusing someone's
trust.
We now have some idea of those acts Solzhenitsyn considers to be wrong
in any situation.
follow?

But aside from this, what standard would he have men

What does he offer in place of moral relativism?

for Solzhenitsyn, is the source of values.

Conscience,

He believes that inwardly,

each person knows that some acts are always reprehensible.

Not every

one follows the dictates of conscience, but this hardly proves that
conscience does not exist.
imperatives are instinctive.

By virtue of being human, certain ethical
But most msi, he believes, choose to ignore

these feelings, passing them off as "bourgeois" or as sentimentalism.
M o d e m man, Solzhenitsyn believes, has carried a commendable
quality— skepticism— to an almost nihilistic extreme.
only take one so far.

Skepticism can

Gleb Nerzhin, a prisoner in The First Circle,

argues that while skepticism is needed to fight dogmatism, it "can
never provide firm ground under a man's feet."

68

When skepticism be

comes a guise for moral relativism, any political act— genocide,
torture, deceit— can be rationalized.

One must transcend skepticism

by affirming something, whether it be certain values or a love for man
kind.

Pragmatism must not exclude morality.

Solzhenitsyn notes that

Western opposition to the Nazis was morally as well as strategically
motivated.

Pragmatism is not exactly the same as expediency, there-

h9.
fore, and any dichotomy between pragmatism and morality is unfounded.
What is true of individuals also holds for nations.
Solzhenitsyn argues that it is natural and justified to judge nations
by the same moral standards we apply to individuals.

’’Human logic,”

he notes, ’’can show no cause why if we permit value judgments on the
one mutable entity [man] we should forbid them in the case of the
other [the statej
guiltless.

in the broad sweep of history, no nation is

What men do for their own interest is often criminal;

what men do for the state's interest is somehow heroic.

Solzhenitsyn

sees hypocrisy and danger in this tendency of judging individual and
national action by different standards. Contrast this with the view
of Hans Morgenthau, the foremost exponent of ’’political realism.”
.The individual may say to himself: ’’Fiat justitia,
pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the world
perish),” but the state has no right to say so in the
name of those who are in its care.7^
This, Solzhenitsyn believes, opens the door to all sorts of mischief.
To him, it is senseless to say that individuals may subordinate ex
istence to justice but that nations must place survival above all
else.

71

No international order can exist without nations acknowl

edging that certain types of actions are wrong.

It is thus useless

to say that morality is relative.
In his search for values in a harsh and violent world,
Solzhenitsyn obeys the existentialist impulse of our time.

But by in

sisting on some absolute standards of right and wrong, by refusing to
sanction any act so long as it is not in ”bad faith," Solzhenitsyn
dismisses one aspect of existentialism so much in vogue.
is the wellspring of values.

Conscience

But for those who ignore the ethical

impulse* the state stands ready to prevent injustice.

Since men often

ignore the urgings of conscience* Solzhenitsyn has no qualms in advo
cating authoritarianism.
^

Freedom as Self-Restraint

Solzhenitsyn distinguishes between inner and outer freedom.
Inner freedom we possess at birth.
between good and evil.
straint.
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It includes a freedom to choose

Outer freedom is the absence of physical re

This type of freedom is determined* not by the fact that we

are human* but by the type of political structure under which we live.
Most important is inner freedom* for it can be preserved under any
circumstance.

For Solzhenitsyn* what we think of as political rights

are ephemeral.' One government grants them* another denies them.

Po

litical or intellectual freedom is not an end in itself* but is a
means for developing the spirit.
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less unless it prompts reflection.
something.

Unlimited external freedom is use
One must use political freedom for

It is dispensable* while inner or spiritual freedom endures.

Freedom is also distinguished from license in Solzhenitsyn’s
analysis.

like everything else in his thought* freedom has its limits.

If not kept within bounds* freedom degenerates into libertinism and
complacency.

Similarly* authoritarianism is not reprehensible so long
7)
as it is not arbitrary and deceitful.
Intellectual freedom— the
right to say what one thinks— is of only secondary importance* he be
lieves.

Look at the West* Solzhenitsyn urges.

It has all the

intellectual freedom it needs* yet its will has weakened and it has
become unprincipled.
ual development.

Political freedom is thus a medium for spirit

£1.
To doubt is to be human* Solzhenitsyn claims • Responsible
action* not physical pleasure* is life’s aim.

Political freedoms

are not irrelevant* but neither are they sufficient to impart some
sense of values.
fits* however.

Intellectual freedom does have its practical bene
Writers* for example* are often the Cassandras of

society* forseeing dangers in advance of their time.

In the Soviet

regime’s early years* Solzhenitsyn recalls* authors such as Boris
Pilnyak and Osip Mandelshtam were condemned for noting unhealthy
traits in Stalin’s character.
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Only in the 19^0’s was their insight

vindicated* but by this time untold millions had needlessly suffered.
What Shelley said of poets* that they are the "unacknowledged
legislators" of society* Solzhenitsyn says of writers in general.
Writers ■serve as living reminders to the state.

Their message is

that political action should incorporate some ethical standard.

In

The First Circle* Innokenty Volodin* a young Soviet diplomat* con
fides to a friend that
. . . a great writer is* so to speak* a second
government. That’s why no regime anywhere has ever
loved its great writers* only its minor o n e s .78
Wien censorship is practiced* international agreements are ignored.
No domestic constituency can protest the violation of treaties* for
the promises are kept secret.

Because of its monopoly over informa

tion* Solzhenitsyn believes* the Soviet Union can violate a Helsinki
79

agreement or a strategic arms pact.

If Solzhenitsyn’s view of freedom entails limits* it also re
quires responsibility.

Freedom Imposes the burden of choice.

Moral

choices are not always so clear-cut and the burden of freedom is

!>2..
shouldered at the price of complacency and happiness.

The process of

cybernetic neurostabilization* used on Alda in Candle in the Wind, re
sembles the Great Operation of the Well-Doer in Yevgeny Zamiatin’s W e .
The former operation Imparts ’’granite-like mental health*" turning
one’s nervous system into a "non-deviating vector."
relieves men of "fancy."

The latter process

In both anti-utopias* men become automata.

The life of the mind succumbs to the temptation of a lotus-eating ex
istence.

For Solzhenitsyn then* freedom involves a certain amount of

pain which inheres in the act of choice.

He is less concerned that men

feel happy in a conventional sense— gorged on consumer goods and obliv
ious to the suffering of others.

The Russian author recognizes* along

with Erich Fromm and others* that freedom can be frightening and total
itarianism seductive.

Choosing the course of freedom* whether on an

individual or national level* is not only the more principled action*
but is also what distinguishes man from other animals.
Mother.Russia
Suffering has limits too.

Russia has suffered enough* Solzhe

nitsyn saysj let her now begin anew.
Solzhenitsyn loves his homeland.

Though he hates the Soviet regime*

Indeed* he distinguishes between

Soviet and Russian qualities. By the latter he means the pre-revolutionary experience.
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Reflecting upon the human agony in his country*

Solzhenitsyn poses the same question asked by Chernyshevsky and Lenin:
What is to be done?

While Solzhenitsyn rejects the Marxist/communist

route for his nation* in 197U he presented an alternative in his Letter
to the Soviet Leaders.

Many Westerners* who thought they had seen in

?3*
this author a reflection of Western liberalism, "were aghast.
Since you are already called revisionists by the Chinese,
8l

Solzhenitsyn writes, abandon your burdensome ideology.

He does not

necessarily ask the Politburo to relinquish power, for it is ideology
and not authority which has tormented the Russian people.

Russia

should also grant genuine self-determination to the Eastern bloc states,
the scattered nationalities, and should cease striving for illusory
diplomatic gains.

Obscure wars of national liberation are irrelevant

to Russia’s real needs, be believes.
Instead, Solzhenitsyn exhorts his countrymen to turn inward—
a political, geographical and spiritual sense.

in

Specifically, the vast

and untamed Northeast expanses ofSiberia are Russia’s salvation.

Dis

missing, the notion of progress asa bane to humans and the environment,
Solzhenitsyn seems to concur with the British economist E. F. Schumacher.
82
that ’’small is beautiful.”

Large cities and rapid industrialization

are Western ills which Russia should not copy.

Citing the Club of

Rome’s predictions of resource depletion, Solzhenitsyn supports a zerogrowth economy.

Russia is one ofthe few countrys that can make a

fresh start.

The Siberian Northeast is the great frontier which symbolOo
izes a spiritual rebirth within the Russian people.
Russia could then
concentrate on its domestic problems and abjure an activist foreign
policy.’ For Solzhenitsyn, the Northeast is ’’more than just a musical
p)
sound and more than just a geographical concept."
Rather, the North
east symbolizes the recovery of traditional Russian values of piety.
Imperialism, resource depletion, moral degradation— these problems would
be solved.

The Northeast is Russia’s Promised Land, with Solzhenitsyn

as its messianic advocate.

5U.
Russia need not adopt a democratic or parliamentary system,
Solzhenitsyn argues.
short-lived.

Democracies have been historically rare and

Russia has at times thrived under authoritarianism, he

notes.

But the Communist Party should no longer monopolize all

thought.

Solzhenitsyn personally believes that Christianity is

Russia’s salvation, but he advocates no state religion.
that religion be "treated fairly and not suppressed."
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He asks only
Democracy,

besides being inappropriate for the Russian tradition, is also
dismissed on practical grounds.

War between various nationalities

might result from the establishment of Westem-style freedoms in
Russia.

P7

Notice, Solzhenitsyn speaks of Russia!s salvation and

Russia’s virtues. He advocates a "Russia first" policy'in an in
creasingly interdependent world.

But to Solzhenitsyn, this display of

nationalism is justified by the fact that the Russian people have
suffered more than anyone else.

Since their agony has been most in

tense, he argues, Russians are excused for placing their national welfare above that of any other group.
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This vision of Russia’s future is pastoral and isolationist.
Distancing himself from much that the West holds so dear,. Solzhenitsyn
places himself squarely in the 19th century Russophile (not Slavophile)
tradition.

After reading his Letter to the Soviet Leaders, no one can

have the slightest doubt that the writer resides in the West only be
cause he is forced to do so.

With this publication, Solzhenitsyn

ceased to be the darling of Western liberals, a role he neither sought
nor desired.
Although Solzhenitsyn is contemptuous of Marxism, he does

55>support a brand of "ethical socialism." The latter is distinguished
from its pseudo-scientific impostor by an esteem for human life above
any ideological nirvana.

This type of socialism is based, not on

material goods or diplomatic gains, but on love.
duces a community based on hate.
not necessarily desirable.

M o d e m socialism pro

Community, Solzhenitsyn implies, is

History tells him that communities fre

quently coalesce around hate for outsiders.

Shulubin, the doleful

Party member in Cancer Ward, reflects that "there's only one true
socialism, and that's ethical socialism."
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ism does not now exist, Solzhenitsyn adds.
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Such a brand of socialHow ironic it is, he

notes, that m o d e m socialism has produced the most anti-social and
philistine culture in existence!

Mutual affection, not surpassing the

West in industrialization or arms, should be socialism's aim.
Solzhenitsyn wants not just any type of community, but one
that is national in scope and devoid of hatred.

He believes that com-

munity is an individual and not a governmental task. 91

Where a

community does not exist, no government can magically create one.
Rather, community is built first at an individual or personal level.
The interaction is between persons, not between the government and
the citizen.

As long as men look first to politics for their sal

vation, the attainment of community will be unlikely.

Though he is

unclear regarding what values can cement a community, it is safe to
say that Solzhenitsyn endorses the Christian values of love, charity,
and piety.

When so-called Eurocommunists now speak of "socialism

with a human face," Solzhenitsyn accuses them of redundancy.
istic socialism is, for him, the only true socialism.

Human

Other forms

are called socialistic, but this is a veil for despotism.
Critical Evaluation
It is difficult to understand the faith Solzhenitsyn places in
suffering.

In his own writings, he offers telling criticisms of the

notion that suffering has its meritorious effects.
effaced in most men all that was humane.

The Gulag, we learn,'

Compassion and friendship were

endangered as long as only* the cunning survived the camp ordeal.

To be

sure, Solzhenitsyn did not sink to this level, but his was an except
ional experience.

Most men, he observes, became indifferent to their

fellow men -when confronted with suffering.

Suffering is not necessar

ily ennobling and is quite often degrading.

Were every man a Solzhe

nitsyn, he could sensibly urge personal calvary as a means of spiritual
purification•
In some ways, Solzhenitsyn is his own most devastating critic.
He recalls with bitterness that Janos Kadar and Wladyslaw Gomulka,
respective leaders of the Hungarian and Polish Communist Parties, had
at one time been unjustly arrested, tortured, and imprisoned.
whole world sees how much they learned.
92
what they are worth.,T

l,The

The whole world has learned

This may be unfair to Kadar, but this con

cession does not mortally wound Solzhenitsyn's main point.

No

guarantee exists that suffering will have what Solzhenitsyn considers
to be a beneficial effect on people.

If his chronicles prove anything,

it is that suffering more frequently has harmful effects.
At the national level, mass suffering has only infrequently
induced the type of change Solzhenitsyn desires.

Nations need defeats,

he argues, for they prompt introspection and liberalization.

57.
Victorious -war only whets a regime’s appetite for more conquests.

Yet,

as Hans Morgenthau and others have noted, lost war is an equally large
inducement to imperialism.
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Eager to recoup losses sustained in the

last exchange, a defeated power may secretly prepare to alter the status
quo with force.

Mass suffering and national defeat contributed to the

rise of Nazism in post-World War I Germany.

Without the setbacks Russia

received in World War I, the Bolsheviks may have never ascended to
power.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that ideology holds such sway in

the wake of national defeat.

The glorious future described by an

ideology may compensate for mass feelings of emptiness and humiliation.
National suffering is thus destructive as well as beneficial in the
long run.

It prompts domestic extremism and foreign Imperialism as

often as it produces introspection and regeneration.
Authoritarianism is also quickly accepted.
rare, authoritarianism the historical rule.
not authoritarianism, are the real villains.

Democracies are

Ideology and the Big Lie,
People lived for

centuries without danocracy and they ’’were not always worse off.”
Millions of Russians in the past centuries have lived under authoritar
ianism and they died happy.

Autocracies preserved the nation’s health:

’’obviously, since the nation did not die out.”
even survived the plague during the Middle ages.

Yes, and some people
May we therefore con

clude that the Black Death preserved Europe's well-being?
Solzhenitsyn’s defense of authoritarianism is at times feeble
and unconvincing.

He points to the relatively humane autocracies of

the past, but perhaps these regimes were more humane only because they
lacked modern and sophisticated instruments of terror.

The modern

police state owes its existence not only to ideology but to technology.
Though he says he cannot imagine a humane ideology, Solzhenitsyn can
endorse benevolent autocracy.

But what will keep the rulers benevolent

What checks will limit the arbitrary power that even Solzhenitsyn
abhors?

Again, Solzhenitsyn is often his own most incisive critic:

"Unlimited power in the hands of limited people always leads to
cruelty."

9ii

And no one is more aware of the prominence of human fail

ings than this man.

Yet a passion for order over freedom persists.

Authoritarianism may maintain a habit of obedience which is
most susceptible to ideological fervor.

Perhaps it is also not acci

dental that m o d e m authoritarian states often embrace ideologies.
Visions of a utopian future make submission to authority a tolerable,
if not welcome, task for the citizen.
exact conformity.

Ideology is a convenient way to

Trusting no ideology, Solzhenitsyn attributes to

authority all sorts of virtues.

One gets the uneasy feeling that he

endorses authoritarianism merely to show that Western institutions do
not offer the best of all possible worlds.
Nor does he present a persausive case for Russian isolation
ism.

Russia should abandon an active foreign policy and concentrate

on its own well-being.

The rest of the world may choke on its own

profligacy, but Russia is saved by the Northeast.
food, minerals, and natural gas.

Here lies plenty of

It is only just that Russia close

itself off from the rest of the world, since Russians have suffered
most of all.

Solzhenitsyn’s call for a ’’Russia first’’ policy is rem

iniscent of the ’’beggar thy neighbor’’ philosophy of the mercantilist
era.

If the surrounding world crumbles, at least Russia will survive.

This is fitting, for Russia has suffered most of all.
But who does Solzhenitsyn blame for these hardships?

He blames

not just the ideology, or Lenin, or Stalin, but the Russian people.
Russians were eager to cast off freedom and the responsibility that
goes with it.

The Big Lie is perpetuated by mass deceit.

Russians

not only submitted, but they tended their torturers in the old age!
Russia is culpable for her own troubles.

q<

Without her habit of sub

mission (engendered perhaps by centuries of authoritarianism?), the
Gulag would not exist.

Justifying Russian self-interest over global

welfare, Solzhenitsyn cites his country's unexceeded agony.
Solzhenitsyn later shows the pain to be self-inflicted.
is guiltless, he argues.

Yet

Wo nation

Somehow he is sure that since Russia1s

suffering has been the greatest, her welfare should be foremost.
Russia!s welfare is not divorced from global existence.

But

Solzhenitsyn

may try to distance Russia from the worlds problems, but this is not
a decision solely within his power to make.

The world will not allow

Russia to sit watching cozily in its Northeast while the rest of the
globe perishes out of warfare or scarcity.
At times, Solzhenitsyn becomes a mirror-image of those things
he abhors.

Consider ideology for instance.

Solzhenitsyn rails

against all ideologies, cataloging the injustice committed in their
names.

When he later discusses Russia's future, Solzhenitsyn advo

cates, of all things, Christianity— an ideology which he has already
mentioned among those culpable for mass cruelty!

Even without his

Christian perspective, Solzhenitsyn's thought contains all the in
gredients of ideology.

His neo-Russophilism explains man and society

and tries to transform both.
its own ethical code.

His thought contains its own metaphysic,

Occasionally striking a tone of intolerance,

Solzhenitsyn can give no guarantee that his beliefs would not be used
posthumously to justify seme atrocity.

His own beliefs jell into a

product resembling his earlier definition of ideology.

TOiat Solzhe

nitsyn offers, therefore, is not an escape from ideology, but rather
an ideology to end all ideologies. .
Conclusion
This does not pretend to be an exhaustive discussion or
critique of Solzhenitsynfs ideas.

If the dissenting voice now ema

nates from Cavendish, Vermont instead of the. Moscow suburbs, the
relevance of the message transcends its geographical source.

Special

ization of knowledge reinforces the tendency to leave politics to “the
experts.11 Solzhenitsyn does not claim to be an expert.
claim to be objective.

He does not

This should not belittle his ideas, however.

His is a fresh, if not always reassuring, message.

B o m of a personal

suffering beyond most men!s comprehension, Solzhenitsyn^ mission is
to introduce sanity, compassion, and morality to an age that considers
itself value-free.

Solzhenitsyn represents no movement, no cult.

He

merely represents his own conviction that politics should serve man, not
man politics.

Yet even this conviction is tempered by his belief in

the limitation of political solutions.
If he cannot answer all questions or meet all objections, this
is a consequence he accepts.

He tries not to offer yet another philo

sopher^ stone for re-molding society in some magic image.

Even if his

pleas fall on deaf ears, he justifies his own existence by bearing the

message of the millions whose voices will never be heard:
I dedicate this
to all those who did not live
to tell it.
And may they please forgive me
for not having seen it all
nor remembered it all,
for not having divined all of it.
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CHAPTER H I
SAKHAROV: THE SCIENTIST
AS DISSIDENT
He appears to be an unlikely dissident— diminutive, shy, softspoken.

Few would guess Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov to be the leader

of the democratic movement within the Soviet Union.

As a founder of

the Moscow Human Rights Committee, Sakharov has barely,avoided the
exile Imposed on two of his colleagues— -Valery Chalidze and Zhores
Medvedev.

Less drastic, but nonetheless annoying, reprisals have been

aimed at Sakharov.

For supporting Jewish emigration rights, he has

been mugged by police agents disguised as Palestinian terrorists.

For

protesting at political trials, Sakharov’s wife Yelena Bonner has been
threatened with imprisonment.

For issuing manifestoes, Sakharov has

had the prospect of psychiatric incarceration dangled before him.

For

having such a renegade father, Sakharov’s children have been denied
jobs and admittance to universities.
The paradox grows.

Andrei Sakharov is widely known as "the

father of the Soviet H-bomb," the youngest man ever to gain full mem
bership in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the brilliant protege of the
eminent physicist, Igor Tamm.

Sakharov has received a Stalin Prize,

a Lenin Prize, and has thrice been distinguished as a Hero of Socialist
Labor.

In the 1960’s, Sakharov belonged to the privileged elite of the

new technocratic class.

Reasons for dissatisfaction seemed nonexistent.
70
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Whether he lounged in his posh dacha, rode in his chauffeured auto
mobile, or taught at the prestigious Lebedev Institute of Physics,
Sakharov awaited a comfortable future.
enemy of the people"?
to the Kremlin?

How then has he become "an

How can one nondescript man pose such a threat

What dissonant views does he harbor that make him so

intolerable to the Soviet regime?
Those studying Sakharov approach a complex man.
have changed over time.
evolution.
are so fond.

His beliefs

They are dynamic, even now in a process of

They resist the tidy classifications of which academicians
Nevertheless, a few themes may be useful in understanding

the development of Sakharov's political thought.
was what one might call a neo-Marxist.

Before 1968, Sakharov

That is, he wished to restore

Soviet society to what he believed to be the humane ideals of Karl
Marx.

Stalin perverted Marxist philosophy, he believed, while Lenin

captured its essence.

Thus, until 1968, Sakharov was a neo-Marxist

or, if you will, a neo-Leninist.

His views he then described as

"profoundly socialist."
After 1968, however, Sakharov's confidence in socialism wanes.
He believes that, in theory, socialism built around "scientific princ
iples" is possible.
rare.

In practice, he feels, humane socialism has been

By 1975, Sakharov calls himself a liberal, albeit a nondogmatic

liberal.

An "open society," one that tolerates the free expression of

all ideologies, seems to be his goal.

Running throughout Sakharov's

thought is the influence of the scientific method upon politics.
through the critical testing of various ideologies will the common
good emerge.

Only
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Sakharov seeks to transpose the virtues of the scientific
milieu— open-mindedness, toleration, rigorous testing of hypotheses,
free discussion— onto the political realm.
Sakharov's internationalism.

This view also underlies

He believes that the nation-state is

an antiquated way to organize society, for reasons we will later ex
plore.

Only a global approach can solve global problems.

In 1977,

therefore, Sakharov is a non-dogmatic liberal and an internationalist.
No one can confidently claim to know what caused these changes in
Sakharov's thought, but some explanations are offered in the section,
"Marxism and Socialism."

Let us begin, therefore, by examining

Sakharov's critique of his own country.
The Soviet System
Soviet society, Sakharov noted in 1968, has departed from the
"scientific principles" inherent in true Marxism.

Such principles,

Sakharov believed, included free and open discussion, fair treatment
of divergent ideas, and a willingness to criticize without .fear of
reprisal.

1

It is precisely these qualities that Soviet society lacks.

Solzhenitsyn judged the Soviet system using his own humanistic and
personal criteria.

Sakharov argues that, even by Marxist standards,

the Soviet system is faulty.

In 1968, these two dissidents evaluated

Soviet society using two very different perspectives yet still pro
duced similar verdicts.
When the state controls all aspects of life— economics, poli
tics, ideology— mass conformity is the result.

The monopolization of
2
all facets of life is, to Sakharov, the heart of totalitarianism.
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Dependence on the state is calculated to breed servitude among the
Soviet citizenry.

When men rely on the government to tell them -what

to think., where to -work, and how to live in general, everyone has a
stake in preserving the status quo.

Thus does statism reinforce the

essential conservatism of Soviet society. 3

•
Despite boasts of having

the best system, the Soviet regime, by restricting travel and emigra
tion, prevents its citizens from making their own comparisons.
Lacking any standard of comparison, the average Soviet citizen lapses
into a materialistic quest for consumer goods J*

Comsumerism, Sak

harov believes, is the new opium of the masses.

It offers an escape

from the dreary slogans and the broken promises characterizing the
regime.

Self-reliance is exactly what the regime fears, Sakharov

argues. For this reason, "the collective" is exalted and the individ
ual belittled.
Sakharov expresses in more explicit terms than Solzhenitsyn
the idea that Soviet government represents, not communism or socialism,
£
but state capitalism.
To Sakharov, Soviet exploitation differs from
American capitalism only by dint of its greater oppressiveness over all
walks of life .^

Again using Marxist terminology, Sakharov notes that

the Soviet state now extracts all surplus value from the toiling masses.
In earlier times, the private capitalist performed the same role.

Both

types of exploitation are onerous. In its excessive statism, the Soviet
system offers no new, ideal, or even beneficial way to organize society,
Sakharov believes.
Also like Solzhenitsyn and Djilas, Sakharov notes the rise of a
new class in Soviet society.

Ranking Party and state officials, the

nomenklatura, drive their handrtooled Zil limousines, send their dullwitted children to the best schools, and avoid long lines by shopping
7
at cheap and convenient "hard currency" stores.
Like the Inner
Party in George Orwell’s 1981;, the Soviet elite clings to its privi
leges.

Sakharov'refers to the "ostentatious and inefficient class

structure" in the Soviet Union, a structure no more egalitarian than
o

the Czarist order.

But at least the old system acknowledged its in

equality, something the Soviet system refuses to do.

By placing their

children in the finest schools, by finding their progeny cushy jobs in
the Party and state, the new class is becoming a hereditary aristoc
racy.

Advantages in earning and learning are passed from generation to

generation.

Again, this occurs in other societies too.

But when it

does occur, it is often recognized and not masqueraded as the "prog
ressive will of the laboring masses."
No guarantee exists that the Communist Party will protect the
common interest.

Instead, Sakharov predicts that the Party will only
9
protect its own "caste interests."
As an oligarchy which claims to
rule for the good of the many, the Soviet leaders resemble the worst
despotisms of the ancient world.

If would-be kings and tyrants now

clamored for power, their claims would be met with derisive laughter.
"Why then should such claims— i.e., ruling in the interest of the
many— now be accepted just because they come from a group that calls
itself the Party?

At times, Sakharov implies that the Party’s in

ability to override its own interest will inevitably lead to.the
dissolution of the one-party system.

In such a way does Sakharov im

pale the Party upon its own Marxist notion of "internal contradict
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Unlike Solzhenitsyn,, Sakharov sees the concentration of polit
ical power as the root of Soviet evil.
ideology, is the main culprit.
ideological factor.

Excessive statism, not Marxist

Yet Sakharov does not ignore the

Indeed, he inveighs against the ’’ideological

monism" -which pervades Soviet society.

11

But Sakharov, unlike Solz

henitsyn, is more -willing to distinguish between this later perversion
and original Marxist thought.

Under this "ideological monism," only

one interpretation (i.e., the PartyTs) of one ideology (i.e., Marxism)
is allowed.

Party decree is law.

The messianic pretensions of Soviet

society are alien, Sakharov claims, to the ideal society.

12

Divergent

thoughts should be tolerated, lest society stultify and decay.

Pres

sures for conformity require the Soviet citizen to lead a double life.
At work, he pays lip service to Party slogans.
at the Party line.

In private, he sneers

Since professional advancement more often results

from ideological conformity than from expertise, those who rise to the
top of their field are usually "hypocrites and timeservers," Sakharov
believes.

13

"When Party guidelines govern promotion, society is run. by

a ruling "mediocracy."
The Soviet citizen must thus practice his own brand of double
think, assuming the trappings of conformity to hide a foundation of
weary cynicism.

Dependent on the state for his livelihood, information,

promotions, and even entertainment, the Soviet citizen is a product of
Soviet totalitarianism.

Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov notes that the

system forces each person to participate in the Big Lie.
citizens extol the regime and support oppression.
apathetic.

Publicly,

Privately, they are
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Perhaps such psychological tricks offer the only way to cope
with an intolerant government.

The contrast between myth and reality

is so stark that this two-track way of thinking is understandable.
Daily propaganda publicizes the state ls love of peace, yet society is
militarized to an unprecedented degree.

Since most resources are sac

rificed at the altar of heavy industry, Soviet society does not even
faintly approach the worldfs highest living standard.

"iii

Sakharov as

serts that Soviet "supermilitarism" causes high defense budgets
worldwide. ^

As Roman mothers frightened their children by screaming

"Hannibal ad portas!M so do the Soviet rulers parade the Chinese bogey
man to bolster the garrison state at home.

Eradicating this

"barrack-square" mentality is impossible, Sakharov believes, without
domestic political reform.
Though the Soviet worker is bombarded with the news that he is
the master of his country, he knows that "the real masters are those
who, morning and evening, speed through the deserted, closed-off streets

"16
in their armed limousines.11

Proclaiming itself the worldTs most

democratic state, the regime holds between 2,000 and 10,000 political
17
prisoners..

To ensure that the myth of Soviet superiority is not de-

flated, morbid secrecy enshrouds the country.

18

Despite claims of

supporting "progressive elements11 in foreign countries, Soviet diplomacy is characterized by a "pragmatic lack of principle."

19

Thus does

the regime, under the guise of aiding ’tars of national liberation,"
support the genocide of Ibos in Nigeria and Kurds in Iraq.

On the pre

text of aiding "enlightened factions," Soviet leaders arms the
corpulent dictator Amin in Uganda and the mercurial Qaddafi in Libya.

20
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Despite the rhetoric, Sakharov concludes, Soviet diplomacy embraces
Machtpolitik so cynically that even a Bismarck would be impressed.
Sakharov’s critique of the Soviet system has changed through
the years.

For example, in his 1968 treatise Progress, Coexistence and

Intellectual Freedom (hereafter referred to as Progress), Sakharov
claimed that in economic performance, socialism and capitalism had
on

"played to a tie.”

From 1968 to 197U, however, he grew more con

vinced of the inferiority of the Soviet socialist alternative with
its attendant poverty, inefficiency, and shoddiness.
In 1968, Sakharov seems almost Sinophobic in condemning Maoism.
The specter of Asian hordes seemed to loom large as he wrote that "our
chief foreign policy problems is our relations with China."

22

In this

respect, the Sakharov of 1968 is similar to Solzhenitsyn and Amalrik,
both of whom warn darkly of an impending Sino-Soviet war.

Yet in the

early 1970’s, Sakharov abandons his inordinate concern over the Chinese
menace.

Again, as in 198U Oceana alternately fights Eurasia and

Eastasia as an excuse for militarizing society, so do Soviet rulers
alternately use the capitalist and Maoist "threats" to legitimize
their own rule.
On balance, Soviet society has more faults than virtues,
Sakharov believes.^
temporary aberrations.

In 1968, he seemed to view these faults as
After nine years of vain struggle to re

form the system, Sakharov is more convinced that the problems are
deeply rooted.

Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov calls for a regeneration

among the Russian people.^

His regeneration would differ from Solzhe

nitsyn’s however, by being less patriarchal, less nationalistic.

Sak

harov calls for a spiritual renewal that will avoid the twin extremes
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of asceticism and materialism.

He seeks reform* not to recover a

sense of Mother Russia” or to retreat into the past -wearing sackcloth
and ashes* but to realign Russia and the world along "democratic
scientific" principles. Sakharov believes that Solzhenitsyn condemns
one anachronism (i.e.* Soviet tyranny) while replacing it with
another anachronism (i.e.* Great Russian chauvinism).

Instead* Sak

harov attempts to synthesize the most ennobling socialist ideals with
the most m o d e m scientific techniques.
Marxism and Socialism
Like his view of the Soviet state* Sakharov's attitude to
ward socialism has changed since 1968.

In Progress 3 he laces his

arguments -with Marxist jargon* referring to the class struggle*
progressive forces* and the scientific approach to politics.

He is

deferential to Marx and Lenin.

To temper his criticisms* Sakharov
2d
states in 1968 that his views are "profoundly socialist."
In 1968*

Sakharov argues that despite its flaws* the Soviet system had "demon
strated the vitality of the socialist course" and "like no other
26
system* has glorified the moral significance of labor."
Criti
cizing society from a Marxist perspective* Sakharov recalls that
Marx and Lenin distinguished between bureaucratic and democratic
systems of socialism.

27

The latter is Sakharov's ideal; the former

represents the Soviet state.

Note* Solzhenitsyn sees Soviet state

capitalism as a predictable product of Marxist thought.

Sakharov*

however* sees it as the perversion of an essentially humane ideology.
Unlike Solzhenitsyn* Sakharov argues that the term "Leninist"
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is meaningful and urges that Lenin’s ideals be recovered.

He associ

ates Lenin with humaneness* toleration* and self-determination.

At

least in 1968* Sakharov believes that Lenin’s successors have be-trayed the spirit of 1917*

Lenin’s nationality policy Sakharov

judges to be particularly enlightened.
style of rule* Sakharov argues.

Leninism was a distinctive

One cannot accept Peter Dornan’s

view* therefore* that ’’the term ’Leninist’ has no real meaning for
29
Sakharov.”

On the contrary* the fact that the term is fraught with

meaning is probably the main reason for Sakharov’s early dissent.
Yet Sakharov offers his own revisions of the Marxist creed in
1968.

For instance* he argues that dogmatic anti-capitalism is just

as unwarranted (perhaps less so) as rabid anti-communism.

30

Joseph

McCarthy's ruthlessness was lukewarm compared to Soviet paranoia
concerning ’’bourgois influences.”

Sakharov calls for an undogmatic

Marxism* one that recognizes and incorporates positive features from
capitalism.
The Marxist concept of dialectic receives special considera
tion.

Though the capitalist world gave birth to the socialist system*

this does not mean that the two systems are irreconcilable.

That

socialism follows capitalism in Marx’s view of history does not prove
either the superiority of socialism or the inferiority of capitalism.
Sequence does not necessarily impart value.

"Without an Igor Tamm* the

scientific breakthroughs of Andrei Sakharov might have been impossible;
but no one condemns Tamm because his views paved the way for Sakharov’s
accomplishments.

To do so would be to jump from time to value* a log

ically unwarranted leap.

Especially in a nuclear age* the antagonistic
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notion of the dialectic is suicidal and stupid, Sakharov argues.
Between 1968 and 1975* Sakharov sours toward socialism in
general.

Heretofore, he argues, all socialist states have been re

pressive.

Sakharov refers to the "ordeals which, so far, no communist

country has been spared: cultural revolutions, massive repressions,
and the dominance of the bureaucracy."

32

In My Country and the World

(hereafter referred to as My Country), he argues that socialism has
thus far always meant a one-party state, bureaucratic tyranny, secret
police terror, expropriation of nearly all private property, and worker
exploitation.

33

Religious persecution is a "frightful tradition" in
"3)
all socialist states, he argues.
Soviet society is not alone in its
excesses.
tofore.

Totalitarian socialism is all that the world has seen here
Ideal socialism would leave some private property intact,

tolerate competing political parties, and allow free expression of
ideas.
Existing totalitarian socialism (Sakharov also calls it
"pseudosocialism") is an historical dead end.

Sakharov refers to the

late Arkady Belinkov, another dissident, who once wrote that "social
ism is the kind of thing that is easy to sample but hard to spit
35
out." ^

Indeed, there are many examples of countries which have

passed from feudalism or capitalism into socialism, but there are few
instances of socialism evolving into a capitalist structure.

His

criticism is not merely that socialism has never voluntarily evolved
into a capitalist or democratic structure.

Sakharov’s point is rather

that socialism has never evolved into any different system, period.
This is why Sakharov tends (he seems undecided on the issue) to view
present socialism as an historical cul de sac.
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Totalitarian socialism is an impostor for true Marxism.

Demo

cratic socialism is Sakharov’s preferred alternative, but he claims
that presently it does not exist. Obviously Sakharov has not
abandoned all hope of evolution toward progressive principles in the
Soviet Union.

But he believes that some external force, such as

Western pressure, must facilitate the process.

Sakharov is gloomy,

not about evolution per se, but about voluntary liberalization.
Sakharov had come a long way from his ’’profound socialism” of
1968.

In a 1972 interview with Jay Axelbahk of Newsweek, Sakharov

explained:
When
I wrote from wnau you caj_L a position or aosrraction . . . I called myself a socialist then, but I
have now modified my beliefs . . . I would no longer
label
myself a socialist,j _
I —am --not— a---Marxist-Leninist,
----------- _■
a communist. I would call myself a liberal.-51
Similarly, in an October 1973 interview with the Swedish journalist
Olle Stenholm, Sakharov declared,
I am skeptical about socialism in general. I don’t
see that socialism offers some kind of new theoretical
plan, so to speak, for the better organization of
society. . . We have the same kinds of problems as the
capitalist world: criminality and alienation. The
difference is that our society is an extreme case, with
maximum lack of freedom, maximum ideological rigidity,
and— this is the most typical— with maximum pretensions
the best society, although it is certainly
At this point, one might be tempted to conclude that Sakharov em
braces Solzhenitsyn’s blanket rejection of socialism.
be a mistake, however.

This would

Later in the Stenholm interview, Sakharov

argues that socialism does not require an absence of competing
parties, implying that present forms of socialism exhibit flaws not
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qO
endemic to Marxism.

Solzhenitsyn refuses to concede this point.

In

197$j Sakharov believes that a different kind of socialism— ’’socialism with a human face”— is possible even if it is now rare.

39

To be

sure, Sakharov conpares Soviet communism to Western capitalism.

To

be sure, neither structure conforms exactly to Sakharov’s liberalism.
Still, it is clear that he believes Western capitalism to be closer to
the ’’scientific— democratic” ideal than its Soviet socialist counter
part.
What may account for the changes in Sakharov’s thought?

Soon

after Sakharov completed his 1968 treatise, Soviet tanks rumbled
into Czechoslovakia to squelch the democratic reforms of IhibcSek’s
’’Prague Spring.”

Sakharov was deeply shaken by this action, fearing

that it. heralded a return to Stalinism.

Perhaps at this point he

grew more bitter toward the regime and everything associated with it.
Additionally, Sakharov had campaigned for a limitation on nuclear
testing ever since Khrushchev’s reign.

Toward the end of the 1960’s,

the futility of Sakharov’s pleas became apparent.

With an ever-in-

creasing megatonnage, nuclear testing continued.

The Soviet arsenal

grew.

Perhaps Sakharov then decided to discard his faith in social

ism and become a more strident critic.
More disillusionment followed.

For publishing his unorthodox

ideas in Progress, Sakharov was dropped from the Soviet nuclear
program.

He was denied access to classified information.

press began to hound him.
scientific colleagues.

The official

He became a persona non grata among his

Realizing the enormity of the reformer’s task,

Sakharov may have decided to revise his mild-mannered musings of 1968.
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Meanwhile, many of his dissident friends were harassed.
imir Bukovsky was sent to a psychiatric prison.
Chalidze, and Zhores Medvedev were exiled.
endangered.

Vlad

Solzhenitsyn,

Sakharov’s family seemed

As his circle of acquaintances grew, Sakharov’s knowledge

of the outside world increased correspondingly.

Perhaps the flaws

were more deep-seated than he had originally thought.

Having more

time to reflect and more opportunities to compare systems, Sakharov’s
assumptions regarding socialism were revised.
Stalinism
Stalinism was the supreme bastardization of Marxism, Sakharov
believes.

The 'Stalinist system displayed the worst excesses of total

itarian socialism.
of Soviet tyranny.^

Stalinism, not socialism, has been the main source
Though Stalin has been dead for nearly a quarter

of a century, neo-Stalinists remain lodged in the ruling organs.
Vestiges of Stalin’s mentality— intolerance, paranoia, cunning— these
linger long after Khrushchev’s so-called denunciation of the dead
vozhd. Accordingly, neo-Stalinists should be purged from the govern
ment’s ranks.

Only a thoroughgoing expose of Stalin’s crimes can lay

the foundation for a regeneration and democratization of Soviet so
ciety.

Archives of the secret police should be opened for public

inspection, political victims rehabilitated, and ’’little Stalins” rooted
out of their positions.^"

Though in 1970 Sakharov is less confident

regarding the possibility of democratic socialism, in 1968 he passes
Stalinism off as ”a tragic accident, a serious, though not inevitable,
I l2

disease.”

This conviction is shaken in the 1970’s as he learns of
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many other police states which clothe their repression in Marxist
garb.
In any case, Sakharov rejects Solzhenitsyn’s facile view that
there is no such thing as Stalinism.
harov.

Most observers agree with Sak

The latter contrasts Lenin’s lenient nationality policy with

Stalin’s harshness.

Indeed, Lenin complained of Stalin’s ruthlessness

when the Georgian was the Commissar of Nationalities.

Lenin may have

been no gentle lamb, but the contrast between him and Stalin is never
theless vivid.

No matter how fiercely Lenin hated a fellow Comrade,

he never had him killed but instead preferred ’’rehabilitation.”

Lenin

scrupulously observed the principle of leadership collegiality and,
unlike Stalin, refused to concentrate all power in his own hands.
Posited against Stalin’s narcissism is Lenin’s self-effacement.

Sig

nificantly, the ’’cult of Lenin” grew only after the leader’s death.
Stalin, on the other hand, craved idolatry while he was still alive.
Absent in Lenin was Stalin’s morbid paranoia.

Shortly before

he died, Lenin warned Kamenev and Zinoviev about Stalin’s rudeness and
arrogance.

A Stalinist-style purge would have been out of character

for Lenin.

Anyway, Stalin felt threatened by Lenin loyalists, the old

Bolshevik ’’class of 1917.” Who could have possibly aroused such fear
in Lenin?

And no doubt Lenin favored collectivization, but never at

such a crushing pace and at the cost of "liquidating the kulaks as a
class.”

The reforms of the New Economic Policy of the early 1920’s

attest to Lenin’s gradualism as opposed to Stalin’s impatience for
industrialization.

Notwithstanding the historical reconstructions of

Lenin in Zurich (is it a novel?

An historical novel?

An authentic
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documentary?), Sakharov cannot accept Solzhenitsyn’s simplistic view
of Stalinist evil.
The Problem of Change
Gradualism
Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov rejects revolution as a means for
societal change.

His reasons for this opposition are also similar to

Solzhenitsyn’s.

For Sakharov., revolutions spell violence, destruction

of worthwhile economic and legal institutions, ’’mass sufferings, law
lessness, and h o r r o r s A s i d e from these general risks, Russia has
experienced so much turmoil that another revolution would irreparably
rip society apart.

Sakharov echoes the 19th century Fabian socialist

view regarding the ’’inevitability of gradualness.”

Positive reform

will more likely result from working within the system— forming groups,
petitioning the government, and appealling to world public opinion.
While Solzhenitsyn believes that meaningful change will start only at
the individual level and is skeptical toward mass movements in general,
Sakharov thinks that group action is the answer to the problem of
reform.

Solzhenitsyn is largely contemptuous of political panaceas,

preferring individual commitment.

Sakharov prefers broad-based action

reminiscent of vintage 19th century Russian populism.
Concerted action is necessary because the Soviet system will
not reform itself, Sakharov believes.^- Sakharov shares Solzhenitsyn’s
concern that reform be based on certain values.
be sought with a ’’scientific” spirit.

First, reform should

By "scientific,” Sakharov means

"a method based on deep analysis of facts, theories, and views,

presupposing unprejudiced, unfearing open discussion and conclu
sions.’’^

This rigorous approach excludes the ideological monism of

Soviet society.

Second, reform should aim at nthe systematic defense

of human rights.

Sakharov judges all action by whether or not it

advances the cause of human rights.

Such rights forbid torture, geno

cide, censorship, and travel restrictions.

Third and more generally,

reform must aim at democratizing Soviet society.

Interestingly (perhaps

naively), Sakharov believes that democratization can be implemented
"with the direction of the CPSU" and that such a process is fully com
patible with the Party’s ’’leading role" in economic, political and
j ^rj
cultural life.
But democratization must be well-planned and gradual.
Sakharov labors under no timetable even though, as we shall see later,
he does have general target dates.
In 1968, Sakharov displays his own brand of dogmatism.

Arg

uing for peaceful coexistence in general, Sakharov rejects any
"ideological collaboration" with "ideologies cf Fascist, racist, miliI4.8
taristic, and Maoist demagogy."
Mow we know with what groups
Sakharov will work.
picture.

China and her 800 million are removed from the

Since he laments the plight of the black American, Sakharov

must thus exclude "racist" America from his plans.

And as for mili

taristic countries, Sakharov has just excluded his own regime!

Surely

this is unintended, but Sakharov’s refusal to even talk with those
systems he deems to be beyond the pale renders his proposals banal.
He patiently explains how Soviet society is oppressive and militaristic,
yet he is willing to work within and compromise with his system.

Some

how, in an astonishingly inconsistent vein, he cannot bring himself to
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recognize other extremist governments.

Yet strict adherence to this

principle -would prevent Sakharov from reforming his own society.

Were

Sakharov not an internationalist* this inconsistency would not severly
damage his proposals.

But since SakharovTs is a global vision* he

clearly cannot change the world the same way one manages a country
club— admitting only those whose views he finds palatable.
Sakharov also exhibits a classic liberal faith in education as
a means of improving society.

Whether he convenes a meeting in his

Moscow apartment* writes to foreign heads of state* or circulates
samizdat at home* Sakharov aims his appeal not only at Russia but at
ho
the world.
He is more of an internationalist than Solzhenitsyn.
Their different perspectives are attributable to their divergent ver
dicts regarding the West rs ability to induce Soviet reform.

Confident

that applying reason or "scientific principles" to problems will
improve society* Sakharov shares the Enlightenment’s esteem for ration
ality.
torpor.

In the Enlightenment* Sakharov sees the cure for Russia’s
In the Enlightenment* Solzhenitsyn sees the secularization of

society and the seeds of moral relativism.

To one thinker* Enlight

enment values are the answer; to the other* they constitute the problem.
The Intelligentsia
When he speaks of the intelligentsia* Sakharov generally means
the scientific and artistic elite of Soviet society.

His view is much

more all-encompassing than Solzhenitsyn's* which demands of the intel
ligent more character than intellect.

Because of the demands of

modernization* the new technocracy constitutes "the most socially
conscious and influential segment of society."

Sakharov believes

88.
that the intelligentsia reflect the true interests of the masses

51

He seems to imply that the new experts are so vital to the regimefs
modernization schemes that their demands for democratization will have
to be met.

The artistic elite now seem to be left behind, since their
/

skills are not needed for industrialization.

Sakharov believes that

secretly, most of the intelligentsia desire democratic reform.
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But

owing to low pay, an atmosphere of anti-intellectualism, and ideologi
cal rigidity, the intelligentsia has been cowed into submission.
The state needs the scientific intelligentsia, but distrusts
it.

Dangling the carrot of special privileges, brandishing the threat

of unemployment or worse, the Soviet rulers have intimidated the
scientific elite.

The result is a "narrow professionalism" wherein

scientists are too timid to pursue innovative projects lest they become controversial.

53

. More than anyone else, the intellectual must

lead a dual life, gaining through private discussions the intellectual
gratification denied him by his job.
Between Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, therefore, we see two
vastly different ideas regarding the intelligentsia.
the intellectual symbolizes rationality.
moral rectitude.

To Sakharov,

To Solzhenitsyn, he embodies

The difference is one of emphasis between the smart

man and the good man, between logos and ethos. In Sakharov^ plan
for reform, the intellectual proselytizes.

In Solzhenitsyn1s vision,

the intellectual serves as an inspiring example only.

During 1976

interview with Michael Charlton of the British Broadcasting Company,
Solzhenitsyn stated,
Once I used to hope that experience of life could be
handed on from nation to nation, and from one person to
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another, but now I am beginning to have my doubts
about this. Perhaps everyone is fated to live
through every experience himself in order to un
derstand.^
The argument strikes right at the heart of Sakharov’s assumption con
cerning the transmittability of human experience.

The Enlightenment

faith in education requires one to reject Solzhenitsyn7s view.
Starting from two different epistemological premises, Sakharov and
Solzhenitsyn predictably reach different conclusions regarding the
intelligentsia, its role in reform, and the efficacy of mass move
ments in general.
Intellectual freedom
Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov values intellectual freedom as a
means to an end, an instrumental good.

Freedom of thought is the

only antidote to mass myths, untruths, and demagogy.
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With his

notion of a ’’marketplace of ideas,” Sakharov resembles the liberal
British philosopher John Stuart M U .

Given a chance to compete

against Soviet ideology, democratic values would quickly spread, Sak
harov implies.

Free thought is thus a precondition for democratization.

Short of far-reaching reforms, however, freedom of thought is
needed in order for society to grow and flourish.
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Sakharov has an

organic view of society: that which does not grow, dies.
ship comes entropy.

With censor

Free exchange of ideas is society’s lifeblood.

Without such freedom, genuine society does not exist.

Instead, people

merely live close to one another in an atmosphere of intellectual
sterility.
Government regulation causes the arts to stultify.

Sakharov

claims that ’’incompetent fmy italics] censorship destroys the living
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soul of Soviet literature.”

Innovative ideas which could improve

society are thus nipped in the bud.

Sakharov implies that some

censorship— i.e., competent censorship— is legitimate, but he never
explains this nuance in his reasoning.

No doubt Glavlit, the state’s

literary watchdog, considers itself a competent censor.
what is a competent censor?

But just

And how can Sakharov ensure that the con

cept of ’’competence” will not be perverted to stifle free thought?
And as long as there is some limit on free expression in Russia, will
not people still be deterred from speaking their minds?

Sakharov

leaves these questions unanswered.
Intellectual freedom humanizes society, rooting out dogmatismand mediocrity.

Progress necessitates intellectual freedom.

liberty will also presumably curb Soviet adventurism abroad.

Such
Domes

tic democratic pressure will produce a more peaceful foreign policy.
Thus does Sakharov, the consummate liberal, embrace a Wilsonian view
of foreign policy: democratic states are peace-loving; autocracies
are usually militaristic.

Finally, intellectual freedom is the sine

qua non of a ’’scientific democratic” approach to politics.
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Through

appeals and patient explanation to the Politburo, Academican Sakharov
will presumably persuade the leaders to recognize the folly of their
oppressive ways, and a hundred flowers will bloom.

Having reformed

Soviet society, Sakharov and his coterie will proceed with the larger
task of perfecting the world.
Ethics and Values
Certain values must underly reform.

One source of these
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values is the human conscience.

In referring to "man’s moral yearning

for the good," Sakharov echoes Solzhenitsyn’s belief in conscience as
<9
the wellspring of values.
Man has an instinctive sense of right and
wrong, Sakharov implies, but this sense has become distorted in the
surrealistic atmosphere which prevails in the Soviet Union.
Beyond this, Sakharov believes that man is b o m with certain
natural rights.
travel.

These include freedom of thought, religion, and

Defense of these rights is the state’s raison d f etre, Sak

harov argues

Unlike a theorist such as John Locke, however,

Sakharov does not agree that a state’s violation of these rights jus
tifies revolution.

Since revolution usually begets only greater

injustice, he argu.es, reform is the saner option.

Sakharov’s con

victions regarding human rights do not rest soley upon the pangs of
conscience, therefore, but on the notion of natural law as well.
These convictions also rest upon Sakharov’s faith in science.

Re

spect for human rights will facilitate the ”scientific-democratic”
approach to politics.

Free discussion, for instance, will encourage

competition among ideas, the best of which will presumably emerge as
polity.
Even if prospects for reform are bleak, the struggle against
inhumanity must continue.

By trying to mold society around the con

cepts of natural rights and scientific principles, the dissident
reaffirms his own humanity in the face of overwhelming odds •
If a man does not keep silent it does not mean that he
hopes necessarily to achieve something. . . He may hope for
nothing but nonetheless speak because he cannot, simply
cannot remain silent. There is a need to create ideals
even when you can’t see any route by which to achieve them, because if there are no ideals then there can be no
hope.°l
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Dissent is thus an existential imperative for the dissatisfied man.
Self-determination should he one value underlying reform,
Sakharov believes.

Just as each nation has a right to choose its

own form of government, individuals have the right to choose the so
ciety in •which they wish to live.
essential.
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Freedom of emigration is thus

Travel restrictions and the prevalence of Jewish refuse-

niks attest to the Soviet violation of this principle.
oppression experienced by individuals only.

Nor is such

Ethnic groups, such as

the displaced Crimean Tatars, should also be accorded self-determina
tion and returned to their homeland.

It is unclear whether by

self-determination Sakharov means limited autonomy or full statehood.
Tiny groups, such as the Mezhki Turks, receive special sympathy.

But

it is not apparent that Sakharov would support secession on the part
of a larger Union Republic.
Additionally, Sakharov calls for a more acute awareness regarding the effect of science on human values.

6)1

In an age of genetic

research and nuclear weapons, Sakharov rs plea finds much resonance.
Like the American physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, Sakharov!s personal
experience.in weapons development lends urgency to his appeal.

The

Soviet scientist believes that education and pleas will make his col
leagues more mindful of their responsibility for human welfare above
all else.

Solzhenitsyn dismisses Sakharovfs idea as unrealistic:

"In all the history of science, has scientific foresight ever saved
us from anything?

If it has, we normally know nothing of it."
l
Undaunted, Sakharov still hopes that other scientists will follow his
lead in opposing the arms race and the suppression of dissent.

The New Enlightenment
For his own country, Sakharov advocates many democratic reforms.

So

viet citizens should be able to elect their own officials, choosing
between many different candidates from various parties.
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Though

Sakharov concedes that a multiparty system is not always necessary,
he never fails to advocate such an arrangement whenever he speaks of
reform.

Party officials should also fill elective positions.

amounts of private ownership should be allowed.

Larger

With independent

newspapers and a purge of neo-Stalinists, Soviet society will recover
its original creativity and dynamism.

All aspects of life will

flourish and ’’full information and competition” will rejuvenate the
£r?

intellectual atmosphere.
.On the global level, Sakharov’s plans are more ambitious.

He

advocates that UN armed forces be granted the power to quell conflicts,
not just between nations but within nations as well.
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An inter

national council of jurists and scientists should be formed to advise
the UN on matters pertaining to human rights and pollution.

In order

to deflate military budgets and to aid poor states, a l£-year tax
equal to one-fifth the national income should be levied on developed
nations.

Even though countries such as the United States may have to

reduce their standard of living, this will be done voluntarily, Sak69
harov believes, ’’solely for the sake of lofty and distant goals.”
Though Sakharov labors under no timetable, he does have some
target dates in his world plan.

By 1980, socialist countries should

reform along the lines of multiparty democracy, peaceful coexistence,
and economic efficiency.

From 1972 to 1985, capitalist states should

9U.
eliminate racism within their borders and should also endorse peace
ful coexistence.

The period from 1972 to 1990 should witness a joint

Soviet-American effort at disarmament and world economic development.
Detente will thus become entente.

From 1980 to the year 2000, the

systems will grow to resemble each other or "converge," '’national
contradictions” will subside, a world government will be created, and
/
\
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inexhaustible fuel sources (such as fusion; will be harnessed.

Sak

harov emphasizes that these dates are suggestions, not ironclad
deadlines.
Critical Evaluation
It would be tempting, though mistaken, to view Solzhenitsyn
as the dissident utopian and Sakharov as the dissenting realist.

For

instance, Sakharov argues that democratization will be carried out
under the supervision of the CPSU.

Moreover, he claims that demo

cratization is compatible with the "leading role of the Party” in
politics, economics, and culture.

But is it realistic to expect the

Party, which has heretofore jealously guarded its authority, to volun
tarily place itself in a weaker position?

Will the Party relinquish

its hold over all aspects of Soviet life?

And since Sakharov believes

that the Party still embodies some mass myths, how can that same Party
play a "leading role” in society, given competition among ideas?
He is no realist.
countries.

Sakharov calls for a tax on'developed

Without bothering to define the term "developed," he

proceeds to assert that richer nations will submit to this levy for
the sake of "lofty and distant goals.” But if such voluntarism ex
isted, there would now be no problem of a gap between rich and poor
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states.

For the sake of lofty goals, affluent nations can now offer

foreign aid or contribute to the World Bank.

Were Sakharov’s assump

tions regarding voluntary effort valid, the problem he seeks to solve
would not exist.
To stabilize conflicts, Sakharov urges more frequent UN in
tervention.
however.

Such a policy might only increase international violence,

Clearly, Sakharov favors TUT forces defending the Kurds in

Iraq and the Ache in Paraguay.

But would he also support UN inter

vention to defend human rights in, say, Alabama or the Ukraine?
has already written that injustice is committed in both areas.

He
But

given the present voting arrangement in the UN Security Council, any
proposal to intervene in either region would be vetoed.

Sakharov

never proposes to restructure UN voting arrangements j he offers no
way to de-politicize the issue of UN intervention.

He is no more

realistic than Solzhenitsyn.
Were UN interventions more frequent, the world would be even
more unstable in many cases.
tive security arrangements.

Herein lies one problem of all collec
Through multinational action, local

conflicts assume global implications• Rarely is the offending nation
totally alone in the world arena.

As the UN internationalizes a

crises, the dispute turns frcm one between local combatants to one
among many nations • Internal disputes can thus escalate into world
71

wars.

Yet Sakharov advances his proposal in the name of peace.
Sakharov’s greatest strength may also be his greatest weak

ness:

an undue faith in rationality and reason.

His is an

over-intellectualized approach in assuming that education cures all
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ill.

In the view of Walter G. Clemens of Boston University,
Sakharov writes and acts as though most men will,
in the long run, respond to reasoned argumentation.
He writes as though egotistical drives for wealth and
power— even for blood-letting— could be eliminated if
enlightenment spread.'

Sakharov reasons from intellect to ethics.
usually be a good man, in his view.

The educated man will

Yet the Albert Speer and the

Trofim Lysenko show that this is not always the case.

There is no

necessary connection between intellect and rectitude.

Modern society

is probably the most educated of all time and undoubtedly the most
scientifically advanced.

Have these factors spawned the "best" so

ciety or an enlightened world?
have no reason to dissent.

If they had, then Sakharov would

Since he does seek change, the very ex

istence of his appeal undermines his correlation between knowledge
and virtue.
Sakharov’s edifice of world government also rests on many
tenuous claims.
ority.

Avoidance of nuclear war is the world’s first pri

Most people, he believes, would prefer anything (including

the victory of their enemies) to nuclear war.

But is the fear of

nuclear war really the world's most absorbing preoccupation?

And, if

it is not, should it even be the world’s foremost concern?
Neither question can be honestly answered in the affirmative.

Like

many other world state proponents, Sakharov puts himself in the po
sition of arguing that global existence itself is the highest good.
But nations, like the individuals in them, cherish ideals for which
73
they are prepared to fight and, if necessary, die.

Importantly,

the choice is not between a holocaust and world government, but
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between the risk of nuclear war weighed against the perceived injus
tice of a global sovereign.

Most nations would rather joust with the

threat (usually dimly perceived) of war than to relinguish their
sovereignty and freedom of action.

And as long as a single nation-

/

state believes this and resists the new leviathan, Sakharov’s plans
for genuine peace and world government will be shattered.

Given one

recalcitrant state, Sakharov would either have to resort to conquest
(an act he condemns) or to a non-global state (a structure he views
as antiquated).
Nations do not rank peace as an absolute value to be pursued
7)
at all costs.
As long as one nation or group perceives the global
state as illegitimate, imposing the new order on a reluctant world
would edge manking closer to the nuclear Armageddon that Sakharov
fears.

In the abstract, nearly every country decries nuclear war.

(Need we recall that 800 million Chinese follow an ideology which
belittles the horror of nuclear war?)

In practice, virtually no one

thinks the risk is so great as to justify relinguishing sovereignty.
World government can only follow, it cannot magically create, a
genuine worldwide community of values.

Abhorrence of the mushroom

cloud is, by itself, an insufficient basis for such consensus.

Witb-

out this consensus, world government will be established by conquest
only.

Sakharov might reply that the convergence process itself

creates a suitable worldwide community of values.
this answer in a moment.

We will consider

♦

Perhaps this makes too much of Sakharov's ideas regarding
world government.

On the surface, he seems to endorse a plurality of

values— peace, freedom, private ownership.

But without comprehending

that these values often conflict with one another, Sakharov ends up
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exalting one value— avoidance of nuclear war— above all others.

Far

frcm being all sweetness and light, Sakharov’s analysis has a dark and
troubling side.

Despite his liberal intentions, his call and justi

fication for world order would produce the most illiberal policies.
The whole notion of convergence is also suspect.

Adam Ulam

has pointed out, for instance, that convergence is found only between
the societies, and not the governments, of East and West.

An in

dustrial manager in Pittsburgh perhaps faces the same problems and
offers the same solutions as his counterpart in Smolensk.

Nothing in

dicates that this induces a convergence between the values, procedures,
or aims of the respective regimes, however.

Societal convergence

should therefore not be mistaken for political identity.
Convergence theorists also overlook the difference in the means
of industrialization between East and West.

In America,-industriali

zation has been a gradual and decentralized process based on private
ownership.

In Russia, modernization has been accomplished at a forced

pace directed from the highest Party and state echelons.

The converg

ence theorist (of which Sakharov is a prime example) often fails to
recognize differing values underlying surface similarities.
Despite increased governmental regulations and burgeoning
welfare programs, American modernization is still based on private
ownership.

Despite experiments in decentralization and private enter

prise, Soviet industrialization remains a state-owned endeavor.
Convergence, such as it is, leaves basic values and organizational
nO
methods unchanged.
Nor is it likely that the new technocrats will agi
tate for reform.

Their advancement will still be based as much on Party
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loyalty as on technical competence.

The experts are not so indispens

able that all of their demands for reform will be heeded.

Given the

abundance of the new technical elites, other, more pliable replacements
can be found for the random renegade.

Yes, perhaps the consumer will

suffer, but since when has consumer preference been the Politburo’s
prime motivating force?

The new breed of specialists may indeed enter

the political arena, but their access to the door will be controlled
by the Party and will be on the Party’s terms.
Underlying Sakharov's convergence theory is the assumption
that ideology is the major source of East-West tension.

But even if

the respective systems renounced their ideologies, clashes of national
interests even, mutual suspicions, might’still produce tension between
East and West.

Systemic convergence, trade links, and ties of line

age did not prevent a major European war in 19lU, for instance.

Not

only is convergence a mistaken path toward Soviet democracy, but
neither is it a guarantee against conflict.
Conclusion
Perhaps in the long run Sakharov will be remembered more for
what he did than for what he wrote.

But as action is rooted in

thought, one cannot fully understand his dissent without his doctrine.
Westerners usually show a greater affinity to Sakharov than to Solzhe
nitsyn.

More than the brooding novelist, Sakharov tells the West what

it wants to hear.

With his liberal-democratic perspective, Sakharov

speaks in a familiar language to the West but in almost unintelligible
tones to his countiymen.
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It has been said that the first Soviet generation was guided
by ideology, the second by terror, and the third by cynicism.

In a

wary age, Sakharov tries to rejuvenate the spirit of the early 1920’s.
He writes and works to remind others that reform is possible.
Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov leads an organized movement.

Unlike

Having surveyed

Soviet society from a privileged pinnacle, he now tastes the isolation
of the pariah.

Friends support him, Presidents write to him, but he

alone directs the struggle.
be a dreaming idealist.

He may be a Russian philosophe.

He may

But his leadership is unquestioned.

He was, as they say, a crystal of morality. . . He
was devoted to the idea that science should bring peace
and prosperity to the world, that it should help Pre
serve and improve the conditions for human life.79
Such accolades Sakharov received, not from a fellow dissident, nor
from a Western supporter, but from one of his critics, Nikita S.
Khrushchev.
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CHAPTER 17

ALMARIK: THE DISSIDENT
AS SEER
If there was any question that the dissident movement was
heterogeneous* such doubts should be dispelled by the presence of
Andrei Amalrik.

An historian by trade* Amalrik has almost as little

in common with other dissidents as he does with the Soviet leaders.
In early 1960’s* Amalrik was expelled from Moscow State Uni*
versity for holding un-Marxist views. In 19&3 came his first brush
with the authorities.

Amalrik*s early work* The Norsemen and

Kievan Russia, contained the decidedly unpopular thesis that the
eleventh-century Slavic state was founded by Scandanavians. Unable
to publish this volume* Amalrik entered the Danish embassy in order
to send his manuscript to an interested professor in Copenhagen.
Though not strictly illegal* this act aroused official ire and
marked Amalrik as a possible troublemaker for the regime.
It was not a mistaken verdict.

Because of a congenital

heart infirmity* Amalrik held no steady job.

Instead* Amalrik cared

for his ailing father and* more ominously* socialized with avantgarde artists and foreign journalists.

On the pretext of

"parasitism*"— i.e.* living off of the state by not having steady
work— Amalrik was tried and sentenced to three years of Siberian
exile in 196$.

Even after his conviction was overturned one year
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later* Amalrik refused to be cowed by the authorities.
Four years later* Amalrik was tried for "anti-Soviet be
havior."

His plays and* especially* his 1969 treatise foretelling

Soviet doom contained too many heresies.

To no one’s surprise*

Amalrik was found guilty and was sped away to prison.

Released

again in 197U* Amalrik continued to associate with foreigners and
refused to still his pen.

By the Summer of 1976* the regime could

brook no more insolence and it exiled Amalrik along with his Tarter
wife Guys el.

They now live in Utrecht* the Netherlands* and verbally

support the dissident cause.
Amalrik stands in bold relief to the two thinkers we have
previously considered.

Unlike Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov* Amalrik

constructs no philosophical system* embraces no ideology* offers
not a single soothing word regarding Russia’s future.
the loner* the seer* the soothsayer.

Amalrik is

Let us begin this discussion^

therefore* by exploring those beliefs that make Amalrik a dissident.
The Soviet System
■What we have seen thus far on the part of the dissidents is
a rather systematic demolition of the Soviet political mythology.
Both Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov offered point after point to show how
the Soviet system was morally bankrupt.
out* rational, and methodical.

Their reasons were thought-

Having once believed in the system*

these dissidents could trace their growing disillusionment with the
regime.
Such is not the case with Andrei Amalrik* however.
his dissent comes from the heart* not from the head.
more visceral than cerebral.

Rather*

His dissent is

Amalrik feels an "organic revulsion"
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toward the system.'- He cannot stand to hear its litany of lies.
Pointing to his head, Amalrik states that his-protest lies not here
but, jabbing a finger at his stomach, there.

MI am so opposed to

2
the system that in reaction I -want to do something with my hands."

And he has * In his two books, Will the Soviet Union Survive
Until 19 8U? (hereafter referred to as 198U) and Involuntary Journsy
to Siberia (hereafter referred to as Involuntary J o u m e y ), Amalrik
paints a picture of despair and doom.

Exactly what is it about

Soviet society that evokes Amalrik!s nausea?
system is based on lies.
lies.

The Party lies.

Pravdalies.

To start with, the

Izvestia

Amalrik, through contact

lies.

The radio

with ether free-

spirited dissidents and occasional foreigners, thinks he knows what
is true and what is not.

Soviet propaganda, with its boasts of

having-the best system, is most emphatically untrue, Amalrik argues.
Secondly, the system treats man as an instrument, not as an
end in himself.

Work in Msocially productive11 areas is the regime's

sole criterion of human worth, Amalrik laments.
denounced as the collective is exalted.
feel that Individualism is unnatural.

Self-interest is

Soviet citizens are made to
Callousness toward man's

full range of needs renders the Soviet system immoral in Amalrik's
view.

As Sakharov denounced the"barrack-square"

mentality of

Soviet society, so does Amalrik rail against thelemming-like
obedience of the masses.
Nihilism is a third flaw that the system exhibits, Amalrik
argues.

The Soviet people have lost all sense of values.

Traditional

morals such as honesty, love, and charity have now been replaced by the
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notion of "class morality."
Amalrik thinks.

Most Russians care only for themselves,

The Soviet rulers sustain themselves only because

they have power, not because they attract the hearts and minds of
the citizenry.

Power is its own sustaining force, the Soviet state’s

raison d ’etre. And the masses accept this, because they have the
attitude that "it’s useless to beat one’s head against a wall."
Fourth, and most importantly, Amalrik objects to the Soviet
system because it holds out absolutely no hope of improving itself.
What people now see as a gradual liberalization, Amalrik argues, is
really nothing more than the regime’s growing decrepitude.

While

liberalization is a planned process moving toward clearly defined
aims, the gradual "thaw" since Stalin’s death has neither been
thought-out nor officially endorsed.
Amalrik *s rejection of the Soviet system rests on these four
pillars.

Let us discuss in more detail what Amalrik sees as the

sources of these objectionable qualities.

Like Solzhenitsyn, Amalrik

distinguishes between Russian and Soviet national attributes.
Unlike Solzhenitsyn, Amalrik sees the Russian characteristics as
contemptible, maybe just as loathsome as Soviet qualities.

For in

stance, Amalrik argues, Russians generally see violence and coercion
3
as the only vehicle for change.
Rather than persuading, cajoling,
or quietly reforming, Russians would prefer to change a mind by
breaking an arm.

The whole notion of peaceful change is thus alien

to the Russian mind, Amalrik argues.
The Russian national character thus provided fertile soil
for Soviet tyranny.

Russia is "a country without belief, without
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traditions, -without culture and without the ability to do an honest
job."^"

Nihilism is a persistent strain in Russian thought, Amalrik

argues.

,TSelf-preservation, damn the moral consequences11— these

have always been the Russians's watchwords, he feels.
It is also significant, Amalrik notes, that what few beliefs
Russians have held have cone from Byzantine, not Western, Christ
ianity.

The Eastern Orthodox creed quickly took hold in Russia since

it was more "rigid and moribund" than its Western counterpart.
Byzantine thought possessed an enormous appetite for orthodoxy.
This habit of intolerance has ingrained upon the Russian mind all
the now familiar qualities of paranoia and intolerance, Analrik
$
argues.
Russians are also blindly patriotic, willing to* obey
practically anyone who preys upon their nationalistic sentiments.
Russians generally approved of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia
but were incensed when the Chinese started lobbing shells across
the Ussuri River one year later.

How prescient Lenin was when,

in a rarely noticed quote, he observed, "Scratch a Russian
Communist and you will find a Russian chauvinist"!

And Stalin knew

what he was doing when, in those first desperate campaigns in World
War II, he exhorted his people to defend not socialism, nor Stalin,
but the Motherland.
On the national level, Russia exhibits self-destructive
impulses, Amalrik argues.

The Russian state has always destroyed

its creators, whether the founders have been Seandanavians, By
zantines, Tatars, Germans, or Jews.

It will destroy the communists
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too, this historian argues. Since power is the only force sus
taining the regime, successive Russian states have lasted only as
long as a stronger claimant did not appear on the horizon.
sees Machtpolitik as Russia's second nature.

Amalrik

Russia, Amalrik argues,

. . . has betrayed all its allies as soon as it
found the slightest advantage in doing so. It has
never taken seriously any of its agreements . -And it
has never had anything in common with anyone.
Amalrik's verdict’on Russia and the Russians is, to put it mildly,
harsh.

When Solzhenitsyn speaks of traditional Russian values, he

thinks of love, piety, and self-sacrifice..

When Amalrik writes of

traditional Russian values, he thirds of violence, egotism, narrow
ness, and duplicity.
Soviet tyranny.

Solzhenitsyn sees Russian values as a foil to

Amalrik sees Russian values as the foundation for

later communist oppression.
In turn, the present regime reinforces these same despicable
qualities in the Soviet citizenry.

Soviet society exhibits a process

of "unnatural selection" in which only the mediocre survive.

The

result is that citizens are cast in the same molds of suspicion and
bigotry.

Just before the 2£th Party Congress in February 1976,

Amalrik was detained for questioning by the secret police.

Bnerging

from prison, Amalrik became depressed by the sight of the first two
people he saw.
How depressing it is, after all, I reflected, the
way the system molds people. Here are two of the first
Soviet people I've come across and they have the faces
of genuine stool pigeons.°
Almrik draws his own unflattering caricature of the New
Soviet Man.
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In any society government employees abound.

The conservative,,

bored and dull-witted bureaucrat is a timeless image -which finds
resonance in all cultures.

Unlike other societies, however, Russia

forces all of her people to be government employees.

Soviet citizens
9
exhibit on a much larger scale these same petty qualities.
Soviet
communism is really state capitalism, Amalrik Implies.

curs with Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov.)
controls the means of production.

(Here he con

The state, not the worker,

Since people work for the state and

not for themselves, their work simply becomes a "job."

The Soviet

worker finds no fulfillment in his labor. , Alienation is not solely a
problem of capitalist systems, therefore.
Despising his job, bored with the meaninglessness of routine,
the Soviet worker feels Impotent • No wonder vodka consumption is so
high and hooliganism so raiqpant.

"Since all of us work for the state,
”

we all have the psychology of government workers."

10

The Soviet citi

zenry is thus simply the typical bureaucracy writ large, with its
attendant conservatism and mediocrity.
Amalrik and Sakharov both agree that the Soviet citizen is a
product of Soviet totalitarianism.

Amalrik differs with Sakharov, how

ever, by contending that the Soviet citizen is a cause of Soviet tyranny
as well.
Sakharov.

Amalrik describes Homo Sovieticus in much bleaker terms than
But like Sakharov, Amalrik laments the uniformity and medio

crity of Soviet society.
not on skill.

Careers advance on the basis of Party loyalty,

The toady has replaced the expert.

Independent-minded

persons are weeded out of the advancement process, lest they become in
tractable • Party promotion criteria validate the Peter Principle in

11)4Soviet society: persons rise to their level of incompetence.

Unlike the

inept in other societies though, the Soviet bumbler will remain in his
position; it was not skill which put him there in the first place.

In

Almarik’s play, Is Uncle Jack a Conformist?, a rebellious youth insightfully notes that "people with real talent get persecuted these days."

11

In his plays, Amalrik portrays the apathy of the Soviet citi
zenry.

Resigned to his fate, the Soviet citizen feels impotent with

regard to his fate, and grows self-centered.

In My Aunt is Living in

Volokolamsk,, Amalrik portrays at least two characters— the neurasthenic
student and the poet— as sexually impotent.

Major Kovalev’s missing

proboscis in Nose! Nose? No-se! has obvious phallic overtones and sug
gests castration.

The imagery of sexual dysfunction may symbolize an

overriding sense of mass powerlesness regarding political change.

In

deed, the prominent mood of all of Almarikfs plays is one of impotence
and disorientation.
gratification.

12

Like the Soviet citizen, each character seeks

Like the Soviet citizen, all characters feel powerless

to change their fate, and people are concerned only about themselves.
In Amalrik1s drama, people talk at one another, speak past one another,
but rarely communicate with each other.
used word in Almarik's plays is "I."

Perhaps the most frequently

"When few believe in the regime’s

conception of the common good, egotism is the ready alternative.

And

given the surreal atmosphere of Soviet society, where lies are submitted
as truth and where in one day a dismissed Politburo member can become a
non-person, it is appropriate that Amalrik chooses the theater of the
absurd to convey his message.
Amalrik is probably closer to Sakharov than to Solzhenitsyn in
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his view of the role of ideology in Soviet society.
institutions, the official ideology is decaying.
Party members pay only lip service to it.

Like many other

Even the highest

Amalrik believes that

ideology, to the Party apparatchik, “is some sort of vague backdrop,”
nothing more.

13

Instead, Soviet leaders have a demonological view

of the world:

rival bureaucrats and unfriendly countries are led by

evil motives.

A most un-Marxist view this is, ascribing to forces of

personality actions which ‘’objective” factors such as class should
actually determine.
"While the Party heirarchy might simply mouth the official
ideology, the vast majority of the masses, Amalrik argues, has little
but contempt for it.

The population has become ”de-ideologized” as

the state’s propaganda barrage yields diminishing returns.

1]_(.

In the

play East-West: A Dialogue in Suzdal, one notices the following ex
change :
Announcer: . . . Inspired by this appeal, the collective
farmers of the district pledged themselves to
harvest the wheat in time and without any
^ loss . . .
^
^
Student ^turning the radio knobj : What a bore . . . ^
It is safe to say that Amalrik believes that this is the way most
Soviet citizens react to the official propaganda.

Unlike Solzhenitsyn,

then, Amalrik does not view ideology per se, and not even Marxist
ideology, as the root of Soviet evil.

Though the ideology does not

help matters any, the basic cause of Soviet tyranny is what Amalrik
sees as the Russian national psychology.
Of course, one reason why the masses have become so densensitized to the Soviet ukase is that they can readily see its falseness.
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Amalrik joins Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov in cataloging the discrepancy
between myth and reality.

Yes, the Soviet economy appears to be

strong, but its priorities are grossly lopsided.

"Soviet rockets have

reached Venus, while in the village where I live potatoes are still
16
dug by hand.'1

True, the regime calls itself a "worker's state,”

but most workers are dissatisfied with their lot.

17

For all the rap

turous praise of "the collective,” this form of social organization
is inimical to quality workmanship.

18

While the media speaks of

’’proletarian solidarity,” the Soviet leaders are the butt of derisive
peasant jokes.

During one of his exiles in Siberia, Amalrik noted

the following ditty song by kolkozniks and prisoners:
Once there were three bandits,
Hitler, Stalin, and Nikita.
Hitler hanged us, Stalin beat us,
Nikita made us starve. '
Amalrik also reports that prisoners often favorably compared Czarism
to Soviet rule.

Under the Czars, for instance, only political pris

oners were shipped to Siberia.

Under communism, simple drunkards are
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sent under the guise of combatting "parasitism” or "hooliganism.”
Certainly every country has its myths.

But in few other

countries does disbelief toward the mythology constitute a crime.

In

few other countries is all information sifted so that it will conform
to the official creed.

In no other system does one see such a de

ification of blind obedience.
The only thing that sustains the regime is force— pure, blind,
overwhelming, brute force.

Ideals no longer inspire the regime.

Neither do they motivate the citizenry.

The Soviet system is power in

carnate, power stripped of any value besides self-preservation.

One

117dominant image contained in Amalrik1s plays is that of aimless power.
In The Fourteen Lovers of IJgly Mary-Ann, a Storyteller relates the
following dream: "A car travels along the road crushing everything in

21
its path— that’s power for you.”

In My Aunt is living in Voloko/

lamsk, the student who becomes the scapegoat for anti-Semitic anger
feels
. . . as though some dull, impersonal force were
pressing down on men. It’s like a blind elephant
passing through the jungle, the crash of falling trees
drowning out men’s voices. 2
In Involuntary Journey, Amalrik compares the operation of the security
23
organs to a huge mill which crushes its victims.
Such is the type of power the Soviet regime now wields,
Amalrik implies.
its path.

The regime’s power is aimless, crushing all those in

Like the blind elephant, Soviet power cannot see the wreck

age strewn behind.
cannot brake itself.
stronger force.

Like a car which has run amok, Soviet oppression
It will stop only when it collides with a

The coercive juggernaut destroys much, and this is

apparent to anyone who can penetrate the regime’s Panglossian boasts.
At times, though, Amalrik implies that Soviet power is not so
monolithic as his dramatic imagery might lead one to believe.

Rather,

the Soviet heirarchy.contains many factions and interest groups.

In the

Involuntary Journey, Amalrik observes that the ordinary police and the
secret police often work at cross-purposes.

2k

Ordinary policemen

were more leniait, more imbued with common sense.

If Amalrik’s ob

servation is valid, he confirms the view of many Western specialists
in Soviet affairs who, like Gordon Skilling, use a ’’group theory”
model to explain Soviet behavior.

Bureaucratic infighting may be more
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prevalent than publicized, Amalrik implies.

At one point he at

tributes the growth of the dissident movement to this disunity within
ruling circles.
In any event, Amalrik does not believe that this rivalry is
capable of adjusting policies to public demands. Interest group
competition is no self-regulating mechanism.

The system is doomed,

Amalrik believes. He loathes the regime, can find few redeeming
qualities in it, and (unlike Solzhenitsyn) feels no sentimental ties
to the homeland.

Intolerant of free thought, slavish toward ortho

doxy, the system stood no chance of persuading this man.

When the

Soviet leaders exiled Amalrik in 1976, they rid the system of an
alien quality— uncompromising individualism.
Marxism and Socialism
As Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov once accepted the Marxist creed,
they now reject it from the standpoint of the betrayed.

Out of their

disillusionment with the Soviet system came their rejection of the
systemfs theoretical underpinning.
"the God that failed."

To these dissenters, Marxism was

Such is not the case with Amalrik.

physicist and the novelist, Amalrik was never a Marxist.

Unlike the
If Sakharov

and Solzhenitsyn condemn Marxism from the position of the betrayed,
Amalrik indicts it from the viewpoint of the never-convinced.
While Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn were familiar with many
Marxist texts, Amalrik can make no similar claim.

Fellow prisoners

often tried to entice him into debates about Marxism, but Amalrik
resisted with the reply, "I didnft believe in Marxism and knew little
about it."

2E>

Amalrik shows little interest in Marxism and seems
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undecided as to which Marx he should study.
gime’s Marx?

The revisionists ’s Marx?

The Western scholars’s Marx?

Should he study the re

The Eurocommunists’s Marx?

The young Marx?

Perhaps the later Marx?

Marxist doctrine has been twisted to justify so many disparate
courses of action that it has lost all usefulness as a "viable
ideology," Amalrik argues.

26

When a philosophy becomes so elastic, re

ferring to it to justify or explain policies is pointless.

Amalrik

may not offer an indictment of Marx here, but rather a broadside
against those who have perverted Marxism.

Having never studied the

philosophy, Amalrik can offer no systematic or penetrating attack on
Marxist thought.

He seems unable to divorce the ideology from the

regime which claims to rule in its name.

In this regard, Amalrik ’■

might agree with Solzhenitsyn in closely identifying the regime’s
atrocities with Marxism.
Like the Sakharov of 197?, Amalrik is skeptical toward the
possibility of "socialism with a human face." Socialism with bared
and bended knees may be likely, he claims, but not socialism with a
human face.^

Why Amalrik takes this view is unclear.

He concedes

that the short-lived "Prague Spring" offered an example cf humane so
cialism.

Thanks to the Brezhnev Doctrine, however, Czechoslovakia soon

reverted to socialism with bended knees.

Had Soviet troops not inter

vened, Amalrik argues, the Czech regime would have abandoned its
socialistic structure and would have embraced a "liberal-democratic"
20
ideology.
Amalrik implies that, at rock bottom, existing forms of
socialism rely predominantly on force.

Without the Soviet shadow, the

bloc countries would presumably cast off communism in favor of a more
democratic system.
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Amalrik occasionally seems to accord Marxism a higher status
than Stalinism and, unlike Solzhenitsyn, does not view Marxism and
Stalinism as parts of a seamless ideological cloth.

Amalrik defines

Stalinism in the following manner:
Marxism pulled through the needle’s eye of Leninist
theory of the seizure of power and Stalinist practice
of holding on to it. ^
Though he distinguishes between Marxism and Stalinism, Amalrik seems
to see few virtues in either.

The comparison for him is not one be

tween a humane ideology and its bastardization, but rather between a
bad ideology and a worse one.
On the tdiole, Amalrik rejects socialism on the basis of very
little thought.

He does not painstakingly compare the socialist and

capitalist systems in the manner of Sakharov.

Amalrik’s only com

parative assessment appears when he claims that ’’within certain
limits free private enterprise” is preferable to a strictly regimented
socialist system.
ideals.
ciety.
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In order to grow, society must cherish some

In this sense, Amalrik shares Sakharov’s organic view of so
Once inspired by Marxist ideals, the Soviet system has

discarded even these values and has become moribund.

As Christianity

postponed but could not prevent Rome’s fall, so can Marxism forestall
but not avert the decay of the Soviet order.

31

The Reformist Illusion
Amalrik wishes to dismiss once and for all the Russian notion
32
that change can be effected by force only.
In their opposition to
the Soviet government, dissidents should not adopt terriorist tactics.
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To do so -would merely reinforce the Russian predilection for violence.
The Soviet system and the Russian people are beyond hope of reform.
The best that dissidents can do,-Amalrik claims, is to save themselves.
Russians are a cursed people, Amalrik seems to be saying.
Never -will they harbor any laudable values.
a natural tie to their land.

Never again -will they feel

The self-regeneration of -which Solzhenit-

syn speaks is a hollow dream, Amalrik believes. 33

Sakharov’s belief in

progress and liberalization is equally groundless.

History, Amalrik

argues, is neither a reasoned nor progress-oriented process.
most true of Russia's history.

3^4*

This is

4

‘What dissenters, Westerners, and

quasi-dissidents now see as gradual democratization is really nothing
more than the regime’s growing ineptitude.

Moreover, no overall plan

-underlies this so-called liberalization yet "liberalization presupposes
come kind of purposeful plan*"

Again we see AmalrikTs organic con

ception of society: nations are born, they grow, mature, decay-and,
eventually, die.

The phrase "body politic" reflects Amalriks Speng-

lerian view of history.

As the Soviet system is beset with its own

seeds of decay, the logical result of this process will be death, fol
lowed by anarchy.^
Traditional peasant apathy is one obstacle to reform.

Amalrik

views the Russian peasantry as the repository of ignorance, conserv
atism, and blind obedience.

Ingrained by years of servitude under the

Mongol, Czarist and Soviet yokes, these qualities stifle any hope of
reform or revolution "from below."

37

Nor will the middle class go
■jQ

beyond its "passive discontent" to change society.

Most Russians are

resigned to their fate and are convinced that change is impossible.
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Russians criticize* are unwilling to generalize* and are unable to
imagine living under any other kind of system.
As Amalrik believes that ideological debate precedes political
struggle* so does he claim that the current dissident ferment presages
eventual civil conflict.

39

If the Soviet leaders try to crush the

dissident movement* terrorist acts will become more frequent and less
isolated.

Violence is inevitable* destruction Russia* fate.

Violence will result* not in beneficial change* but in anarchy.

In

his pessimism toward the possibility of any beneficial change* Arnalrik is an anomaly among dissidents.

ko

Neither Sakharov nor

Solzhenitsyn are glowing optimists* yet they both believe that the
system may be changed for the better.

Perhaps it is because of this

pessimism and resignation that Amalrik offers no formal model of the
ideal society.

He clearly believes that any such plan would be

utopian in the literal sense of the term— i.e.* existing nowhere.
The Peasantry
Amalrik*s disenchantment with Russia’s peasantry is born of
personal experience.

In his vilification of the peasant* Amalrik de

parts from the populist strain found in much Russian political thought.
'Like Solzhenitsyn* Amalrik exposes himself to the charge of elitism.
What is it about the peasantry that Amalrik dislikes?
One of the first qualities Amalrik observed during his Siberian
sojourn was the peasants*s conservatism.

Since these people own very

little, they are even more loath to risk what they have.

The last thing

a peasant wants to do* therefore* is to jeopardize his standing by as
serting his rights and thereby antagonizing the leadership.^

The
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fewer the possessions* the deeper the conservatism.

Solzhenitsyn

argued that he who owns little is beyond the State’s grasp.

Amalrik

counters that he who owns little is even more manipulable. For
Solzhenitsyn* asceticism allowed for various degrees of self-denial.
For Amalrik* asceticism seems to be an all or nothing commitment— only
by owning nothing can one flout the state.
Tempering the peasant’s conservatism* however* is his plia
bility.

He will obey any order.

Were the Soviet leaders to declare

tomorrow that agriculture was to be organized around private land
holdings* the peasants would quickly conform.

If* on the next day*

the Politburo announced the abolition of private plots* the peasantry
would just as quickly toe the line.

h2

The peasantry is like so large

a lump of clay* easily shaped by official decree.
Clearly* Amalrik does not share the Russian intelligentsia’s
traditional love of the narod. Worse than their pliability is the
peasants’s hypocrisy* Amalrik argues. .After complaining about his
rigorous life* the peasant will show a fondness for the system and
will admit being unable to conceive of living under anything but an
)^
authoritarian order.
The peasant* like the world-weary intellec
tual whom Amalrik also excoriates* always has to complain about
something.
The peasantry possesses no shortage of despicable qualities
in Involuntary Journey. Narrow-minded* filthy* lewd— these epithets
describe the typical peasant* Amalrik believes.
appalled by the peasant’s stupidity.

The historian is

In East-West: A Dialogue in

Suzdal* Amalrik offers the following dose of provincial ’’logic*” an
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example he would have us believe to be typical.

A rural prison warden

"reasons”:
If we had brothels* there’s be no adultery* all
this lying would stop* and most important of all*
family bonds would be strengthened. So you see* we
provincials know a thing or two as w e l l . h h
Amalrik Ts sarcasm toward the peasantry probably stems from his exposure to them while he was an exiled "parasite.”

Disdain for the

peasantry underlies Amalrik’s pessimism regarding the prospects of
beneficial change.
What Amalrik conveys in his assessment.of the peasantry*
however* may be nothing more than a firsthand account of the age-old
conflict between the Intellectual and the uneducated* between the
urbanite and the rustic.^

The fact that Amalrik concedes the

peasantry a prominent role in any reform scheme is* in an ironic sense*
a-compliment to their group.

In spite of himself* Amalrik often

reveals a typical Russian reverence for the peasant ideal * even if
he now criticizes its motley representatives.
save all of his scorn for the peasantry.

But Amalrik does not

The intelligentsia serves

as another group which arouses Amalrik’s bile.
The Intelligentsia
Amalrik dislikes the word "intelligentsia."

He believes

the word is too vague* and prefers to talk in terms of the middle
class.

Still* it is clear as to what types of people Amalrik

includes in this educated stratum: academics* artists* engineers*
lawyers* doctors* and students.

Amalrik*s definition of this

class is broader than Solzhenitsyn’s and Sakharov’s.

Even without
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a revolution in peasant attitudes, the middle class, were it not so
moribund, could implement change.
The intelligentsia mirrors many of the same faults of the
peasantry in Amalrik*s view.
are largely naive.
improving life.

For instance, Soviet intellectuals

They accept the reformist notion of a gradually

They blithely talk of "thaws'* and "liberalization"

and believe, contrary to all facts, that "things are getting better."
What Amalrik calls the "ideology of reformism" constitutes one of
the three major groups comprising the dissident movement.
Like the main character in Dostoevsky's Notes From Under
ground, Amalrik distinguishes between the man of thought and the man
of action.

The cautious, contemplative, and scholarly milieu of

the intelligent is inimical to decisive action, Amalrik believes.
Dostoevsky's misfit refers to people "who think and therefore do
)7
nothing."
In Is Uncle Jack a Conformist?, the political activist
probably echoes Amalrik*s sentiments when he exclaims, "Intellec)R
tuals are impotent!"
The poet in My Aunt is Living in Volokolamsk
is the play's sole representative of the creative intelligentsia.
This lame intellect serves alternately as a mouthpiece for the
regime and as an inarticulate fool.

Neither image casts a flat

tering reflection upon the Soviet intelligentsia.

The latter class

is paralyzed along with the peasantry, albeit for different reasons.
Amalrik endorses the timeworn dichotomy between action and thought.
Too absorbed in "speculative thought," the Soviet intellectual
lacks the pragmatism needed for effective reform, Amalrik argues.
Neither is hypocrisy an exclusively peasant trait.

In
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East-West; A Dialogue in Suzdal, a young student eager for a liaison
with his aging mistress complains of a filthy man who happens to
share their room.

The matron, who welcomes the presence of a

potential customer, chides the intellectual; "You're even more of a
moralist than a reformed prostitute."
society's

every

JiQ

Mendacity seeps from

pore in Amalrik's chronicles.

In My Aunt is Living

in Volokolamsk, the professor claims to be an intellectual, yet there
<0
are no books to be found either on his shelves or in his apartment.
A group so concerned with appearances over substance could never
serve as the vanguard of reform.
Even if the intelligentsia was more energetic and sincere,
it is too elitist in its attitudes (Amalrik may be his own best
example) to carry its message to the people.

"The intelligentsia,"

he notes, "most of whom have barely 'come out from the people,'
51
do not want to 'go to the people.'"
The intellectual class comes
off very poorly in Amalrik*s plays.
derision.

Intellectuals are objects of

So estranged is he from the intelligentsia that he muses,

probably in a flight of hyperbole, that this class "as a whole is
an even more unpleasant phenomenon than the regime that formed
52
it."v

Amalrik's intelligent is a contemptible creature— impotent,

naive, arrogant, "full of sound and fuzy, signifying nothing."
The Dissident Task
Amalrik does not equate the intelligentsia with the dis
sident movement.

This latter group, though more decisive and

desirous of reform, is nevertheless beset with its own internal
fissures.

The dissident movement grew out of two developments which

followed Stalin's death.

First, the Soviet ruling circles split into
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factions favoring or opposing democratization.

The jockeying for

position, which followed Stalin’s death allowed for the emergence
of an opposition movement of sorts • This movement also had spokesmen within the highest Party and state echelons.

Second, the

growth of samizdat was an added impetus for the dissident movement,
Amalrik believes.

After Stalin, vigilance in cultural matters

slackened and samizdat spread, fostering a sense of community among
heretofore disparate and unknown persons.
Opposition to the Soviet regime has coalesced around three
ideological axes.
and Liberalism.

These are neo-Marxism/Leninism, Christianity,
Neo-Marxists, of which Roy Medvedev is an example,

tiy to recover and implement the original Marxist ideals which
Soviet practice has discarded.

Christian ideologists, represented

by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, wish to create a religious state, if
not a state religion.

Liberals such as Yuri Orlov and Andrei Sak

harov embrace a reformist policy, seeking to transform Russia into
a Western-oriented and democratic state.

Amalrik concedes that

the phrase ’’dissident movement” is misleading, given the diversity
of thought which this term conceals.

Yet Amalrik sees as the com

mon denominator of all these dissident factions a respect for the
rule of law and an esteem for the individual.
Nevertheless, even this is a slender reed upon which to
rely for positive reform.

For the dissident movement retains

many of the flaws which hamstring the intelligentsia in gen
eral— naievete, elitism, circumspection.

The dissident campaign

remains largely a middle class effort, Amalrik notes.

And most

middle class citizens are relatively satisfied with their lot.

128.
Moreover, the dissident movement asks people to act, to take a stand— -a
request -which makes most ’’loyal citizens” uncomfortable.

Overall,

the movement is too tiny and disorganized to agitate for an effective
reform of the system.
Still, Amalrik feels that for all of its -weaknesses, the dis
sident movement is resilient, has -weathered many storms, and will
weather many more.

Ironically, the state needs a dissident movement

-within the Soviet Union.
suspects.

To justify its existence, the KGB requires

Like any interest group, ’’the KGB -wants to sho-w the party

chiefs its importance and indispensability.”

By succeeding in

quashing all ’’subversive elements,” therefore, the KGB would doom
itself.

Just as the roles of victim and executioner are inseparable,

so is there a dialectic relationship between the dissidents and the
security organs.
Morals and Values
Russia’s nihilism is one cause of her downfall.

In his

quest to recover values in a skeptical era, Amalrik resembles both
Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov.

Unlike the latter dissident, Amalrik the

moralist is also Amalrik the loner and he is willing to join no
movement.

Some commentators consider Amalrik’s 198U to be a re

buttal to Machiavelli1s Prince, as the dissident argues that politics
c>9
is not solely a matter of power, not only a question of the state.
Amalrik^ satire and irony can easily overshadow the moral message
of his fiction.

But despite his self-deprecation, ’’Amalrik’s own

.idealism cannot be doubted,” Daniel Weissbort notes
Older notions of right and wrong have now been supplanted

by the idea of "class morality"— the view that those actions which
benefit the proletariat are ethical.

Since the regime arrogates

to itself the right to define "benefit/ 1 class morality proves to
be an elastic concept which will sanction any action deemed to be for
the good of the cause.

Glass morality crushes the individual, for

the latter must subordinate himself to the interest of the collective
By arguing that class rights and "social justice" are paramount, as
they now do with regard to the Helsinki human rights provisions, the
Soviet rulers admit that they view man as an instrument.
Russian attitudes have reinforced'this notion of class
rights, itself a type of moral relativism.
most Russians equate freedom with disorder.

Amalrik believes that
62

Western ideals such

as self-determination and liberty are alien to the Russian mind.

&O

Justice is the only value that is firmly entrenched in Russian
thought. This is the one value that the citizenry expects the state
to revere.

Yet even this reverence has a dark side.

Amalrik con

tends that the Russian view of justice is simply expressed by the
determination that "no one will be better off than me."

This is a

negative type of justice, despising excellence and producing medio
crity.

Far from saving Russia from moral sterility, this view of

justice "represents the most destructive aspect of Russian psychology
Amalrik contends
t

The few ideals that the masses cherish are antagonistic to

democracy.

The confidence in violent change has already been noted.

Russians also denigrate individual initiative and have always viewed
man as a means to an end, something to be used.

Human life is
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dispensable, not inviolate.

The authoritarian lifestyle, not just

Soviet oppression, is the source of Russia’s present malaise.

Like

TocqueviHe, Amalrik argues that democratic institutions are less
important than a democratic lifestyle among the citizenry.
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Reorg

anizing the kolkhoz in yet another fashion is thus useless.
Revolutionizing public attitudes, jettisoning the intellectual baggage
left over from the past— only this will effect positive change, but
Amalrik considers such reform unlikely.
Intellectual Freedom
If the individual cannot reform the system, he can at least
save himself by refusing to submit to arbitrary authority.

Amalrik,

like Solzhenitsyn, distinguishes between inner and outer freedom and,
also like Solzhenitsyn, believes the former liberty to be most im
portant .
What, in effect, threatened the Russian writer if,
before the first visit abroad, he had refused to col
laborate with the KGB? The writer would not have gone
abroad, but he would have remained an honest man. In
refusing to collaborate he would have lost a part,
perhaps a considerable part, of his external freedom,
but he would have achieved greater inner freedom.
The Storyteller in The Fourteen Lovers of Ugly Mary-Ann exclaims,
One should never make the mistake of thinking one’s
a free man in this country! One is subject to moral pres
sure even at one’s desk, writing stories
External freedom includes the freedom to travel and to perform those
physical activities that one desires.
thought, if not necessarily expression.

Inner freedom is freedom of
In true individualist form,

Amalrik has lived his ideals by writing what he wants, with scant
regard for the wishes, conventions, or rules of the governing elite.
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Individualism
Refusing to obey the state, declining formal membership in
the democratic movement, Amalrik is the loner’s loner.
to conform with minor regulations while in prison.

He refused

Antagonizing

guards and fellow prisoners alike with his intractability, Amalrik
was an island unto himself.

In Involuntary Journey he writes what

may well be a succinct description of his whole life: "I had never
believed in being ’like everybody else’ and I refused to give
70
in.”

Central to Amalrik’s political thought is an intense indi

vidualism, the belief in the need to assert one’s rights.
Even if the Soviet rulers deny that men are born with natural
rights, the Soviet Constitution guarantees many liberties.

It is

the i n d i v i d u a l t a s k to hold the state to the letter of the law.
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Natural rights, Amalrik believes, include the free expression of
ideas and freedom of movement.

But these liberties have been

shelved in favor of "class rights” in communist states and "national
rights" in the Third World.

By asserting one's rights, one reaffirms

one’s human dignity in the face of oppression.
Amalrik is no joiner.

Few petitions bear his name.

political trials are graced with his presence.

Few

An abrasive man,

Amalrik has irritated the organized dissident movement almost as much
as he has taunted the regime.
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In contrast to Sakharov and Solz

henitsyn, Amalrik wages no campaign.
he believes.
integrity.

Russia’s fate is foreordained,

All that a man can do, therefore, is salvage his own
Amalrik certainly believes, in Aristotelian fashion,

that it is possible to be a good man in a bad state.

But he does not

join in the fashionable pastime of sneering at patriotism.

Rather,
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Amalrik claims that by fostering critical discussion, he helps the re
gime and is more of a patriot than those who blindly obey.

Rule of Law
Law, Amalrik believes, is the means by which the individual
keeps oppression at bay.

It does little good to resist tyrants by

appealling to lofty values.

Instead, one should quote the regimefs

own laws back at one!s oppressors.

73

Freedom of speeh, religion,

and assembly— these liberties are enshrined in the Soviet Constitution.
Make the state abide by them in practice, .Amalrik urges.
The regime should realize, Amalrik reasons,

that its disdain

for strict observance of the law is not in its own interest.
laws can be flouted, the leader must always
his rule.

When

be waryof plotsagainst

Ever-vigilant force is all thatsustains

him.

As long as

laws are nothing more but scraps of paper, the ruler is vulnerable
to the next, claimant who possesses superior force.

No one can feel
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safe when a state violates its own laws.'4
What is needed, Amalrik believes, is not some "grand design"
for Russia in the manner of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, not new laws,
nor stricter ones, but enforcement of existing statutes.

Dissidents

would do better to spend their time studying the present laws and
devising ways law can be used to protect colleagues• Law is a sacred
instrument to Amalrik.

It expresses, or should express, man’s mores

and a respect for man’s rights.

To Amalrik, laws represent the ac

cumulated wisdom of the ages, "the ethical standards that mankind
has arrived at during its long history."
pedantry will not defeat the state.
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Perhaps this legalistic

But at least the dissident will
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not have given up without a fight.

In the process, the state will be

frustrated, perhaps tire of persecuting individuals, and the hypocrisy
of its laws will be exposed to the world.
The Soviet Apocalypse
The doomsday prophet's role is not an easy one, least of all
when it is one's own country which is doomed.

Yet what Amalrik offers

is nothing less than a Soviet and Russian Goetterdaemerung, an
apocalyptic and fatalistic vision of doom.

Because of its internal

contradictions, the Russian state has entered its last decades.

After

all, what Amalrik depicts is not only the demise of the Soviet order
but the collapse of Russian society as well.
of

Notwithstanding the title

his treatise, Amalrik questions whether Russia, not just the

Soviet

Union, will last until 1981*. What are the seeds of Russia'sdecline
and fall?
Inevitably, Russia will perish in the flames of a Sino-Soviet
conflict.
rary.
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Any rapprochement between these countries is only tempoAside from their ideological squabbles, Russia and China have

conflicting national interests all along their 6,000 mile common
border.

Russia has more sophisticated nuclear weaponry, but the

Chinese have superior manpower.

The prison warden in East-West: A

Dialogue in Suzdal muses uneasily:
It would take a whole lifetime to mow down all the
Chinese with a tommy gun, there are so many of the
buggers. Those up top ought to give that a thought or
two.?8
Any success over the Chinese would be a Pyrrhic victory only, so
numerous are the orientals.
The Sino-Soviet rift aids the dissident movement, since fear
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of the "Asian menace" pushes' Russia closer to the West.

Criticism

of Chinese communism also reflects poorly upon Soviet socialism.
In such a manner does this cause of Soviet decay feed upon itself
and grow.79
Until the final confrontation* however* several other fac
tors will undermine the regime.

Simple biological forces dictate

the eventual extinction of the current Soviet gerontocracy.
Nearly all of the Politburo members are in their 70’s.
bureaucratic infighting will intensify.
demotion may be a case in point.
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As they age*

Nikolai Podgorny’s sudden

Neither are there any heirs

apparent who might succeed a Brezhnev or a Kosygin.

When these men

die* an unprecedented power struggle will occur and will weaken the
already decaying order.
While the current leaders try to keep themselves in power
they must also heed* or at least cannot ignore* cries for reform.
Yet with reform comes change and uncertainty.

This is especially

tine in the all-important area of economic policy.

"In order to

remain in power* the regime must change and evolve* but in order to
Q1
preserve itself* everything must remain unchanged."
With this
tension between self-maintenance and reform cones one source of
Russia’s decline and fall.
Marxism no longer inspires the masses* so a new ideology
must be found.

The likely alternative* Amalrik predicts* will be

Russian nationalism.
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Only a new or different ideology will spur

the masses on to greater labors.

But this turn to Russian national

ism will likewise alienate many non-Russian nationalities. Only
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about 53 percent of the Soviet population is ethnically Russian.

Sig

nificantly* the birthrate for non-Russian nationalities is much higher
than it is for ethnic Russians.

Rallying the populace around the

Russian flag might only revive feelings of loca^L nationalism in many
other regions• Supplanting socialist ideology* Russian nationalism
will sow the seeds of its own dissolution.
And as the system needs scientific successes for purposes of
power and prestige* so do these same successes eat away at the foun
dation of the regime’s authority.

The more sophisticated the scientific

advance* the starker will be the contrast between the exploiters and
Po
exploited in Soviet society.
Scientific progress also needs free
inquiry.

Cultivating a scientific elite is necessary for economic

development* but it also runs the risk of having free-thinking scien
tists train their intellects on existing'political problems.
Scientific inquiry cannot exist in a vacuum.

Rather* the critical

spirit will seep into other facets of life and will challenge the
Party’s claim of infallability.
These five factors— Sino-Soviet conflict* gerontocratic rule*
the conflict between stability and reform* between identity and
particularism* between scientific advance and official preten
sions— make it unclear as to whether either the Soviet rulers or
the Russian people will survive until 198U*

As the Sino-Soviet con

flict begins to simmer* various nationalities will declare their
independence* the Soviet satellites in East Europe will strike out
on their own* and the resulting human costs will dwarf those incurred
in the ’’Great Patriotic War.” What Amalrik offers is not so much a
prediction as a prophecy* not so much a plan as a vision.

More than
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Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov* Amalrik serves as a Russian Cassandra* of
fering not analysis but a glimpse of Russia as a cursed country.
Critical Evaluation
Since he harbors no grand conception regarding Russia’s future
or the ideal society* Amalrik presents a smaller target for criticism
than Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov.

Nevertheless* a few points must be

discussed.
Since a prophecy does not derive its validity from thorough
documentation* trying to disprove it by amassing facts is a bit like
trying to hunt deer with a fishing pole.

Still* Amalrik’s gloom re

garding the Russian/Soviet system may be unwarranted.

His proof of

peasant ineptitude* for example* is largely anecdotal and smacks of
hasty generalization.

So appalled by peasant coarseness is this

urban sophisticate that he abandons all hope of reform.
peasants did Amalrik really know?

But how many

Can he be so sure that these were

representative of the peasantry as a whole?

In his quickness to con

demn this entire class* does Amalrik not exhibit the same ugly strain
of elitism which he condemns in the intelligentsia?
The Soviet system may be more resilient than Almarik thinks.
Not all Politburo members are bearded ancients.

A few possible

successors to Brezhnev* such as Dmitri Ustinov and Andrei Kirilenko*
are in their 60’s or late f?0’s.
struggles before.

The system has weathered succession

Why should it be unable to do so now?

Perhaps

such a struggle might even pave the way for more cultural diversity
and freedom* the way the post-Stalin crisis was followed by the first
’’thaw.”
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Granted that the regime needs a new idiom to inspire masses.
It does not follow from this* however* that the symbol must be Great
Russian nationalism.

The ruling circles are well aware of the touchy

nationality problem* and for them it aggravate it by appealling to an
alienating symbol is improbable.

Soviet nationalism* not Russian

chauvinism* may be the likely replacement for proletarian international
ism.
idiom.

Or an emphasis on consumer values may provide another unifying
In any case* the ucontradiction” of which Amalrik speaks may

not be so profound.

Thus does he underestimate the system’s resil

iency.
Regarding the ’’contradiction” inherent in scientific progress*
Amalrik may also miss the mark.

All Amalrik proves is that scientists

may try to infuse their habit of free inquiry into the political
realm* not that they will indeed be successful in this endeavor.

He

proves only that restricting critical thought to science is difficult*
not that it is impossible.

Thus far* in a record which spans six de

cades and impressive scientific achievements* the regime has
successfully insulated politics from the influence of reform-minded*
free-thinking scientists.

As we noted in our discussion of Sakharov*

the scientist’s entry into the political realm will be controlled by
the Party and will be on the Party's terms.

Anyway* scientists are

among those whom Amalrik classified earlier as the impotent intel
ligentsia.

How then can Amalrik consistently argue that scientists*

by force of will* may become the vanguard of reform?
Nor is it so obvious that a Sino-Soviet war is inevitable.
"Who can say what will emerge in the way of Sino-Soviet policy once
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the post-Mao leadership stabilizes. Importantly* Soviet broadsides
have been calculated to attack Mao and not the Chinese people.

Pro

vocative rhetoric aside* it is doubtful that either country desires war
or truly believes there could be anything resmbling a "winner”
emerging from the rubble.
impossible?

Who is to say that a Sino-Soviet detente is

World politics has seen stranger things.

Former American

Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew once stated that ”war with Soviet Rus
sia is as certain as anything could be.” That was 30 years ago.

If

the intervening decades do not deserve the appellation "peace*” neither
can they honestly be described as war.

Mho could have forseen the

recent Soviet-American detente 30 years ago?

How can Amalrik cav

alierly discount a Sino-Soviet rapprochement for now and forever more?
If war comes* the result may not be so apocalyptic as Amalrik
suggests.

If Russia could not win such a conflict* she could probably

at least avoid losing it.

Amalrik writes as though nations die.

This

simply does not happen* though* least of all to a nation of 2I4.O mil
lion people* a countiy which straddles the world’s largest political
land mass.

Russia will survive* notwithstanding Amalrik’s dramatic

notion of Armageddon.
There is one quality in the Russian national character which
Amalrik conveniently ignores— resiliency.

Amalrik himself cat

alogs the succession of conquerors that the Russians have
outlasted— Vikings* Mongols* Turks* Nazis.

Perhaps the Russians

will cast off the shackles of Soviet tyranny too.

Perhaps only

a conflict with China* with its attendant destruction* could prompt
such an awakening.

Great changes and surprises are not new to

this land* and Amalrik’s confident vision of gloom may yet be t o m

asunder.

It was Peter the Great who characterized Russia as a

"country in which things that just don't happen happen."

Like Amal

rik* Peter the Great embraced traditional Western values.

Like

Amalrik* Peter the Great railed against "typical Russian narrowness."
And like Amalrik* Peter the Great underestimated the resilience of
that vast land— Russia.
Conclusion
What we are left with- is more of a vision than an ideology*
more a mood than a philosophy.

What Andrew MacAndrew wrote of

Dostoevsky can be applied to Amalrik as well:
It is impossible to make a philosophical system
out of jhi0 world. It is full of contradictions*
inconsistencies* absurdities. It is a universal
n of the human soul speaking in many clashing
He is a seer* a prophet* an exile.

Living in the Netherlands*

Amalrik still writes of that which he knows best— Russia. ' Forever
the loner* he laments the plight of the Soviet dissident and the
endangered ideals for which they stand.
with most other dissidents.

Amalrik contrasts vividly

Pessimism* fatalism— these qualities,

make him an anomaly within the democratic opposition.

Yet through

out Amalrik's thought runs the characteristic dissident esteem for
morality and for the sanctity of the individual.

Discord and

unity— such is the tenor of Amalrik's world view* such is the spirit
of the dissident movement.

lUo.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1
Andrei A. Amalrik, quoted in Henry Kamm, "Portrait of a
Dissenter," in Will the Soviet Union Survive Until I98I4? (New York:
Harper and Row, 1970), p. ix.
*”
2

Henry Kamm, "Portrait of a Dissenter," in Will the Soviet Union
Survive Until 198U? (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. viii.
3
Andrei A. Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, trans. Manya
Harari and Max Hayward (New York: Hareourt Biace Jovanovich, 1970),
p , 182 .
^Andrei A. Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 198b.?
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 5^7
-*Ibid., pp. 37-38.
^Ihid., p. 1>0 .
^Ebid.., p. £8 .
^Andrei A. Amalrik, "Arrest on Suspicion of Courage," trans*
Thompson Bradley, Harper *s 25’3 (August 1976): 5>0-f>l«
^Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1936?, p. 21.
10Ebid., p. 19.
1I
■‘• Andrei A. Amalrik, Is Uncle Jack a Conformist?, trans* Daniel
Weissbort, in Nose! Nose? No-se! and Other P l s 5 ^ \NewYork: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1970j, p.
"" " ’
12
Daniel Weissbort, Introduction to Nose! Nose? No-se! and Other
Plays by Andrei Amalrik (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970),
p. xiv.

13
-Andrei A. Amalrik, "Ideologies in Soviet Society," Survey
22 (Spring 1976): 2.
li+Ibid.
1E>
Andrei A. Amalrik, East-West: A Dialogue in Suzdal, trans.
Daniel Weissbort, in Nose! Nose? No-se! and Other Plays (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 89.
T6
Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive until 198U?, p. 6 6 .
17
Andrei A. Amalrik, "Dissidents1 Fate Turns on Kremlin Power
Struggle," Washington Post, 5 Jnne 1977* p* C318
Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, p. l£8.

Uil.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV (continued)
1?Ibid., p. 122
20^
. .
Ibid.,
21

Andrei A. Amalrik,
The Fourteen
Lovers of Ugly Mary-Ann, trans.
Daniel Weisshort, in Nose!Nose? No-se1 and Other Plays (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovano^d!nh7™1^7077^P^9?^
22
Andrei A. Amalrik,
My Aunt is Living in Volokolamsk,trans.
Daniel Weissbort, in Nose? Nose? No-sei and Other Plays (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), p. 39*
^Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, p. 3b•
^\lax Hayward, Introduction to Involuntary Journey to Siberia
by Andrei Amalrik (New York: Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich, 1970)s P* ix*
2<
r
mAmalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, p. 167r>C

Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 198U?, p. 38.
^Ibid., p. 292 8Amalrik, "Ideologies in Soviet Society,” p. 9*
29Ibid., p. $.

J30Amalrik,

Involuntary Journey to Siberia, p. l 8l.

Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 19 8U?, p. 65.
32
Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, foreword.
33
^Hayward,
p. xi.
^Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 198U?, p. 28.
36
Ibid., p. 30*
3 Ibid., p. 31.
37
Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, p. 37*
oO
Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 198U?, p. 32.
39
Amalrik, "Ideologies in Soviet Society," p. 2.
k^Susan Jacoby, "Andrei Amalrik, Rebel," New York Times Magazine,
29 July 1973, p. 12.

Ili2.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV (continued)
^Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, p. 2.69•

k2Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 168.
^Amalrik,
East-West: A Dialogue in Suzdal, p. 6£.
1
Sidney Monas, "Amalrik* s Vision of the End," in Will the
Soviet Union Survive Until 198U?? hy Andrei Amalrik (New York:
Harper and Row, 1970), p. 82.
U6
William J. Parente, "Brave Parasite," New Republic 1963
(7 November 1970): 27.
I4.7
Feodor Dostoevsky, Notes From Underground, trans. Andrew
MacAndrew (New York: New American library,' 19ol), p. 96.
U8
Amalrik, Is Uncle Jack a Conformist?, p. 180.
h9
Amalrik, East-West: A Dialogue in Suzdal, p. 4 0 .
£0
Amalrik, My Aunt is Living in Volokolamsk, p. 10.
Amalrik, "Dissidents1 Fate Turns on Kremlin Power
St niggle," p. C3.
£2

Quoted in Kamm, p. v.

£3
Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 198U?, p . 7 •

^Tbid., pp.

9=10.

Amalrik, "Ideologies in Soviet Society," p. 7«
t?6
Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 198Ii?, p. 13.
<7
Amalrik, "Dissidents1 Fate Turns on Kremlin Power
Struggle," p. C3.
Amalrik, "Arrest on Suspicion of Courage," p. $6 •
5>9
Jean-Francois Revel, Without Marx or Jesus (New York:
Doubleday and Company, 1971), p. 9b •
^Stfeissbort, p. x.
^Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 198U?, p. 37*

62.
‘Ibid., p. 3h

1Ji3.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV (continued)

63
Ibid., p. 33*
61;
,
Ibid., P. 3?-

^Ibid., p . 3>h •
66

Revel, p. 93*

^quoted in Namm, pp. ix-x.

68

Amalrik, The Fourteen Lovers of Ugly Mary-Ann, p. 9?•

69
Thompson Bradley, Translators Note to ’’Arrest on Suspicion of
Courage,11 by Andrei Amalrik, Harper’s 2^3 (August 1976): 38.
^Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia, p. 122.
71

1 Hayward, p. xi.

^Jacoby, p. 12.
^%ayward, pp. x±-xii.
7hj
^Amalrik,
Involuntary Journey to Siberia, p. 111;.
Xbid., p. 113.
76
Ibid., p. 112.
77
Andrei A. Amalrik, ’’Europe and the Soviet Union, ” Survey 22
(Summer/Autumn 1976): 12.
nQ

Amalrik, East-West: A Dialogue in Suzdal, p. 70*
79

'uAmalrik, ’’Dissidents’ Fate Turns on Kremlin Power Struggle,11

p. C3.

80

Ibid., p. Cl.

81

Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until I98I1?, p. 22.

82

Ibid., p. 38*
83
Ibid., p. 66.
8U
Andrew MacAndrew, Afterword to Notes From Underground by
Feodor Dostoevsky (New York: New American Libraiy, 1961;, p. 232 •

1UU.
WORKS CITED IN CHAPTER IV
Books
Amalrik* Andrei A. East-West: A Dialogue in Suzdal. Translated by
Daniel Weissbort. In Nose! Nose? No-se! and Other Plays. New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich* 1970, /
________. Involuntary Journey to Siberia. Translated by Manya
Harari and Max Hayward. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich*
1970.
. Is Uncle Jack a Conformist?. Translated by Daniel Weissbort.
In Nose! Nose? No-se! and Other Plays. New York: Harcourt Brace
Javanovich* 1970.
. My Aunt is Living in Volokolamsk. Translated by Daniel
Weissbort. In Nose! Nose? No-se! and Other Plays. New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich* 1970.
-

The Fourteen Lovers of Ugly .Mary-Ann- Translated by Daniel
Weissbort. In Nose! Nose? No-se! and Other Plays. New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich* 1970.
. Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 198U?. New York:
Harper and Row* 1970.

Dostoevsky* Feodor. Notes From Underground. Translated by Andrew
MacAndrew. New York: New American Library* 1961.
Hayward* Max. Introduction to Involuntary Journey to Siberia* by
Andrei A. Amalrik. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich* 1970.
Kamm* Henry. "Portrait of a Dissenter." In Will the Soviet Union
Survive Until 19,8U?. pp. vii-xv* by Andrei Amalrik. New York:
Harper and Row* 1970.
MacAndrew* Andrew R. Afterwork to Notes From Underground by Feodor
Dostoevsky. New York: New American Library* 1961.
Monas* Sidney. "Amalrik1s Vision of the End." In Will the Soviet
Union Survive Until 1981;?. pp. 69-90* by Andrei Amalrik.
New York: Harper and Row* 1970.
Revel* Jean-Francois. Without Marx or Jesus. New York: Doubleday and
Company, 1971*
Weissbort* Daniel. Introduction to Nose! Nose? No-se! and Other Plays.
by Andrei Amalrik. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich* 1973-

115*
Periodicals
Amalrik* Andrei A. "Arrest on Suspicion of Courage*" Translated byThompson Bradley. Harper1s 253 (August 1976): 37-56
. "Dissidents1 Fate Turns on Kremlin Power Struggle."
Washington Post, 5 June 1977* PP* Cl* C3*
. "Europe and the Soviet Union." Survey 22 (Summer/Autumn
1976): 11-12.
. "Ideologies in Soviet Society." Survey 22 (Spring 1976):
1-11.
Bradley* Thompson. Translators Note to "Arrest on Suspicion of
Courage*" by Andrei A. Amalrik. H a r p e r *s 253 (August 1976):
38-39.
"Involuntary Journey." Time, 6 August 1973* PP* 33-3U*
Jacoby, Susan. "Andrei Amalrik, Rebel." New York Times Magazine*
29 July 1973, PP* 12-13* 36-UO.
Parente* William J. "Brave Parasite." New Republic 163 (7 November
1970): 26-27.

CHAPTER V

THE DISSIDENT DIALOGUE
There are many reasons why dissident views regarding East-West
relations deserve separate treatment.

Firsts the dissidents have

given this subject so much thought that including their opinions
along with their critique of the Soviet system would have interrupted
the primary focus of their dissent.

Second, such a spirited debate

surrounds the topic that it is worthy of special emphasis. This
emphasis will reinforce our thesis that the dissident movement is
heterogeneous.

Third, the flow of argument is more accurately

represented in a separate section.

Dividing the dissident debate .

into three different sections would interrupt the continuity of the
discussion, would be needlessly repetitive, and would distort the
contrapuntal quality of the dissident dialogue.
Let us therefore discuss the dissidentsTs views regarding
East-West relations and consider the internal dissension found within
the dissident movement.
Solzhenitsyn on East-West Relations
Though he is a newcomer to the West, Solzhenitsyn offers some
timely insights.
he sees.

Looking to the West, the novelist dislikes what

But he insists that he is not a critic of the West, only

a critic of the Westfs shortcomings.

- 1U6 .

Absorbed in the pursuit of

1U7.
material comfort and lacking the -will to defend any values , the
Western world now crumbles before the Soviet challenge, he feels.
The West’s demise is rooted in the Enlightenment idea that "man is
p
the measure cf all things."
As society become increasingly secular,
men start to think that existence itself is the highest good..

Moral

principles are dismissed and replaced by the notion that men have no
ethical responsibility to any higher power.

The slavish devotion to

comfort and the attachment to worldly goods has sucked all moral
fiber out of the West. For Solzhenitsyn, the "spirit of Munich"
survives as the West feebly capitulates to Soviet demands rather than
3
hazard its precious affluence.
Western liberals particularly attract Solzhenitsyn’s scorn.
He recalls that in 19l±7, most Western liberals indignantly denied the
existence of concentration camps in Russia.^- Solzhenitsyn reserves
special contempt for leftist dilettantes such as Jean-Paul Sartre,
who can claim with a straight face that "Marxism is the unsurpassable
philosophy of our era."

In Bertrand Russell’s addage, "I’d rather be

Red than dead," Solzhenitsyn, detects a chilling lack of principle.
Russell, Solzhenitsyn suspects, would rather be anything— a slave,
an accomplice in crime— than dead.
Throughout his critique of the West, Solzhenitsyn sustains a
tone of apocalyptic gloom.

This is in contrast to Amalrik, who

reserves such dark imagery for Russia and not the West.

Consider these

words from Solzhenitsyn’s Warning to the West: ”1 wouldn’t be surprised
£
at the sudden and imminent fall of the West.”
Similarly, in his
Letter to the Soviet Leaders he claims that, as a moral challenge to

1U8.
the Soviet Union, "the Western world . . . has almost ceased to
£
exist.”
Russia’s troubled period from March to November 1917> he
argues, is merely a condensed version of the West’s current plight.

7

Unfortunately, one can no longer count on the West for moral leader
ship.

Russian dissidents must thus steer their own course and not
0
depend on Western assistance.
3h this respect, Solzhenitsyn crosses
swords with Andrei Sakharov, who believes that the West must nudge
the Soviet Union for any liberalization to occur.
Like Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West in the 1920’s,
Solzhenitsyn’s warnings fall on a reluctant audience.

Indeed,

Solzhenitsyn’s approach, like Amalrik’s, is somewhat Spenglerian.
Both believe that history unfolds in circular patterns and that
civilizations undergo birth and death.

Yet one does not find the same

determinism in Solzhenitsyn that one notes in Spengler and Amalrik.
Certainly Solzhenitsyn does not believe that the West is doomed, or
else he would not bother to sound the alarm.

When he attempts to

raise the level of Western consciousness, Solzhenitsyn dabbles in the
Hegelian business of aufheben.

”In spite of his ignorance of the ways

of the West, and some jarring notes in his message to it,” Solzhenitsyn
9
has succeeded in his task, Leopold Labedz notes.
Genuine detente, Solzhenitsyn believes, precludes ideological
warfare.

He is not an opponent of detente, but is a foe of a certain

type of detente.

As long as the West is vilified daily in Pravda and

Izvestia, detente is meaningless.10

As long as the Soviet oligarchy

verbally or materially supports so-called wars of national liberation
in Africa, detente is meaningless.

As a Roman Senator closed each

aJU9speech by saying that "Carthage must be destroyed," so does the Soviet
media, under the guise of detente, hurl a stream of invective at the
West.

Solzhenitsyn favors detente, but a different type of detente

nonetheless.
being duped.

11

Under the present relaxation of tensions, the West is
Oppression in many communist countries intensified, he

claims, after the 1975> Helsinki agreement was signed*

What appease

ment was in 1938., Solzhenitsyn argues, detente is in 1977•
Unwittingly, the West aids Soviet tyranny by supplying the
communists with valuable technology and food.

As long as the United

States trades with the Soviet Union, liberalization will be stalled
and dissidents will still be persecuted.
timely.

Solzhenitsyn1s argument is

Vladimir Bukovsky claims that when he was kept in a psy

chiatric prison in Russia, he wore handcuffs upon which was inscribed,
"made in the U.S.A."

If the West stops aiding the tormentors of the

Russian people, the regime must liberalize and abandon senseless space
and military projects.

12

Western resolve could make a difference,

even if it could not "reform" Russia in the manner of Sakharov.

In

stead of worrying about nuclear war, the West should take less dramatic
but more effective steps to meet the Soviet challenge.

As it stands

now, Solzhenitsyn argues, there will be no nuclear war, for the Soviets
will demoralize and subdue the West long before any Armageddon is
necessary.
Unlike Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn dismisses the whole notion
of East-West convergence.

The ideological and philosophical differ-

ences separating the two systems show no signs of being bridged.

13

In an age of emerging nationalism in the Third World and revived
nationalism in developed countries, all this talk of convergence is

150.

absurd, Solzhenitsyn believes.

Even if the systems could grow to re

semble each other, this is not necessarily desirable.
claims, are natural and beneficial entities.

Nations, he

"Nations are the wealth

of humanity," and their cultural diversity enriches the world.

111.

Internationalism— the belief that no major problem’can be solved at
the national level— is a chimera.

Here again, Solzhenitsyn disagrees

with Sakharov, who views the nation-state as an atavism.

Esperanto

will never replace national languages, Solzhenitsyn notes, and anyone
who thinks that it'will is naive.
Nationalism wedded to the concept of sovereignty, however,
has had some pernicious effects • Sovereignty— the idea that a state
has the right to do anything it wants in its own internal affairs—
has become the modern handmaiden of oppression.

Because of this

notion of the inviolability of internal affairs, the West is criti
cized for verbally supporting Soviet dissidents (but the Soviet
Union may make a cult heroine out of Angela Davis).

Because of this

notion, the Organization of African Unity watches Idi Amin terrorize
his own people (but Rhodesia is^ condemned for its "intolerable
racism").

Because of this attitude, Czechoslovakia may jail dissi

dents with impunity (but when Francoist Spain shoots Basque
terrorists, this is a crime against humanity and Europe recalls its
ambassadors).

There exists no such thing as strictly "internal af-

15
fairs," Solzhenitsyn claims.

Freedom is indivisible. Once

repression is tolerated just because it occurs within a countryTs
own borders against its own citizens, freedom elsewhere is jeopardized.
Why should oppression be sanctioned merely because it occurs within

151.
some arbitrarily drawn and historically shifting boundary?

In a world

that is morally as well as economically interdependent, "internal
affairs" is a phrase which tries to mask brutality.
Thus does Solzhenitsyn detach the concept of nationalism from
the principle of absolute sovereignty.

Similarly, he distinguishes

between patriotism and blind obedience to the state.
one’s country without being a chauvinist.

16

One can love

He rejects the current

version, of detente but does not sound the tocsin for a renewed Gold
War.

Many persons have aimed these groundless criticisms at Solzhe

nitsyn, however.
Soviet tyranny.

All he asks is that the West at least stop aiding
Sakharov believes the West can do more than this.
Sakharov on East-West Relations
International Relations

In the early stages of his political thought, Sakharov seems
to favor a balance of power approach to world politics.

17

That is to

say, he believed that a rough equivalency in power between the two
superpowers was conducive to global stability.

For this reason, he

had no qualms about developing an H-bomb for Stalin, even though he
recognized Stalin’s faults.
than a nuclear monopoly.

18

Nuclear bipolarity would be more stable

Sakharov wanted the Soviet Union to match,

but not necessarily overtake, the West in military might.
As his appeals for a reduction in weapons testing fell on deaf
ears, Sakharov’s views changed.

He began to criticize the "empiri

cal-competitive’’ approach to modern diplomacy.

Simply stated, this

approach dictates that each nation advance its own interest to the
greatest extent and, likewise, cause its adversary the greatest

l£2.
unpleasantness.

19

Sakharov decries the idea that international

diplomacy be seen as a "zero-sum game."

Rather, he advocates a "dem

ographic perspective," a view of international relations which has
the common lot of mankind as its starting point.

20

_ .
This perspective

demands that the world be viewed as a family rather than as so many
ideological camps.

The demographic view must transcend nationalism

and embrace the principle of peaceful coexistence.

In a nuclear age,

Sakharov argues, preaching the exclusivity of ideologies is "madness
and a crime."

21

Problems of pollution, militarism, and economic

development are common to all parts of the globe.

These ills will be

surmounted only by shaking off the particularistic pretensions of the
nation-state system.
MankindTs first priority, Sakharov believes, should be the
avoidance of nuclear-war.

22

After 19b£3 he became convinced that we

no longer live in a socialist world or a capitalist world, but a
nuclear world.

In an atomic war, none of the combatants can "win" in

a conventional sense of the word.
outcome.

Pyrrhic victory is the best possible

The sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons prevents modern

warfare from being a rational instrument of policy.
render obsolete the Clausewitzian conception of war.

Nuclear weapons
War is now a form

of universal suicide, not "a continuation of diplomacy by other means."
At least two assumptions undergird Sakharov*s ideas regarding modern
warfare.

First, he discounts the idea of a limited nuclear war.

Sak

harov is one of many analysts who argue that once nuclear weapons of
any size or number are deployed, the conflict will escalate.

Second,

Sakharov believes that any conflict between the superpowers will be a
nuclear and not a conventional clash.
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The threat of nuclear holocaust is so horrible, Sakharov
argues, that the prevention of this calamity takes precedence over all
other problems.
nuclear war.

Most people, he believes, -would prefer anything to

Even the victory of an adversary is preferable to war.^
/

World government and universal disarmament are feasible because they
are so necessary, he reasons.
Regarding the Third World, Sakharov urges that arms-producing
states embargo weapon sales to developing countries.
wars, Sakharov believes.

Weapons cause

"Historical experience testifies to the fact

that when cannons are at hand, they will sooner or later begin to
shoot."

This is a clear retreat from his 1953 view that nuclear

bipolarity helps stabilize international relations.
Aside from urging the Third World to demilitarize, Sakharov
advises the Third World to stop blaming all of its problems on other
countries. Labels of "colonialism" and "neo-colonialism" are now
used to forestall reform and self-help on the part of poor states.
Sakharov calls for the less developed nations to "restructure their
national psychologies" and to accept the responsibility for their own
plight.

26

Only when such a change in thinking occurs will the gap

between rich and poor countries be narrowed.
Convergence and Detente
Like Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov favors detente, but prefers a
different type of detente.

In the past, he feels, detente has been

little more than a modus vivendi between the US and the USSR.

The

relaxation of foreign tensions has been valued while any relaxation
of domestic oppression has been avoided.

But Sakharov insists that

i$k.

meaningful detente must, among other things, democratize Soviet so
ciety.

Otherwise, rapprochement will amount to little more than ,ran
27
unprincipled, antipopular plot between ruling groups.”
Detente reflects, at least in part, the Soviet need for
sophisticated technology.

Without Western computer systems, for in

stance, the Soviets cannot launch their ’’Second Industrial Revolu
tion."

Detente is thus a signal to and an opportunity for the West

to nudge Russia in the direction of democratic reform.
can the West use to promote this development?

What levers

Sakharov endorses a

"partial boycott of scientific and cultural contacts" or embargoes on
certain types of technology.

28

Food embargoes, credit denial, and

cancellation of arms negotiations are inadmissible levers, Sakharov
a r g u e s S i n c e it is only the detente relationship which makes lever
age feasible, Sakharov rejects any return to Cold War tensions.

Yet

detente must not become a process of capitulation to Soviet demands and
must encourage democratization.
Aside from promoting human rights in the Soviet Union, detente
should also aim at containing and avoiding local conflicts.

29

The

Middle East is one area, Sakharov believes, where the superpowers
should show more restraint.

Similarly, supporting so-called "wars

of national liberation" is incompatible with detente and exemplifies
the "empirical-competitive" approach that Sakharov condemns.

Occasion

ally, Sakharov expands detente’s aims to include the democratization of
all socialist countries, not just his own.

30

Sakharov shares Solz

henitsyn's view that detente is indivisible, that the relaxation of
tensions must not end at the Soviet border but must also induce some
measure of toleration within Russia as well.

15?.
It is vital to think of detente in terms of the West and the
Soviet Union rather than just between the US and the USSR.
latter perspective is endorsed* detente will fail.

If the

Only Western

solidarity will enable detente to induce Soviet reform.

31

Too often

the Western countries have been divided with regard to Soviet policies.
For this reason* American attempts at outright linkage between human
rights and trade relations have failed.

The Soviets have merely

looked elsewhere for eager customers and too many concessions have thus
been made.

Western pressure on the Soviet Union is only as strong as

its weakest link.

Western unity is thus a prerequisite for effective

detente.
In 1977 > Sakharov argues that disarmament "must have priority
over all other problems."^2

This is a drastic shift from his 1975

view that arms control was but one of many aims of detente.

Sak

harov grows increasingly alarmed at the growing nuclear stockpiles
of both superpowers.

For this reason he favors a continuation of the

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
of unilateral disarmament.

Still* Sakharov rejects the notion

Not only would such a move not be recip

rocated by the Soviets* but it would also be very destabilizing.
Having a clear military advantage* the Soviet leaders would merely in
crease pressure on the West in volatile areas such as the Indian
Ocean.

Thus* while Sakharov views the current arms race as

potentially disastrous* he seems to concede that a "balance of terror"
deters irresponsible action in many instances•
Since Sakharov endorses a quid pro quo between Western trade
and Soviet liberalization* it is not surprising that he applauded the

156 *
197U Jackson Amendment.

To Sakharov, Jackson’s proposal was a ’’moral

approach” consistent with ’’the ethical principles of American demo
cracy.”^
Reform Act.

Of course, the Kremlin eventually rejected the entire Trade
Many observers have concluded from this that ultimatums

to the Soviet Union are ineffective and counterproductive.
been the ’’lesson” of the Jackson Amendment episode.

Such has

The Amendment’s

rejection supposedly shows the futility of overt pressure as opposed
to quiet diplomacy.

Sakharov rejects this as a misreading of the

epis ode.
Senator Jackson’s proposal sought freer emigration for all
Soviet citizens, not just Jews.

"While most observers have pointed to

a recent reduction in emigration to ’’prove” the Amendment’s failure,
Sakharov notes that emigration of other ethnic groups has indeed increased since 197h»

Critics of the Jackson Amendment ignore other

important categories of emigration and select only the data that
support their case.

If the Jackson Amendment failed, Sakharov

argues, it did not do so because it interfered with Russian internal
37
affairs, but because the West lacked unity.
Disheartened by
America’s demand, the Kremlin found eager and more obliging customers
in, say, 'fofest Germany and France.

Had other Western states resolutely

supported the Jackson condition, Sakharov argues, the Amendment’s
success would have been assured.

The ’’lesson” of the episode is not

that conditions linking trade with human rights are ineffectual, but
that Western unity is necessary for effective pressure.

38

Sakharov rejects the view that support for human rights con
stitutes meddling in Soviet internal affairs.

When the Soviet leaders

157.
signed the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights in 19U8 and the
Helsinki agreement in 1975 > they themselves removed the human rights
issue from the sole province of internal affairs*

39

Far from meddling

in Russia’s domestic politics, the Jackson Amendment asked only that
the Soviets honor in practice -what they had already agreed to in
principle.

Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn concur in their view that the

phrase "internal affairs" is usually a facade for oppression.
The West must make the violation of human rights "a political
problem for the leaders of the culprit countries.’’^0

Predictably,

therefore, Sakharov is enthusiastic about President Jimmy Garter’s
verbal support for human rights• Even if such action constitutes
interference in internal affairs, Sakharov believes Garter’s policy
is noble.

Andrei Amalrik also shares Sakharov’s enthusiasm for

Garter’s stand.

'When American Communist Party leader Gus Hall visits

Leonid Brezhnev, no one complains.

Wien the Soviet press seethes with

indignation over the unspeakable cruelties inflicted upon Angela
Davis, there is no crisis.

When American imperialism and capitalism

is denounced in Pravda as racist, the world takes this in stride.

But

let the American President issue a statement deploring the suppression
of dissent, and listen to the barrage of criticism.
v

The double standard is as insidious as it is hypocritical.
Soviet criticism of America’s domestic politics is somehow permis
sible.

But any American statement bordering on criticism of police

state actions is thought to be naive, evangelical, moralistic,, and
dangerous!

Incredibly, the Soviet leaders assume an indignant pose

toward Carter’s remarks and, in the next breath, reserve for themselves

158*
the right to criticize America1s domestic policies.

Carl Linden* a

Servlet Affairs specialist at George Washington University* notes that
the Soviet rulers have "always felt free about attacking the founda
tions of Western democracy* so Carter's opening moves have really been
a matter of playing the Soviet's own game."
Not all dissidents share Sakharov's view.
Medvedev* for instance* disagrees.

The historian Roy

Like Solzhenitsyn* Medvedev

claims that Russia's fate will ultimately be decided by Russians* not
by outside pressure.

Western public opinion is too faddish and tran

sient to rely upon in pressing for liberalization.^
Medvedev argues* detente will spur democratization.

In the long run*
By offering em

barrassing ultimatums* the West jeopardizes the very detente
relationship which makes liberalization possible.
the Soviet rulers to reject the Jackson Amendment.

Medvedev expected
Continued Western

pressure will only cause a reversion to a Cold War-type of situation
and will reinforce the seige mentality which Sakharov dislikes.
Medvedev believes that Sakharov's open support for the Jackson
Amendment was a "tactically wrong" step.

Such action will only in

furiate the Soviet rulers and cause them to tighten the screws at home.
Instead* Medvedev notes that a new Soviet Constitution is being drafted
and that the authors "cannot avoid" making the right of free emigra
tion a part of the new document • American economic pressure* Medvedev
notes* did not moderate Cuban radicalism.

Given this fact* Medvedev

argues* the idea that witholding credits and technology will induce
Soviet reform is pure fantasy.

Overt pressure will only hinder* not

advance* the goal of democratization.

) "3
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Andrei Amalrik comes to Sakharov’s defense against Medvedev.
The West can induce same change within the Soviet Union* Amalrik be
lieves* even if he disagrees with Sakharov over the extent of that
change.

In any event* Amalrick refuses to accord Roy Medvedev the

status of "dissident."

"In reality*" Amalrik notes* "everything

that Medvedev says meets almost completely the official Soviet
views."
Ad hominem arguments are not the only weapons Amalrik uses to
impale Medvedev’s view.

Medvedev calls Sakharov’s support of the

Jackson Amendment unwise because this action antagonizes the regime
and prompts the Soviet leaders to tighten the screws.

Taken to its

logical conclusion* however* Medvedev's argument militates against
any expression of dissent.
Party.

No doubt the dissidents antagonize the

Should the movement thus disband* lest it hurt Brezhnev's

feelings and forestall reform?

Medvedev's "logic" really calls for

silencing all dissidents* and Amalrik refuses to join Medvedev's leap
of faith regarding voluntary reform.
Aside from Western pressure* Sakharov sees hope for world
peace in the process of convergence between East and West.

Because of

common needs for industrialization and modernization* a new managerial
class has emerged within the respective societies. As ideological
fervor gives way to a preoccupation with technical problems* the So
viet and American societies will grow to resemble each other.

In both

systems* the new elites will demand more consumer goods* forcing
society to demilitarize.

With education* the technical class will spurn

the Party slogans and demand reform.

As the systems' converge* radi

calism subsides* democratic values spread* consumer demand prevails*

160.
and world peace is promoted.

Such, at least, is Sakharov’s theory.

"When he speaks of the ’’inevitable process of rapprochement between the
two systems,” Sakharov implies that even without the dissident move
ment, democratization is inevitable.^

Since they face similar prob

lems, the capitalist and socialist systems must freely borrow
)7
’’positive elements” from each other.
In this respect, convergence
represents a new synthesis between East and West.

Sakharov’s ana

lytical style thus retains some aspects of Hegelian thought.
and convergence represent two roads to the same goal.

Detente

To Sakharov,

convergence is an inexorable process leading to liberalization.

But

through Western pressure and internal dissent, democratization may
progress long before convergence reaches fruition.
Western Leftism
Too often Western! intellectuals exhibit what Sakharov calls
}P,
’’Leftist-liberal faddishness.”
Both Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn are
critical of Western leftism, but the latter dissident is much more
bitter.

This faddishness displays itself when Western liberals apply

one set of values to socialist systems and an entirely different set of
values to capitalist systems.

The human rights issue is one example.

Western leftists, Sakharov believes, are much too gullible in accepting
at face value the claims of socialist states. Any information con
flicting with their preconceptions is dismissed as reactionary.
Illustrative of Western liberals1s hypocrisy is the issue of
America’s intervention in Vietnam, Sakharov argues.

Sakharov has long

been consistent in his opposition to America’s hole in Vietnam.

Yet

161,
Sakharov notes that many Western liberals -who condemned America1s in
volvement as immoral "did not notice" reprehensible acts committed by
li9
the Viet Cong against other Vietnamese.
Mass executions of civil
ians in Hue, systematic terror against villagers suspected of
collaboration— these atrocities were committed by the "progressive
forces" while the left’s moralistic critique fell to a hush.
The Chilean Pinochet regime is routinely condemned in the
world press, in the United Nations, and by nearly every government.
But no condemnation is heard regarding Cambodia, *where the Khmer Rouge
"liberators" have killed approximately 1.2 million people.

$0

n

Compare

this to the groundswell of outrage when President Nixon ordered an
invasion of Cambodia in 1970*

If Western liberals are truly concerned

about human rights, Sakharov asks, what explains the selectivity of
their outrage?
Sakharov does not argue that atrocity justifies atrocity.
Rather, he is trying to introduce some perspective and a measure of
consistency to the human rights issue.

The left generally exhibits

neither perspective (unless it be their own narrow one) nor consis
tency, he believes.

How simple the left’s approach is!

the left and here is the right.

Here is

On one side we have our good dic

tatorships, on the other side the intolerable tyrannies.

On one side

we have our "progressive elements," on the other side the "reac
tionary forces."

Leftist tyranny is written off as a growing pain of

those regimes combatting "neo-colonialism."

Rightist oppression must

be fought, however. .Sakharov certainly does not pillory all Western
liberals on this score, but he nevertheless sees shallowness as a
prominent trait.

162,
What causes this "leftist-liberal faddishness"?
offers four suggestions.
of young radicals.

Sakharov

First, much of the Western left is made up

The ardor for revolution per se seems to override

a systematic concern for human rights.
seems to be an unexciting task.

To young leftists, the latter

Second, faddishness is compounded

by a reluctance on the part of older people to appear to be oldfashioned.

Novelty starts to take precedence over consistency.

M o d e m societies exalt youth and denigrate agedness.
ionable is more tempting than what is principled.

What is fash

A third reason for

Western gullibility is found in the distorted information received
from communist states.
Finally, Sakharov notes that "often it is not the more logical
idea that takes precedence but ephemeral notions that are more ex51

travagant and easier to grasp."

Tet this view contradicts

Sakharov’s earlier justification for intellectual freedom, i.e., the
argument that such liberty is needed in order to destroy mass myths
in the "marketplace of ideas."

The race for credibility is not al

ways given to the logical or true, but to the plausible and the
inaccurate.

Such a view lands a roundhouse blow to Sakharov’s con

fidence that enlightened ideas will prevail.

In such a way does

Sakharov unwittingly demolish one of the liberal assumptions under
lying his proposals.
Amalrik on East-West Relations
Amalrik shares Solzhenitsyn’s concern over the West’s demise
but, unlike the novelist, Amalrik does not see the West, in almost
certain decline.

He speaks of the West’s "faltering self-confidence,"

163*and views the current preoccupation with human rights as a moral boost
for the West.

Dissidents defend those values which have always been

the Westfs moral foundation.

Supporting the democratic opposition in

the Soviet Union is thus in the West's best interest.

52

Soviet dis

sent helps to humanize communism elsewhere, inspiring groups such as
Euro communists to act independently of Moscow.
-Americans reflect much of the naivete of the reformist
ideologists as well.

Amalrik argues that the United States sees Russia

as a status quo power, not a revolutionary force.

With increased

trade, tourism, and Western influences, Russians will become "just
like us," Americans believe.

American opinions regarding the Soviet

Union derive from hopes and not realism, Amalrik argues.

He urges

Americans to recognize the Soviet Union as an aggressive state which
will never be "just like us."
But a new Gold War is not the answer.

Rather, the West

should seek detente, but a different type of detente.

Amalrik!s

ideal would differ from the current relaxation of tensions.
✓
detente requires Soviet democratization.

Genuine

Just how much democrat

ization Amalrik would require is unclear, but toleration of dissent
is surely one condition.

Without an affinity of values between the

two systems, detente will be meaningless.

Western diplomats should

watch for the Soviets to respect basic human rights.

Otherwise

detente will degenerate into a cynical modus vivendi and will not be
much different from the Cold War.

Amalrik admits that he is

!

skeptical toward the possibility of any cultural affinity.
less, he argues, rapprochement should still be the goal.

Neverthe

16U,
Lacking in Amalrik’s discussion is Sakharov’s urgent tone.
The historian clearly does not share Sakharov’s worry over nuclear
war.

Amalrik also favors more aggressive Western pressure in order

to induce Soviet respect for human rights• Here Amalrik differs with
Solzhenitsyn and Roy Medvedev, both of whom argue that Western pres
sure on Russia would be ineffectual, if not counterproductive.

Western

leverage includes withholding from Russia credits, technology, and
food.
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Amalrik thus ventures beyond Sakharov’s linkage, which em

braces technology embargoes but which rejects credit and food cut-offs
on humanitarian grounds.

It is also important to note that while

Sakharov believes that Western pressure can speed Russia on her path
toward the New Enlightenment, Amalrik has no such ambition.

The best

that any linkage can do is to make Russia more peaceable toward the
West, a bit more tolerant as a society.

But Amalrik denies that

-*

Western pressure can rebuild Russian society in the image of some
grand and new system.
The Dissident Debate
That the dissident movement is heterogeneous can be easily
seen from the dialogue between Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov.

Respec

tively, they are leaders among the creative and scientific
intelligentsia.

In his horror over Solzhenitsyn’s vision of Russia’s

future, Sakharov joined many Western liberals.

Though he acknowledged

Solzhenitsyn’s unequalled status as a writer, Sakharov had many
objections to Solzhenitsyn’s political views.
Specifically, Sakharov claims that by exaggerating the role
of ideology, Solzhenitsyn misanalyzes the Soviet system.

Even if

165.

the rulers renounced ideology, Sakharov argues, no genuine reform will
be forthcoming without a corresponding diffusion of governmental power.
Concentration of authority, not Marxism, is the root evil of the Soviet
system.

As long as men function in a climate of conformity, it is use

less to discard ideology.

To Sakharov, the major Russian problem is

the ’’barrack-square” mentality cultivated by authoritarian regimes.
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Thus does Sakharov readily endorse the model of Western-style parlia
mentary democracy for Russia.

Ideology is not the main problem, for

most Soviet citizens privately scoff at it.
Solzhenitsyn retorts that ideology is the root problem.

If no

one believes in this dogma, yet all submit to it, this shows the
frightening power of communist ideology.
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Russia’s political history

has been characterized by concentrated political power, and people
lived quite well.

Soviet cruelties dwarf the calamities of past

centuries not because of authoritarianism, but because of the callous
ideology.

More than any other people, Russians have suffered at the

hands of this tyranny.

Thus, it is only just that the Russians gain

some respite by turning inward and focusing on their own problems.
Sakharov counters that all nationalities, not merely the
Russians, have suffered.
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akin to national chauvinism.

Solzhenitsyn’s lament for the Russians is
Crimean Tatars, Ukrainian nationalists,

the Baltic peoples— these groups have suffered too, yet they are ex
cluded from Solzhenitsyn's scheme.

In turn, Solzhenitsyn reminds

Sakharov that he favors granting self-determination to all nationali
ties.

(Yet this contradicts one of his earlier objections to

democracy.

Refuting Sakharov’s call for liberal freedoms, Solzhenitsyn
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talks ominously of war between various nationalities.

Later, answer

ing Sakharov’s charge of Great Russian nationalism, Solzhenitsyn notes
that he favors full self-determination for all nationalities! Ob
viously, Solzhenitsyn cannot have it both ways.)
Russian nationalist, he insists.

He is no Great

"Whenever Russians stop hating each

other and speak of a spiritual rebirth, they are criticized for being
Great Russian chauvinists.

Again Solzhenitsyn distinguishes between

nationalism and chauvinism, between patriotism and lemming-like
obedience.
Sakharov also takes dead aim at his colleague's plan for the
Russian Northeast.

Developing this inhospitable wilderness, he argues,

is impossible without using that which Solzhenitsyn hates— technology
and Western capital.

Economic autarky, Solzhenitsyn’s goal, is in-

compatible with the aim of Northeast development.
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However much

virtue Solzhenitsyn sees in it, manual labor will never do the job.
And how will Solzhenitsyn lure able-bodied people to this austere
taiga, at bayonet point?
land scheme?

Is this not just another harebrained virgin

Citing the worst excesses of insustrial1zation, Solzhe

nitsyn proceeds to unfairly condemn all progress, all development, all
technology, all economic growth.
however.

The clock cannot be turned back,

If Solzhenitsyn is serious about developing the Northeast,

Sakharov argues, he must abandon his antiquated and misplaced bias
against all that is modern.
National introspection is not a desirable policy either, Sak
harov claims.

No major problem, such as disarmament, pollution, or

development, is solvable at the national level.

An international
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approach is necessary and world government'is one solution.

Contrasted

to Solzhenitsyn’s parochialism is Sakharov’s internationalism.

If the

famous author is in the Russophile tradition, the noted physicist is
closer to the 19th century Westernizer mold.
Convergence, not isolation, is Sakharov's alternative.

Un

like Solzhenitsyn, he is optimistic regarding the West’s ability and
willingness to use leverage and induce Soviet Liberalization,

But

Sakharov finds Solzhenitsyn’s cavalier acceptance of authoritarianism
frightening.
manticism."
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He accuses Solzhenitsyn of "patriarchal religious roWhat Solzhenitsyn offers is not an escape from ideology,

but rather one more utopian myth— the chimera of spiritual and material
salvation bases on primitive methods and aims. One more myth is the
last thing that this century needs.

Solzhenitsyn offers an unper

suasive response to the charge of patriarchy.

He simply claims that

he advocates no return to the past since "it’s clear to any normal
person that one can only move forward."

These criticisms, Solzhenitsyn

asserts, come from hack journalists who are used to writing only about
women’s fashions.

But Solzhenitsyn has a few criticisms of Sakharov’s

proposals as well.
Since Sakharov's is a global vision, he must compromise or at
least work with every group and ideology, Solzhenitsyn argues.

In

tolerance toward those beliefs deemed to be "Fascist, racist,
militaristic and demagogic" is incompatible with global reform.
once Sakharov supports peaceful coexistence.
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At

Without breaking stride,

he announces his refusal to work with extremist ideologies.

Solz

henitsyn asks what will happen if, in Sakharov’s brave new world, these
ideologies reappear.
ideas be censored?

Will the offendors be "liquidated"?

Will the

If they are not censored, is there not the risk
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that the ideas will gain more adherents?

If they are censored, has

Sakharov not trampled upon his own cherished ideal of intellectual
freedom?
And as for "leftist-liberal faddishness," Solzhenitsyn argues,
Sakharov is a prime example!

In his 1968 volume, Sakharov condemns

the internal policies of rightist regimes in Indonesia and Greece,
yet presents the "excesses" of his own country in a most indulgent
light.
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When he urges UW intervention to protect and support "pro

gressive elements" in other lands, Sakharov only paves the way for
more bloodshed, Solzhenitsyn argues.
Russia will only be changed by Russians, Solzhenitsyn em
phasizes, and Sakharov will be no more successful than Peter the
Great in transplanting Western traditions in Russia.

Multiparty

systems entail pettiness and squalor, Solzhenitsyn parries, and Sak
harov is merely mouthing his own weary brand of democracy.

The whole

notion of party and the factious temperament it introduces into
society is the problem, not the answer.
to the Russian tradition.

Democracy is inimical

Western assistance is nice, Solzhenitsyn

concedes, but it is also a fair-weather friend.

The West is too pre

occupied with its own problems to make a sustained press for Soviet
reform.
Sakharov is thus chasing a mirage, Solzhenitsyn argues.

When

Western public opinion tires of the dissident campaign and moves on
to dabble in another "cause," Sakharov will have wasted much time
that could have been spent on internal reform.
problems is a difficult enough task.

Solving Russia’s

Solving the world’s problems

gives Sakharov material for another book, but the idea that Russia
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or Sakharov can accomplish this is a flight of fancy.
Stylistically, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn vastly differ.
Solzhenitsyn is the impassioned Cassandra, the raging Lear.
harov is the moderate and occasionally pedantic Polonius.

Sak
In

apocalyptic terms, Solzhenitsyn warns of an East-West conflict.
Sakharov counters with his optimistic assessment of convergence as
the new ordering principle.

One man represents the suppressed

anger of the masses; the other voices the suppressed reasoning of
the intelligentsia.

6U

The dispute between them is remarkably free

of acrimony.
The same carrnot be said for the Amalrik-Medvedev dispute.
But Roy Medvedev is not the sole recipient of Amalrik’s criticism.
For instance, Amalrik views Solzhenitsyn as yet another ideologue.
Solzhenitsyn may claim to oppose all ideologies, but what he himself
offers is no different.

Amalrik considers Solzhenitsyn *s neo-Russo-

philism to be nothing more than "nationalism with a human face."
Solzhenitsyn1 literature, Amalrik argues, "contains the rudiments of
a ’complete world philosophy’ and will scarcely be tolerant of other
6<
ideologies."
In his eagerness to replace Marxism with a different
unifying belief, ‘Solzhenitsyn becomes what he hates— an ideologue.
There is little doubt that when Amalrik refers to naive
persons who accept the notion of "reformism," he has Andrei Sakharov
in mind.

Contrary to the physicist's hopes, the systems of East and

West are not converging.

Amalrik unfairly misrepresents and belittles

the convergence argument by referring to those who believe that
"foreign tourists, jazz records, and miniskirts will help to create

170.
66
a ’humane socialism.’”

The socialist and capitalist systems will

not grow to resemble each other.
Soviet Union.

Things are not getting better in the

Grandiose reform schemes are not practical.

this dissidents, Amalrik is the most fervent nay-sayer.

Of all

In question

ing the likelihood of progress, coexistence, and intellectual freedom
within the Soviet Union, Amalrik rejects much of Sakharov’s liberalism.
On many political issues, therefore, these three dissidents
are poles apart.

Their debate (and it is a debate, not an argument) is

emblematic of much of the dissonance within the dissident movement.
But this should not overshadow much common ground shared by these
thinkers. All three men agree on the need for change within the
Soviet Union.

Moreover, all three advocate an evolutionary rather

than revolutionary path for such change.

None of the three endorse

Marxism, though their reasons for this differ. Human values form the
foundation of their political perspectives• The substantive dispute
among these men reveals an entire philosophical spectrum, a spectrum
which corrects any mistaken notion of a monolithic dissident movement.
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CHAPTER VI

EPILOGUE
He who establishes a dictatorship and
does not kill Brutus , or he who founds a
republic and does not kill the sons of
Brutus, will only reign a short time.
Machiavelli Discourses
A man can be destroyed but not defeated.
Hemingway The Old Man and the Sea
That there is much dissonance within the dissident movement
should not be surprising.

One can hardly expect dissidents to endorse

freedom of discussion in principle and then avoid practicing it among
themselves. Contrast this with certain West European communist parties
which, by a vote of 1,700 to zero, claim to renounce the doctrine of
proletarian dictatorship.

1

Democracy is endorsed without a single

dissenting vote among 1,700 delegates.

These delegates now endorse

democracy as unanimously as they swore allegiance to proletarian dic
tatorship a mere year ago.

The tension between internal party

guidlines and party platforms, between democratic centralism and demo
cratic values, accounts for much of the skepticism toward Eurocommunism.
But this same tension can only revive confidence regarding the dissi
dents^ fidelity to ideals.
Dissidents practice among themselves what they preach in their
samizdat. Since truthfulness to oneself is a prominent dissident theme,
one must almost require that there be disagreement within the movement
177-
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itself.

Additionally, we are examining intelligent, free-spirited and

oftentimes temperamental men.

Within any group such as this there are

bound to be differences of opinion.

By being truthful to their own

ideals and by tolerating dissent within the movement, dissidents may
weaken their own campaign by a lack of consensus as to aims and methods.
Herein lies what may be the supreme irony of the dissident task:

to be

true to dissident ideals, the movement must be hamstrung by doctrinal
debate.
If dissidents formed a more disciplined group, if they enforced
more conformity on their colleagues, they might have a better chance of
effecting change.

In the process of this change, however, original

dissident values such as toleration and critical discussion would have
been betrayed.

In a sense, an emasculated political movement may be the

price that dissidents pay for fidelity to their ideals.

Anyway, the

dissidents lack the formality which effective reform needs.

To speak

of a dissident "movement" can be misleading, since the term embraces
disparate groups such as the Helsinki Monitoring Committee, Amnesty
International, Ukrainian nationalists, and the Committee for Human
Rights.

Various splinter groups comprise the movement and there is no

such thing as formal membership.
Yet the three dissidents discussed herein are united on many
points • All oppose the Soviet regime and condemn Stalin, even if they
cannot agree on whether the vozhd deserves the suffix "ism."

All re

ject Marxism, even if they differ in what they embrace in its place.
Individual liberty forms the cornerstone of their appeal.

Whether

they rely upon Soviet, natural or international law, the dissidents
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argue that the indivudual must not submit to "the collective."

All

three dissidents deplore nihilism, even if they disagree over what
values men are to hold.

All three desire a reform of Soviet society,

even if they disagree as to its likelihood.
It is important to reiterate that what we have examined is but
one small slice of a broad movement.

For instance, all three dissi

dents discussed herein are reformists, not revolutionaries.
not a point of consensus within the entire movement, however.

This is.
Certain

nationalist and fascist groups sanction violence as a means to resist
or change the state.
We have sought neither a "representative dissident" nor a
synthesis of dissident thought.

The first is a futile search; the

second a presumptuous and equally fruitless task.

But the fact that

we have examined so tiny a slice of the dissident movement only supports
our main thesis.

For if there is substantial disagreement among these

three dissidents, there is probably even more within the movement as a
whole.

Given such a dialogue within the movement’s moderate wing, one

can easily imagine the doctrinal discord within more extreme Maoist and
neo-Leninist groups.
If any central truth emerges from the dissident dialogue, per
haps it is the message that ideas are indomitable.

Pariahs to their

countrymen, misfits to many in the West, the dissidents speak to who
ever will listen.

Men may be lobotomized, exiled, or killed.

are not so easily obliterated, though.

Ideas

Soviet leaders hope against hope

that this is not the case.

They have thus expunged the word arkhipelag

from the Russian language.

Geographers must now use some euphemism

regarding a "group of small, far-flung islands."

2
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Of course, the Soviet leaders have also denounced "bourgeois"
terns such as "individualism" and "toleration."
live.

Yet these concepts

More than any of their predecessors, the current Soviet leader

ship tries to sustain at least the appearance of legality in its
actions.

The newest Constitution accords many liberties (even if it

conditions them all on obedience to the state).. In their rhetoric,
*the leaders appeal to democratic ideals.

"The pretense of democracy,"

writes Robert Strauz-Hupe, "is the compliment which tyranny pays to
freedom."

It is also the compliment which the regime pays to the

dissidents.
During World War II a Soviet counter-intelligence agent, Zoya
Kosmodemyanskaya, was captured by the Nazis and publicly executed.
Now a folk heroine in the Soviet pantheon, the woman died with words
that could well be the dissidents Ts motto and solace: "There are many
of us."
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